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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
LATE OTTOMAN MODERNIST/RATIONALIST DISCOURSES ON ISLAM: 
SUPERSTITION, SUFISM AND ŞEMSEDDİN GÜNALTAY 
 
 
Hakan Feyzullah Karpuzcu 
 
History, MA Thesis,2008 
 
Thesis Supervisor: Assistant Prof. Dr. Selçuk Akşin Somel 
 
Keywords: Şemseddin Günaltay, superstition, Sufi orders, true Islam, Islamism 
 
 
This study attempts to sketch a general picture of the late Ottoman 
conceptualizations of Islam through the preliminary observation of the ideas of M. 
Şemseddin (Günaltay), an important intellectual and political figure of the Ottoman 
Second Constitutional Period (1908-1918).  More specifically this thesis deals with 
why and how Şemseddin Günaltay devised an exclusionary rhetoric on Sufi orders and 
superstitions. In Şemseddin Günaltay‟s understanding of Islam, superstitions, folk 
beliefs and Sufi practices were represented as the “other” of the imagined “true Islam” 
as an essentialized and homogenized category. While the idea of “true Islam” was 
thereby identified by Şemseddin Günaltay with the notion of “natural religion” which 
was a product of the Western Enlightenment thought, it was streamlined as a 
rationalized, scientific and “privatized” religion. In this regard, this study argues that 
Şemseddin Günaltay‟s conception of Islam was in some ways emblematic of the late 
Ottoman patterns to understand and define religion. Therefore studying Şemseddin 
Günaltay‟s discourse on true Islam is on the one hand useful to analyze how Islam was 
undertaken as an ambiguous and functional entity for various social ends like adjusting 
Islam to the necessities of the time or devising some Islamic reform projects. On the 
other hand this might contribute to draw at least a partial picture of the underlying 
transformations in cognitive codes of the late Ottoman intellectual life as well as the 
new meanings Islam acquired. In order to fulfill these goals, this thesis focuses on 
Şemseddin Günaltay‟s intellectual production during the Second Constitutional Period.  
5 
 
ÖZET 
 
 
OSMANLI SON DONEMİNDE İSLAM‟A DAİR MODERNİST/RASYONALİST 
SÖYLEMLER: HURAFE, TASAVVUF VE ŞEMSEDDİN GÜNALTAY 
 
Hakan Feyzullah Karpuzcu 
 
Tarih, Yüksek Lisans, 2008 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Selçuk Akşin Somel 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Şemseddin Günaltay, hurafe, tarikatlar, gerçek İslam, İslamcılık 
 
Bu araştırma Osmanlı İkinci Meşrutiyet Döneminin (1908-1918) önemli 
entelektüel ve politik simalarından olan M. Şemseddin (Günaltay)‟ın fikirlerinin bir ilk 
incelemesi yoluyla geç Osmanlı dönemindeki İslam‟ı kavramsallaştırma çabalarının 
genel bir resmini çizmeye çalışmaktadır. Daha özelde ise bu tez çalışması Şemseddin 
Günaltay‟in niçin ve nasıl tarikatları ve hurafeleri dışlayıcı bir söylem geliştirdiğiyle 
ilgilenmektedir. Şemseddin Günaltay‟ın İslam anlayışında, hurafeler, halk inanışları ve 
belirli tasavvuf pratikleri özselleştirilmiş ve homojenleştirilmiş bir kategori olan 
mütehayyel “hakiki İslam” kavramının “ötekisi” olarak resmedilmektedir. Böylece 
hakiki İslam fikri Şemseddin Günaltay tarafından Batı Aydınlanma düşüncesinin bir 
ürünü olan “tabii din” nosyonu ile eşleştirilirken, aklileştirilmiş, bilimsel ve 
“özelleştirilmiş” bir din olarak kurgulanmaktadır. Bu çalışma Şemseddin Günaltay‟ın 
İslam kavramlaştırmasının belli yönlerden Osmanlı son döneminde İslam‟ı anlama ve 
tanımlama biçimlerine emsal teşkil ettiğini iddia etmektedir. Bu nedenle, bu çalışmanın 
amaçlarından birini oluşturan Şemseddin Günaltay‟ın “hakiki İslam” söyleminin 
incelenmesi bir yandan İslam‟ın nasıl muğlâk ve işlevsel bir hususiyet olarak, İslam‟ı 
zamanın gerekliliklerine uydurmak veya bazı İslami sosyal reform projelerini hayata 
geçirmek gibi muhtelif sosyal amaçlar için deruhte edildiğini analiz edebilmek adına 
faydalı olacaktır. Öte yandan, Osmanlı son döneminde İslam‟ın edindiği yeni anlamları 
ve entelektüel yaşantıda temelden gelişen birtakım bilişsel dönüşümleri kısmen de olsa 
resmetmeye katkı sağlayacaktır. Bu amaçlar doğrultusunda bu tez çalışması temel 
olarak Şemseddin Günaltay‟ın İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi‟ndeki entelektüel üretimine 
yoğunlaşmaktadır. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Popular beliefs and religious organizations, remarkably tarikats (Sufi orders), 
have long been one of the most controversial issues surrounded by a rhetoric of 
religious obscurantism and backwardness in contemporary Turkish social and political 
life. However, the disputed position of tarikats/tekkes (dervish lodges) and folk beliefs 
are not peculiar to the Republican discourses on religion but they have been a site of 
fervent discussions and negative representations in the late Ottoman public. The period 
following the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, called as Second Constitutional Period 
(1908-1918) has been generally perceived as a watershed for the flourishing of the 
intellectual production, ideological flows and discussions in the Ottoman Empire. 
Besides, Second Constitutional Period was also seminal for the outflow of discussions 
on religion, Sufi orders and superstitions. The articles with negative representations on 
tekkes and tarikats constituted a considerable amount, even – usually- in the journals 
published by devout Muslims, commonly called as Islamists. I think the criticisms and 
negative rhetoric on Sufi life and popular beliefs by the Islamist intellectuals of the 
period provide a fertile site to scrutinize the late Ottoman intellectual perceptions and 
contentions on Islam. Here the broad concern of this study is to observe the perceptions 
of Islam in relation to the representations of Sufi orders and superstitions in the Second 
Constitutional Era. 
Ottoman modernization starting from the 18
th
 century generated dramatic 
changes in the social fabric. A deeply buried structural transformation in the meaning 
and function of Islam during the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries of the Ottoman Empire 
was in the making. As Serif Mardin asserted, on the eve of the foundation of Turkish 
Republic (1923) Islam came to mean something different than it meant one century 
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earlier
1
. The outcomes of the changes in the very meaning of religion more or less 
crystallized in the intellectual context of the Second Constitutional Period. The aim of 
this study is thus to make a snapshot of the framework through which Islam was 
essentially and monolithically conceptualized in the Second Constitutional Period 
through preliminary observation of some of its basic dispositions. More specifically, I 
deal in this study with the intellectual enterprises to reshape Islam in its “authentic” 
form which found expression in the catchphrase of “true Islam” in the Second 
Constitutional Period. Due to the extent of this task, this study concentrates its attention 
on a particular exemplar, an “Islamist” intellectual of the period, M. Şemseddin 
(Günaltay) (1883-1961). I think his ideas provide a useful mounting to have a grasp of 
the uses and implications of the idea of true Islam as a monolithic and universal 
“religion” in the late Ottoman context. Similar to the Islamist trend in the Second 
Constitutional Era, some Sufi beliefs, rites and values, which were denounced as 
corrupted and folk beliefs imbued with superstitions were excluded from the content of 
Şemseddin Günaltay‟s ideal true Islam.  
There are three basic reasons for me to opt for Şemseddin Günaltay for this 
study. First, Günaltay may simply be seen as a representative of a group of “modernist 
Islamist” intellectuals of the period. In this sense, although some recent studies put 
some doubt about the Islamist nature of Şemseddin Günaltay‟s thought2, his ideas are I 
think indicative of the Islamist thinking during the Second Constitutional Period, in its 
modernist orientation. It must be reminded that a group of devout intellectuals and 
ulema (Islamic scholars) gathered around some journals of the Second Constitutional 
Period like Sırat-ı Müstakim (means Straight Path; named as Sebilürreşad in 1912), 
Islam Mecmuasi or Beyanu’l Hak and involved into an intellectual production in the 
defense and favor of Islam have been commonly regarded as Islamists. One of the 
unique features of Second Constitutional Period Islamism in its modernist form was the 
foothold that modern ideas and intellectual orientations gained, like the trust in modern 
science and rationality; and the effort at the side of Islamists to reconcile the ideas and 
                                                 
1 Serif Mardin, Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of 
Bediuzzaman Said Nursi. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), p. 105. 
2 For an example of this view, see Fahrettin Altun, “M. Semseddin Günaltay” in 
Modern Turkiye’de Siyasi Dusunce, Cilt 6: Islamcilik, ed. Yasin Aktay, (Istanbul: 
Iletisim Yayinlari, 2001), 160.  
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values assumed to be modern and Islamic. Günaltay‟s intellectual make-up with his 
strong rationalist, scientist and modernist leanings in this respect presents a fruitful 
example to see the syncretic nature of “Islamic modernism” of the Second 
Constitutional Period as a mélange of modernist and Islamist tendencies. 
In this respect Şemseddin Günaltay is not only reflective of the characteristics 
of “Islamic modernist” trend in the Second Constitutional Era but also one can grasp 
through his ideas an overall register of the scientist, rationalist, social Darwinist and 
also modern Salafi
3
 discourses due to his position at a vantage point of various 
discursive networks and intellectual trends. Namely, he can be recognized as a linchpin 
through which the transformation in the meaning and functions of Islam in the late 
Ottoman context can be better scrutinized. Therefore examination of Islam‟s 
conceptualizations through Günaltay‟s ideas is instrumental to understand the hybrid 
nature of the conception of true Islam woven within a syncretic intellectual and cultural 
context made up by the reciprocal influences of what might be designated as the 
modern and the Islamic. Therefore, his position is practically important to better 
comprehend the “rationalization” and “essentialization” of the conception of Islam. For 
the examination of Günaltay‟s ideas on true Islam in my opinion makes it more 
convenient to follow the traces of the reinterpreted Islamic references and symbols, 
Enlightenment rationalist and scientist discourses as well as the penetration of 
Salafi/Islamic modernist thought into the Ottoman intellectual life.  
Secondly, I think Günaltay‟s views on Sufism and superstitions provide us with 
a useful pattern of the common Islamist discourses on the popular/folk beliefs in the 
Second Constitutional Period and the related emphasis on the notion of “true Islam”. In 
these discourses, some popular beliefs were counted as superstitions and were brought 
under biting criticisms by Islamists. This challenge was associated with a 
stigmatization of some supposedly distorted beliefs/values, rites and life styles in 
popular religious orders. I prefer to call these negating discourses during this study as 
“anti-Sufi” and “anti-superstition” criticisms/discourses. Some correlations between 
superstitions and Sufi orders were established and the anti-Sufi and anti-superstition 
                                                 
3 The term modern Salafi thought was generally used to describe 19
th
 and early 20
th
 
century Islamist reformist movement that proposed to reform Islam in the light of the 
Islam of the pious forefathers (Salaf). The major figures of this reformist trend were 
generally seen as Jamaladdin Afghani, Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida.  
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discourses were interchangeably used in the Islamists‟ contemplations. Superstitions 
and degenerate Sufism were believed not only to diverge from pristine Islam but also to 
corrupt the “spirit of Islam”, thereby inhibit the progress of Muslim societies and cause 
them to decline. Therefore, the trouble of Sufism and superstitions turned into macro 
scale socio-political problems of Muslim survival and progress in the Islamist 
discourses. But also I try to examine via Günaltay‟s ideas in this study how the 
superstitions and degenerate Sufism were instrumentally depicted as “un-Islamic” to 
keep the unwelcome elements in the folk beliefs out of the imagined true Islam and 
thus to keep its purity. In this juncture, the criterion to single out the superstitions and 
false Sufi traditions had been compatibility of these folk belief elements with the 
demands of the time, namely modern knowledge, science and rationality. Günaltay‟s 
ideas in this respect are of use to observe how Islam was rationalized and its basic 
tenets were stretched to a great extend in line with the rising values of a new 
intellectual Weltanschauung of the period. Therefore the flexibility of the idea of true 
Islam also signifies both the detachment of this conception from the traditional 
mechanisms to bound Islam, and its practical availability to be used for various social 
and political ends. In this regard, Günaltay‟s views are instrumental to realize this 
functionality of the concept of true Islam. To give an example, his turn towards a 
Turkish nationalist political view following the foundation of republic (1923) was 
reflected in his contemplation of true Islam in conformity with a nationalist ethos. 
Third, Günaltay‟s political and intellectual career makes him an important 
carrier of the mentioned discourses and ideas; therefore a remarkable agent of the 
paradigmatic shift in the sociality of religion. He was a major Islamic modernist 
intellectual of the Second Constitutional Period and had close affiliations with the 
Young Turk party Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) which administered the 
empire during the Second Constitutional Period. Günaltay occupied important positions 
both during the late Ottoman and Republican era. He was a deputy both from CUP in 
1910s and for years from the People‟s Republican Party, the official political party 
during the early Republican period. Let us not forget that he served as prime minister of 
Turkish Republic from 1949 to 1950. He also actively participated in religious reform 
plans of the Republic in 1920s and Republican projects of official history-writing. 
These connections depict Şemseddin Günaltay‟s quite influential role in the intellectual 
and political arena of Turkey and his close affinities with the CUP might shed some 
13 
 
light on CUP‟s approach to Islam. In this regard the discursive analysis of Şemseddin 
Günaltay‟s ideas with a special focus on the construction of an essentialized and 
purified “real Islam” may suggest modest insights about the instrumental role of Islam 
during the Second Constitutional Period. They might also help us to roughly make 
sense of the epistemological and ontological (social) ethos underpinning the formation 
of the Republican official discourses.  
One of the main incentives behind my decision to start this research was to go 
beyond the dominant trends in the academic studies dealing with Islam and history of 
ideas in the late Ottoman context. The academic works studying the changes in the 
Islamic structures in the late Ottoman history have been mostly preoccupied with the 
political and economical dimensions of the issue. Comparatively little attention was 
paid to studying Islam sociologically with an emphasis on its cognitive and conceptual 
make-up. This study therefore attempts to put emphasis on the change in 
conceptualization and definition of Islam in the late Ottoman context. However, this 
does not mean a theological reexamination of the conception of Islam. Rather, it 
involves, through the scrutiny of Şemseddin Günaltay‟s ideas, an assessment of how 
religion came to be perceived and what were some of the intellectual orientations that 
these perceptions signified. In other words, it is important to inquire the perceptions 
about the nature of Islam and their rhetorical outcomes in order to analyze the 
ideological, cultural and political motivations for and repercussions of these 
definitional approaches. This study therefore intends to brush a tangential picture of the 
very context and the Weltanschauung upon which Şemseddin Günaltay based his 
conception of true Islam. 
On the other hand, during the research process what I came to realize was the 
important impacts of the 19
th
 century religious and intellectual changes, especially 
during the Abdulhamid period, on the subject of this study. Namely, these changes 
were conducive not only to the cultivation of Şemseddin Günaltay‟s ideas but also to 
the formation of the intellectual/cognitive ground his ideas were based on. In the works 
on Ottoman Islamism continuities between the Second Constitutional Period and the 
period prior to Second Constitutional Period have not usually been given the emphasis 
14 
 
they deserve
4
 and Islamism has been studied as a movement confined to the Second 
Constitutional Period. Actually the new cast of Islam that I mentioned to be important 
in the very framework to conceptualize an essentialized religion was already in the 
making during the Tanzimat (1839-1876) and especially Hamidian period (1876-1909) 
and was not idiosyncratic to Second Constitutional Period. Tanzimat reforms, the 
change in the position of ulema during the 19
th
 century, Islamic ideas of Young 
Ottomans and Islamist policies of the Abdulhamid period had already created a 
“reified” Islamic understanding prior to the Islamist movement of the Second 
Constitutional Period. In that respect, Second Constitutional Period Islamism and 
Şemseddin Günaltay were genuinely indebted the very basis of their ideas to the 
preceding transformations within the Ottoman religious context. 
Another important structural influence was the formation of a new 
Weltanschauung on the eve of the 20
th
 century in the Ottoman intellectual landscape 
which resulted in the emergence of a new type of intellectual with a new “cognitive 
currency” to interpret the world. The interactions with the Western culture and thought, 
education in the Tanzimat and Abdulhamid periods were some of the crucial 
developments of the 19
th
 century that made their imprint on the formation of a 
progressive and temporal intellectual mind valued science, reason, progress and natural 
laws and helped the creation of a more rationalized and standardized way of 
understanding Islam. These helped to spin the intellectual fabric within which new 
Islamic understanding was given a shape. The formative influences of the Tanzimat and 
Abdulhamid period both in the function and meaning of Islam and in the intellectual 
groundwork will be taken as seminal to the formation of the very context and the 
Weltanschauung upon which Şemseddin Günaltay based his conception of true Islam. 
This is why this study reserves a special section for a brief account of these prior 
developments.  
It should be also reminded that the examination of the ideas of Şemseddin 
Günaltay is instrumental in this study to take a particular outlook of the new “cognitive 
currency” through which Islam was conceived. Specifically, this study is forged to 
                                                 
4 Some seminal works on Ottoman Islamism were written by Tarik Zafer Tunaya and 
Ismail Kara; and these works more or less underrate the impact of the pre-1908 period 
on the formation of Islamist thought.  
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scrutinize the implicit relation between Günaltay‟s exclusive representation of 
superstitions, popular/folk beliefs and Sufi life, and the conception of Islam claimed to 
be authentic and true. How Günaltay‟s exclusive depiction of superstitions and Sufi 
practices came to be instrumental to construct an essence of so-called “true Islam” in 
Günaltay‟s discourses will be examined in this study. Then this study on Günaltay‟s 
views, which mean more than ideas of an individual, seems useful to sketch a rough 
picture of the changes in the Islamic tradition and social cognitive codes during the 
Second Constitutional Period. Understanding the basic outlines of the conception of 
true Islam is also crucial to discern the instrumentality of this conception and the 
implications of this instrumentality. So to speak, this makes Islam more malleable for 
social and political ends as a rhetorical, ideological tool. As was the case for Şemseddin 
Günaltay, the practical outcomes of this instrumentalization might be to become able to 
modify Islam in line with the necessities of the time or to meet the challenges leveled 
against Islam as well as to forge some Islamic reform projects. 
This study directs its attention on Günaltay‟s writings published during the 
Second Constitutional Period. The particular reason of this selection is the expectation 
of this study to explore basic dispositions of a perspective for understanding and 
constructing religion during the Second Constitutional Period. That is due to the 
conviction of this study that Second Constitutional Period presented the most 
remarkable crystallization of this perspective if not the sole period in which such a 
perspective was forged or can be noticed. Observing the tendency to an essentialized 
understanding of religion specifically in Second Constitutional Period is also related to 
the transitional and constitutive place of this period towards the Republic. Günaltay‟s 
ideas of the Ottoman period might open a path to the examination of the general 
ideological trends and intellectual currents, namely the Zeitgeist, of the Second 
Constitutional Period, that carved the discursive content of the Republican ideology. 
On the other hand, the preference for studying the writings of Günaltay during the 
Second Constitutional Period is also related to the convenience to observe the Islamist 
reformist tone that constituted the backbone of his ideology more saliently. The 
Islamist complexion in his intellectual works conspicuously disappears with the 
Republican period.  
Here in this study I would like to carry out my analysis through the textual 
analysis of Günaltay‟s works since my intention is to unravel the discourses on Islam 
16 
 
and representations of Sufism and superstitions in Günaltay‟s writings.  I will mainly 
conduct my analysis over two prominent books of Günaltay, published in the Second 
Constitutional Period: Zulmetden Nura
5
 (From Darkness to Truth) and Hurafatdan 
Hakikate
6
 (From Superstitions to Truth). In order to look for the change in his views 
after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, I will also try to make some correlations with 
another book: Maziden Atiye
7
 (From Past to Future). These are almost the sole books 
reflecting his political and ideological views. His other works are academic and mostly 
introductory history books or textbooks. Here I think it should be also reminded that 
Zulmetten Nura is a collection of Şemseddin Günaltay‟s articles published in Sırat-ı 
Müstakim and later Sebilürreşad that were mostly written prior to and during the 
Balkan Wars (1912-13) and the beginning of the World War I (1914-1918). The book 
seems to be designed by Günaltay to outline the backbone of his social reform plan 
ingrained within an Islamist and rationalist/modernist understanding. In this regard, 
Zulmetten Nura systematically exposes the reasons of the decline/decay in the Ottoman 
Empire and the Muslim world. Hurafattan Hakikate was devised to historically unfold 
the emergence of superstitions within the Islamic culture. Maziden Atiye in this respect 
can be interpreted as a clear divergence in Günaltay‟s frame of thinking from a more 
salient Islamist position to an overtly Turkist viewpoint. The study of these works is 
sufficient to reflect the general outlook of Günaltay‟s social and political thought in the 
Second Constitutional Period since they not only constitute almost all of his writings 
during this period but also these are the bulk of his written works with ideological and 
political content. 
Here I think brief information about Semsettin Gunaltay‟s life and intellectual 
profile might shed light on why he was selected in this thesis to study. I will also try to 
give a very short review on the academic works written on Gunaltay.  
                                                 
5 From now on in this study the name of the book will be used as Zulmetten Nura. 1
st
 
and 2
nd
 editions of the book were published in 1915, 3
rd
 edition with some major 
changes in 1925. 
6 From now on in this study the name of the book will be used as Hurafattan Hakikate. 
The book was published in 1916. 
7 Published in 1923. 
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Born in 1883, in the Eastern Anatolian city of Erzincan, Şemseddin Günaltay 
was the son of a muderris, an Islamic professor in the medrese (Islamic school). He 
both had a classical Islamic education together with the study of Arabic and Persian, 
and a “modern” professional education in the rusdiyes (secondary school) and idadis 
(high school) established by Abdulhamid II in Istanbul. He graduated from the fen 
(science) branch of the High Academy of Teachers (Dar-ul Muallimin-i Aliye) in 1905. 
Later he went to France and then he was sent to University of Lausanne in Switzerland 
by the government to study physical sciences in 1909. Upon his return, he instructed in 
high schools and after 1909 he started to write for Sırat-ı Müstakim and later for 
Sebilürreşad, the most prominent Islamic journal of the 2nd Constitutional period. In 
these journals he wrote articles mostly about social concerns relating to Islam, 
modernity, advancement of society and Westernization, emphasizing themes of science 
and progress. After 1913, he also started to write in Islam Mecmuasi, the Islamic 
journal published by the intellectuals with Islamic nationalist tendencies and known 
with their affinities to CUP including Ziya Gokalp
8
. It is commonly argued that he was 
highly influenced by his personal interactions and conversations with Ziya Gokalp after 
1915
9
. He collected his articles written in Sebilürreşad, especially before and after the 
Balkan Wars (1912-1913), in his renowned book, Zulmetten Nura
10
 (From Darkness to 
Light). The first and second editions of this book were published in 1915. The 3rd 
edition of the book was published after the foundation of the Republic in 1925 with 
                                                 
8
 Kamil Sahin, “Şemseddin Günaltay”, Turkiye Diyanet Vakfi Islam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 
14 (Istanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi Genel Müdürlüğü, 1996), 
286-288. 
9 Ibid, 286. Serif Mardin, Bediuzzaman, 144. 
10
 Zulmetten Nura in its latest edition consisted of some of the articles starting from the 
198
th
 (1910) to 387
th
 (1916) issues of Sebilürreşad. For further information see 
Abdullah Ceyhan, Sırat-ı Müstakim ve Sebilürreşad Mecmualari Fihristi (Ankara: 
Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi Yayinlari, 1991), 413-416. Günaltay claims in the preface of 
the book that it was received with great attention and first and second editions were 
sold more than a few thousands. The book also reflects the traumatic experiences of the 
Balkan Wars with a sentimental and pejorative nationalistic rhetoric and anti-
imperialist and anti-Western stance. Şemseddin Günaltay, Zulmetten Nura, (Istanbul: 
Furkan Yayinlari, 1998), 98. 
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minor but salient changes to its content
11
. This book mainly focused on the situation in 
the Ottoman society of its time and Islam in the face of modernity and West with dense 
emphasis on material progress, civilization and science, superstitions and corruptions in 
the society. 
Gunaltay joined in the Istanbul University (Darülfünun) Literature Department 
as a Turkish and Islamic history lecturer in 1914 and published another important book, 
Hurafattan Hakikate
12
 (From Superstition to Truth) in 1916. In 1915, he was elected as 
Bilecik deputy in the Ottoman National Assembly from CUP and thus went on his 
political career as a deputy from 1923 to 1954 in Cumhuriyet Halk Firkasi (Republican 
People‟s Party), the official party of the Republic established by Mustafa Kemal 
(Ataturk). In 1924, he started as a lecturer of Islamic history in the Faculty of 
Theology, at Darülfünun and in 1925 he was appointed as the dean of the faculty
13
.  
During the Republican period, he took part in various reform plans of the 
government including the 1928 religious reform project and took some political duties. 
He was selected a founding member for the Turkish Institute of History in 1931, and 
after 1941 until his death in 1961, he held the chair of the institute. He also participated 
in the commission to write history textbooks that were instructed in high schools from 
1931 to 1950 but these books were severely criticized as a result of the misinformation 
they contained about Islamic history
14
. He also actively participated in 1930 in the 
writing of official history thesis of the Republican regime known as Turk tarih tezi 
(Turkish history thesis)
15
. Between 1949 and 1950, he became the prime minister of 
Turkey from RPP and later took other important positions in the party. Crucial steps in 
                                                 
11
 Kamil Sahin, 286-288; Ismail Kara, Turkiye’de Islamcilik Dusuncesi 2, (Istanbul: 
Kitabevi Yayinlari, 1997), 563-565; Hilmi Ziya Ulken, Turkiye’de Cagdas Dusunce 
Tarihi, (Istanbul: Ulken Yayincilik, 2005), 395. 
12 This book was also consisted of his writings in Sırat-ı Müstakim and Sebilürreşad 
starting from 1910. For further details look at Abdullah Ceyhan, 413-416. 
13 Kamil Sahin, 286-287. 
14 Ibid, 286-287. 
15 One interesting feature of this nationalistic thesis is its quite phobic and exclusionary 
narrative towards the Islamic background of Turkish people and Turkey. 
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religious education like inclusion of optional courses of religion in high school 
education; establishment of courses for imam and preachers; and foundation of first 
theology faculty (after the abolition of theology faculties) in Ankara University were 
taken during Günaltay‟s prime ministry. In 1954 elections, he was not elected deputy 
but prior to his death in 1961 he was selected senator of Istanbul from RPP
16
. 
Günaltay‟s intellectual production concerning Islam, social problems and 
modernity intensified in the last decade of the Ottoman Empire, mainly in the 1910s 
and the early years of the Republican era (1923-1925). These years of his career 
reflects a more enthusiastic and idealist intellectual profile. As a prolific writer in this 
period of his life, similar to various Islamic modernists, he endeavored to devise a 
project of Islamic revision and reform compatible with modern institutions and 
scientific developments. The imprint of Ziya Gokalp‟s views can be also felt in his 
writings in terms of a turn towards a social solidarist and nationalist understanding with 
an apparent esteem in Durkheimian sociology
17
. 
However his academic and political career and the new emerging political 
context of the Republic seem to pull him back from his reformist intellectual idealism. 
A radical change in the methodology and content of his writings after the establishment 
of Republic can be noticed, similar to the change or silence in intellectual production of 
a number of ex-ulema (Islamic scholars) and Islamist intellectuals. In other words, in 
the intellectual level, he appropriated a more academic and apolitical style of writing 
and diverted his attention to studies on Islamic and pre-Islamic Turkic history with a 
conspicuously nationalistic tone. The issues dealing with reforming and modifying the 
prevalent forms of Islam in the society found less voice in his writings in this later 
period. This was probably due to the seemingly contrary nature of Islamist idealism to 
the secular and to some extent anti-Islamist policies of the Republican regime. 
However, politically he eagerly participated in the revolutionary projects of the 
Republic. In this regard Mardin calls him as a former cleric who went over to the 
                                                 
16
 Hilmi Ziya Ulken, Turkiye’de Cagdas Dusunce Tarihi, 395. 
17 Serif Mardin, Bediuzzaman, 144. 
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Republican forces
18
. This case, I think, depicts his ideological ability and flexibility to 
conform to the practices and philosophy of the Republic. 
As a founding member of Turk Tarih Kurumu (Turkish History Institution) in 
1931, and later as its chairman, his active participation in the process of the 
development of the Turk tarih tezi, in the writing of official history textbooks or his 
participation in Islamic reform project of the Republic in 1928 is a good example of 
this adaptability
19
. This is in my opinion indeed related to the accommodating nature of 
his intellectual stance which enables him to adjust to the changes in the political 
context. Hence I think he can easily come to terms with the ideals of the Republican 
elite. On the one hand, probably he had already shared some basic underlying premises, 
like positivism, scientism, and rationalism, of the Republican ideology that their native 
versions had been sculpted in the context of the late Ottoman intellectual life. On the 
other hand, his exclusionary interpretation of the popular Islamic beliefs and Sufi 
orders may be comparatively interpreted with the understanding of Islam in the 
Republican ideology. In this study I will mainly focus on Ottoman period of his 
intellectual life and its affiliations with the Republican ideology in regard to Islam. This 
is mostly due to the convenience to observe the Islamist reformist tone more saliently 
during the Second Constitutional Period that constituted the backbone of his ideology 
extending to the Republican period. Furthermore, his ideas of the Ottoman period 
might open a path to the examination of the general ideological trends and intellectual 
currents of the Second Constitutional Period that carved the discursive content of the 
Republican ideology. 
Şemseddin Günaltay has been generally perceived as an important intellectual 
and political figure of late Ottoman and Turkish history. This perception is one of the 
reasons for the substantial academic works written on Şemseddin Günaltay‟s thought. 
His active participation in politics and official history-writing projects during the 
Republican period as a generally agreed upon Islamist intellectual of the Ottoman 
Empire makes him perceived not only as a crucial figure but also a puzzling intellectual 
                                                 
18 Serif Mardin, Religion, Society and Modernity in Turkey, (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse 
University Press, 2006), 234. 
19
 Kamil Sahin, 286-288. Ismail Kara, Turkiye’de Islamcilik Dusuncesi 2, 563-565. 
Hilmi Ziya Ulken, Turkiye’de Cagdas Dusunce Tarihi, 395. 
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persona of the late Ottoman and early Republican era. Şemseddin Günaltay is one of 
the few late Ottoman Islamic modernists that a considerable number of Master‟s 
theses
20
, articles
21
 and even a book
22
 were written on.  
From the earlier works that touched upon Günaltay‟s ideas his intellectual, 
political and religious identity became a matter of discussion. There occurred some 
doubts and discussions about his ambivalent and changing intellectual position. Peyami 
Safa is one of the earliest that displays this ambivalence:  
“Sharia-minded, anti-secularist M. Şemseddin Bey who was an alim 
(religious scholar) and the writer of various religious books and articles was 
completely different from revolutionist and secular(ist) Şemseddin Günaltay 
who was a former Republican People‟s Party (RPP) prime minister, and an 
                                                 
20 Unfortunately most of these MA theses are unreachable due to lack of sharing of 
these works and hindrance of copyright issues in Turkey‟s Council of Higher 
Education‟s National Digital Thesis/Dissertation Archives. Nevertheless, I could 
achieve to obtain some of these works through personal contacts with the authors of 
these theses. The theses that I could reach are the following: Huseyin Subhi Erdem, M. 
Şemseddin Günaltay’da Turk Toplumunun Problemleri ve Felsefe, (MA thesis: 1995, 
Ataturk University). Ali Caglar Deniz, Mehmed Şemseddin Günaltay’in Dini ve 
Toplumsal Gorusleri (MA thesis: 2006, Gazi University). Bayram Ali Cetinkaya, 
Mehmed Şemseddin Günaltay ve Fikriyati (MA thesis: 1994, Ankara University). 
The other theses written on or related to Şemseddin Günaltay are: Sevdiye Yildiz, 
Mehmed Şemseddin Günaltay’in Tarih-i Edyan Isimli Eserinin Sadelestirilmesi ve 
Degerlendirilmesi (MA thesis: 1998, Cumhuriyet University). Unsal Bozkurt, Osmanli 
Devleti’nin Son Donemlerinde Yapilan Dinler Tarihi Calismalari Uzerine Bir 
Arastirma (MA thesis: 2003, Ankara University). Ilhami Ayranci, Bir Tarihci Olarak 
Mehmed Şemseddin Günaltay (Hayati, Eserleri ve Islam Tarihi ile Ilgili Eserlerinin 
Tahlili) (MA thesis: 2007, Ankara University). Mustafa Sakaci, Mehmed Şemseddin 
Günaltay’in Felsefik Kisiligi (MA thesis: 1996, Selcuk University). Huseyin Subhi 
Erdem, M. Şemseddin Günaltay’da Turk Toplumunun Problemleri ve Felsefe, (MA 
thesis: 1995, Ataturk University). Necmi Uyanik, Modernist Islamci Bir Aydinin 
Geleneksel Egitim Kurumlarina Bakisi: Medreseler, Tekkeler ve Mehmed Şemseddin 
Günaltay (MA thesis: 1996, Selcuk University). 
21 One noteworthy article is written by Fahrettin Altun. Hilmi Ziya Ulken also reserved 
a section for Şemseddin Günaltay‟s views in his book Turkiye’de Cagdas Dusunce 
Tarihi. See Fahrettin Altun, “M. Şemseddin Günaltay” in Yasin Aktay (ed), Modern 
Turkiye’de Siyasi Dusunce, Cilt 6: Islamcilik, Iletisim, Istanbul, 2001, 160. 
22 Bayram Ali Cetinkaya‟s MA thesis was also published as a book. I used this book in 
order to gain information about Bayram Ali Cetinkaya‟s views. Bayram Ali Cetinkaya, 
Turk Modernlesmesi Surecinde Şemseddin Günaltay, (Ankara: Arastirma Yayinlari, 
2003). 
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opponent of religious education. These two personalities had been living 
together in the same body for years without any conflict.”23 
Tarik Zafer Tunaya in his seminal work Islamcilik Cereyani (Islamism Current) 
describes Şemseddin Günaltay as a “modernist” and “Westernist” Islamist24. This 
modernist, rationalist aspect of Şemseddin Günaltay‟s thought has been appreciated by 
Tunaya because of his relative moderateness of adaptability to modern change and 
efforts to reconcile Islam with the modern compared to other more conservative 
Islamists
25. One distinguishing aspect of Günaltay‟s modernism in Tunaya‟s writings is 
his criticism of the Sufi orders and superstitions presented as the indicator of his 
reconciling attitude
26. A similar labeling can be identified in Hilmi Ziya Ulken‟s 
writings. In his view, what makes Şemseddin Günaltay important and unique among 
Islamists is his effort to reconcile Islamism, Westernism and Turkism similar to Ziya 
Gokalp
27. In this respect, both Ulken and Tunaya likened Günaltay to “Westernists” 
like Celal Nuri or Abdullah Cevdet in his utter belief in modern values like rationalism 
and science, and modernization and progress
28
.  It is remarkable that Şemseddin 
Günaltay had been seen in an appreciative manner as the most progressivist and open-
minded exemplar of the Islamic modernism in this narrative. Moreover, his intellectual 
profile was addressed as a mixture of various ideological trends and civilizational traits 
like Islam and the Western cultures.  
The MA theses that I could reach also had a similar appreciative approach to 
Şemseddin Günaltay. These MA theses generally dealt with two issues in Şemseddin 
Günaltay‟s writings. One group of works focused on the scholarly writings of 
                                                 
23 Islam Ansiklopedisi, 286. 
24 Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Islamcilik Cereyani: Ikinci Mesrutiyetin Siyasi Hayati Boyunca 
Gelismesi ve Bugune Biraktigi Meseleler (Istanbul: Baha Matbaasi, 1962), p. 75-76. 
25 Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Islamcilik Cereyani, 75-76. 
26 Ibid, 75. 
27 Hilmi Ziya Ulken, Turkiye’de Cagdas Dusunce Tarihi, 398. 
28 Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Islamcilik Cereyani, 75, 76. Hilmi Ziya Ulken, Turkiye’de 
Cagdas Dusunce Tarihi, 398. 
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Şemseddin Günaltay, mainly on his historical29 and semi-philosophical works30. The 
other group of writings dealt with his Islamic reformist and political writings
31
. Bayram 
Ali Cetinkaya and Ali Caglar Deniz‟s works are two examples of the second approach 
that I could have access
32
. These works analyze his writings without much thematic 
differentiation and analytical insight. So to speak, these are works devoted to the study 
of Şemseddin Günaltay‟s ideas as a whole without any theoretical or analytical concern 
for any specific issue or matter, and they each present descriptive accounts of his views 
concerning almost all issues he dealt with. These works also lack any efforts to locate 
Şemseddin Günaltay‟s ideas in any wider framework or within historical context. Nor 
do they involve into discussing the specificity or typicality of Günaltay‟s ideas in the 
late Ottoman and Republican context. Thus in my opinion these two works do not go 
beyond simple eulogies for Şemseddin Günaltay‟s ideas and intellectual, political 
personality. The main reason behind this apparent celebration of Şemseddin Günaltay 
is I think the assumption of Şemseddin Günaltay as an embodiment of “enlightened”, 
learned and open-minded (open to change) Muslim intellectual conforming to the 
Turkish Republican official ideology‟s commitment to science, reason and secularism 
proposing religion as a privatized matter. In other words, instead of being a so-called 
“reactionary” Islamist who is at odds with the Republican policies, he has been 
introduced as a “moderate”, integrative and patriotic Muslim intellectual whose 
                                                 
29 The ones dealing with Günaltay as a historian are: Sevdiye Yildiz, Mehmed 
Şemseddin Günaltay’in Tarih-i Edyan Isimli Eserinin Sadelestirilmesi ve 
Degerlendirilmesi. Unsal Bozkurt, Osmanli Devleti’nin Son Donemlerinde Yapilan 
Dinler Tarihi Calismalari Uzerine Bir Arastirma. Ilhami Ayranci, Bir Tarihci Olarak 
Mehmed Şemseddin Günaltay (Hayati, Eserleri ve Islam Tarihi ile Ilgili Eserlerinin 
Tahlili). 
30 The works focused on Günaltay‟s philosophical works are: Mustafa Sakaci, Mehmed 
Şemseddin Günaltay’in Felsefik Kisiligi. Huseyin Subhi Erdem, M. Şemseddin 
Günaltay’da Turk Toplumunun Problemleri ve Felsefe. 
31 Some of these theses are by Bayram Ali Cetinkaya, Ali Caglar Deniz and Necmi 
Uyanik. Bayram Ali Cetinkaya, Mehmed Şemseddin Günaltay ve Fikriyati. Ali Caglar 
Deniz, Mehmed Şemseddin Günaltay’in Dini ve Toplumsal Gorusleri. Necmi Uyanik, 
Modernist Islamci Bir Aydinin Geleneksel Egitim Kurumlarina Bakisi: Medreseler, 
Tekkeler ve Mehmed Şemseddin Günaltay. 
32 Ali Caglar Deniz, Mehmed Şemseddin Günaltay’in Dini ve Toplumsal Gorusleri. 
Bayram Ali Cetinkaya, Turk Modernlesmesi Surecinde Şemseddin Günaltay. 
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“modern” ideas might be even applicable to current day circumstances33. For example, 
Bayram Ali Cetinkaya proposed Günaltay‟s ideas on Sufi orders as a call for activism 
and reconciliation with the modern day circumstances for the contemporary Turkish 
Sufi orders and religious groups
34
. Therefore he has been presented as a role model for 
the contemporary Turkish Islamist groups
35
.  
On the other hand, a recent article by Fahrettin Altun brings up a more 
analytically configured examination of Şemseddin Günaltay‟s ideas. One peculiar 
aspect of his analysis is I think its critical reconsideration similar to Peyami Safa of 
Şemseddin Günaltay‟s intellectual makeup as an Islamist36. He especially underlines 
the changing lanes of Şemseddin Günaltay‟s intellectual stance during the Republican 
period but criticizes the views that conceive this change as a break in his intellectual 
route
37
. To Altun, Şemseddin Günaltay talked through the pre-eminent ideology of his 
time both in the Second Constitutional Era and during the Republican years
38
. He first 
complied with Islamism as the dominant ideological trend during the Second 
Constitutional Era and used Islamist arguments as a legitimate way for raising the ideas 
of saving the nation while getting affiliated with CUP as the central political power
39
. 
He later conformed to the Republican official ideology with an overtly Turkist tone
40
. 
This analysis is important to underscore the accommodating and partially fickle nature 
of Şemseddin Günaltay‟s ideas and intellectual profile but I think it is mistaken to deem 
this adaptability idiosyncratic to Şemseddin Günaltay. It is not unusual to see similar 
kaleidoscopic and eclectic intellectual features in the Islamic modernism of the Second 
                                                 
33 Ali Caglar Deniz, 173-174. 
34 Bayram Ali Cetinkaya, 64. 
35 Ibid, 64.  
36
 Fahrettin Altun, “M. Semseddin Günaltay” in Yasin Aktay (ed), Modern Turkiye’de 
Siyasi Dusunce, Cilt 6: Islamcilik, Iletisim, Istanbul, 2001, 160. 
37 Ibid, 160, 172. 
38 Ibid, 172. 
39 Ibid, 172. 
40 Ibid, 172. 
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Constitutional Period. Some modernist Islamists like Ahmet Hamdi Akseki, Seyyid Bey 
or Serafettin Yaltkaya followed similar intellectual and career paths from the Second 
Constitutional Period to Republic. Especially the efforts to reconcile the Islamic and the 
modern were inherent in the narratives of some prominent modernist Islamist 
intellectuals of the period like Mehmet Akif. In this regard, it would not be mistaken to 
conceive Şemseddin Günaltay as an important intellectual figure that Islamic modernist 
trend and the syncretism of modernist, rationalist and Islamist ideas and discourses can 
be saliently observed. 
After this introduction about Şemseddin Günaltay‟s life and intellectual profile, 
and the brief review on the academic works dealt with his ideas I would like to give the 
basic organization of this study. This study consists of four chapters. First chapter aims 
to draw a historical background of the intellectual developments of the 19
th
 and early 
20
th
 century Ottoman Empire in its central provinces. The main objective of this 
chapter is to introduce the basic outlook of the Weltanschauung of a new intellectual 
generation that came out towards the end of the 20
th
 century. This section pays special 
attention on intellectual interactions with the western culture and education during 
Tanzimat and Hamidian period. Second chapter deals with the change in the meaning 
and function of Islam during Tanzimat (1839-1876) and especially Abdulhamid (1976-
1909) periods. The main aim of this section is to explain the formation of a “newer” 
conception of Islam related to the structural changes in the religious establishment, and 
Islam‟s new functionality utilized by the Ottoman administration and intellectuals. The 
third chapter introduces a general outline of the Second Constitutional Period Islamism 
and the influences of Salafi thought on Ottoman Islamist thought and Şemseddin 
Günaltay‟s ideas. This chapter also deals with the anti-Sufi and anti-superstition 
discourses in the Second Constitutional Period with a brief background knowledge 
about the roots of these discourses. Fourth chapter presents Şemseddin Günaltay‟s 
ideas on Muslim decline, superstitions, Sufism, ignorance and laziness as well as his 
methods to differentiate superstitions and corruptions in Islam. The second part of the 
chapter is more theoretically oriented and looks for the theoretical outcomes of anti-
Sufi and anti-superstition discourses of Günaltay‟s thought for describing his “true 
Islam”. Then, the chapter tries to address what the basic features of his concept of true 
Islam have been and what the outcomes of this conception might have been. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE NEW OTTOMAN INTELLECTUAL WELTANSCHAUUNG IN THE 
EARLY 20
TH
 CENTURY 
 
 
To make a rough grasp of the basic intellectual setting underpinning Günaltay 
and his generation we need to locate it within its historical context. On the eve of the 
20
th
 century, there was a new generation of Ottoman intellectuals with a new mindset. 
Şemseddin Günaltay can be counted among them. There occurred, of course, wide 
differences and fault lines between their standpoints and ideological inclinations; 
however, there were some common convictions and underlying discursive similarities, 
which were unlike their counterparts in the 18
th
 century Ottoman intellectual life. This 
was surely indebted to the 19
th
 century Ottoman transformations in institutional and 
intellectual levels. At this juncture we should admit the contribution of the institutional 
reforms and cultural and intellectual changes in the Tanzimat and post-Tanzimat 
periods. Especially Hamidian educational reforms were formative in the genesis of this 
generation of intellectuals. Then, a brief account of the intellectual and cultural 
transformations during the Tanzimat and Hamidian period and their basic outcomes 
with specific attention to education might be useful before analyzing the ideas of 
Günaltay.  
In order to make sense of the very context that provided the main dispositions of 
Günaltay‟s mindset, the historical developments through which these dispositions were 
formulated should be presented. Therefore, in the following chapter, first I will try to 
analyze the impacts of modernization in Tanzimat period (1839-1876) and 
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Westernization in institutional and educational fields and intellectual life in this 
context. Second, I will attempt to display a general outlook of the regime of 
Abdulhamid II and the impacts of modernization, especially through education, on the 
formation of a new intelligentsia. I will specifically focus on the secularizing impacts 
of education and intellectual production in the period that prepared the bedrock for the 
intellectual culture of the 2
nd
 Constitutional Period.  
 
I.1. The Intellectual Changes in the Tanzimat Period (1839-1876) 
 
19
th
 century Ottoman transformations have been described as modernization, 
Westernization or secularization. I think these all labels are valid to explain certain 
processess since they described different aspects of the change. Nonetheless, a general 
methodological approach in the literature is the equation of the 19
th 
century Ottoman 
modernization with Ottoman Westernization or secularization. Here I think of the 19
th
 
century Ottoman social odyssey as an outcome of the interplay between different 
transformative forces. Hence, I will try in this chapter to distinguish the secularizing 
and Westernizing drives and their interactive resonances with the Islamic and 
traditional forces. In order to bring the background of my subject matter to the front I 
will focus on major intellectual trends and occurrences among the elite or intellectual 
circles in the mentioned period while trying to find some interrelations with the 
adoption of Western ideas and their modifications within the Ottoman context. 
Ottoman modernization and reform can be traced back to early 18
th
 century, 
although there can be found some booklets or writings that go back as early as the 
second half of the 16
th
 century that indicated the decay in the empire and offered some 
remedies
41
. The reform efforts, which mainly focused in the 18
th
 century on military 
renewal with more practical concerns to arrest the decline and save the empire, had 
                                                 
41 Some Ottoman “intellectuals” of the previous centuries like Taskopruluzade, 
Kinalizade, Mustafa Ali or Katip Celebi had written about the decline and the possible 
remedies for the decay in their pamphlets. For a detailed account of these writings see 
Osman Ozkul, Gelenek ve Modernite Arasinda Osmanlı Ulemasi (Istanbul: Birharf 
Yayinlari, 2005).  
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already turned into a more comprehensive modernization programme that expanded to 
administrative and educational areas in Mahmud II‟s era. The practically-oriented 
nature of the reforms was retained; nevertheless a relatively more conscious and 
systematized project was being put into practice while the imprint of European systems 
and ideas were finding a stronghold among the Ottoman elite. Therefore, Europe with 
its militaristic, administrative and civilizational superiority came to be a central 
problematic and thus object of inquiry for the Ottoman administration of the early 19
th
 
century
42
.  
In 1830s permanent embassies were re-established in major European capitals 
and resident missions were formed in various other centers of Europe
43
. Also a group of 
students were sent to take education in fiscal and legal professions
44
. On the other hand, 
the number of translations of European medical/physical and mathematical books on 
the recent knowledge of sciences were growing
45
. The ministry of foreign Affairs 
(Hariciye Nezareti) and the chamber of translation (tercume odasi) – started 
functioning in 1821 but formally founded in 1833- within the ministry became 
important mediums for the penetration of Western ideas
46
. The diplomats sent to 
Europe, like Mustafa Sami or Sadik Rifat Pasha, were looking in their writings for the 
causes of European progress and coming out with a crucial answer which was turning 
into a predominant “watchword” in the Ottoman intellectual and administrative life: 
“science” was the basis of the European “progress” and “civilization”47. The 
department of foreign affairs and the chamber of translation were also seminal for the 
upbringing of a new clique of reform-minded bureaucrats that would undertake the 
                                                 
42 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1967), 83-88. 
43 Ibid, 83. 
44 Ibid, 88. 
45 Ibid, 87. 
46 Ibid, 88. 
47 Niyazi Berkes, Turkiye’de Cagdaslasma, (Istanbul: Yapi Kredi Yayinlari, 2006) 201-
202. According to Niyazi Berkes, Turkiye‟de Cagdaslasma Sadik Rifat Pasha was the 
first to enunciate the notion of “civilization” and to underline as an ideal to catch up 
with.  
29 
 
major government offices during the Tanzimat period
48
. Moreover important members 
of the Ottoman intelligentsia that would take to the Ottoman public stage in the late 
Tanzimat period were also being cultivated in these offices
49
.  
Education during this early modernization period was appreciated by the elite as 
an important medium for the acquisition and transmission of necessary knowledge and 
sciences of the times. Necessarily, educational reform inaugurated during Mahmud II‟s 
rule had been the harbinger of the Tanzimat‟s project of public education. Mekteb-i 
Tibbiye (Medical school), established in 1827, became an important medium for the 
blossoming of secular and materialist ideas, even before the Tanzimat period
50
. An 
English visitor to Mekteb-i Tibbiye in 1847 was amazed by the huge collection of 
materialist books in the library of the school as well as the interest of the students in 
materialist and scientist ideas
51
. Abu-Manneh mentions the appearance of a group of 
people in Istanbul as early as 1820s, came together to discuss about the recent 
developments in science and Western philosophy and liberal ideological 
developments
52
. In 1830s, the respect for the Western sciences and civilization as well 
as the idea of accommodating with the „demands of the time‟ was likely to be an 
important trend within the Ottoman ruling and intellectual circles
53
. This trend gained 
incredible momentum with the Tanzimat reformism. 
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A phase of ardent reform followed the proclamation of the Gülhâne Hatt-ı 
Hümâyûnu (Tanzimat Edict) in 1839. Tanzimat Period (1839-1876) had been an 
interval that the impetus of reforms in administrative, judicial and educational fields 
accelerated. Adjusting to the “demands/necessities of the time” to ensure the empire‟s 
survival was likely to be the central tenet of Tanzimat orientation. Ideals of “science”, 
“civilization”, “progress”, and “reason” were pillars of the practical ethos of 
Tanzimat
54
. I think the gradual promotion of these ideals in the Tanzimat context 
neither involve a sheer Westernization-cum-secularization process nor imply an overtly 
hostile attitude towards Islam or the religious establishment. They were incorporated 
into the indigenous Ottoman understanding and evolved through the Ottoman 
experience of change in the 19
th
 century. In other words, they on the one hand had a 
transformative impact on the Ottoman thought and culture; on the other hand, they 
were given new meanings and niche during the modernization of the empire. The 
determination to the cause of Westernization as the principal way to erect the Ottoman 
state led the “men of the Tanzimat”55 to execute expeditious adjustments. 
 In the Tanzimat understanding, education was generally perceived as the 
primary means to fulfill the civilizational ideals. As a consequence, “the late Tanzimat 
reformist elite aimed at a radical change in the existing educational structure, 
eliminating the cultural compartments imposed by traditional religious divisions and 
                                                 
54Gokhan Cetinsaya, “Kalemiye'den Mulkiye'ye Tanzimat Zihniyeti”, in Mehmet O. 
Alkan (ed), Modern Turkiye’de Siyasi Dusunce, Cilt 1: Tanzimat ve Mesrutiyet'in 
Birikimi, Iletisim, Istanbul, 2001, p. 54-71. Some of these crystallizing ideals can be 
already observed in the premises of the Tanzimat Edict. 
55
 These were well versed diplomats in politics and state affairs and had got acquainted 
with European politics and thought. Famous (or infamous) Ali and Fuad pashas, kept 
the government under control, during most of the “late Tanzimat” period (1856-1876), 
which was pictured as a forceful Westernizing and secularizing period. Ali and Fuad 
pashas can be better described as pragmatic bureaucrats determined to help the survival 
of the empire; and from their viewpoint, a top-down modeling of Western civilization 
within the Ottoman system seemed as the most effective means to achieve this urging 
necessity; even at the expense of autocratic rule. For further details for their practical 
and pragmatic thinking, look at Serif Mardin, Genesis of the Young Ottoman Thought, 
A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse 
University Press, 2000).  
31 
 
secularizing government schools”56. The Ministry of Public Instruction technically 
brought the education under the supervision of the state and the financing of the 
primary schools previously funded by the religious establishment was replaced by a 
state-led fiscal system57. Yet, the religious primary schools went on to enjoy relative 
independence for some more time. Nevertheless, secular and extra-Quranic contents of 
the schools were augmented. Another important educational development of the 
Tanzimat was the establishment of middle level school (rusdiyye), although they would 
not have been systematized and spread sufficiently58.  
 However, the most crucial advancement propounded in the educational 
system by the Tanzimat was the constitution of “Regulation of Public Education” in 
1869. By this regulation, the state took over the control of the instruction in Muslim 
schools except medreses and united them under one comprehensive law. Moreover, 
schoolbooks were launched in the instruction of modern sciences and the influence of 
the ulema over Muslim education was restricted to a considerable degree. Above all, 
different from previous regulations, the transmission of worldly knowledge had been 
emphasized as the main aim of education. The natural sciences and education were 
proposed as the main agents for being a part of the “community of civilization” that 
was the only way to progress59.  
 This regulation is quite crucial not only because it reflected the worldview of 
the late Tanzimat elite but also as it suggests a general profile of educated Ottoman 
subjects‟ upbringing. The reforms implemented following the regulation can also be 
interpreted as the bedrock of the Hamidian educational formation and pedagogies. 
Parallel to this regulation, Galatasaray Lycee inspired by the program of French lycee 
system was established in 1868. Galatasaray became a bastion of the dissemination of 
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Western ideas and the formation of intellectuals in the following years60. Also an 
attempt to institute a university in 1869 was failed due to the reaction of the ulema61. 
However, in contrast to these educational reforms, almost no measures were taken to 
reform the medreses (Islamic schools) in the period –even some of the demands were 
dismissed62. 
Especially educational reforms and contacts with the West provided an 
intellectual „acculturation‟. This surely created a change of mind and admiration for the 
Western civilization among the high officials and intellectuals who were the first ones 
that got into contact with the Western ideas and values. Yet these influences gradually 
bore some discursive dispositions articulated through certain „catchphrases‟ as I 
previously indicated, like fen (natural science) or medeniyet (civilization) which lost 
their original meanings in time. These discourses also started to spread out and 
acquired some attention among wider circles. For instance, in the opening speech of the 
High Council, in 1845, Sultan Abdulmecid emphasized the importance of natural 
sciences and necessity to eradicate ignorance
63
. Here, the negative rhetoric on 
„ignorance‟ –basically in modern sciences- which was despised as an impediment to 
material progress, was being incorporated into the discourse of science and education. 
Safvet Pasha, the minister of education, in the opening ceremony of the foundation of 
the university in 1869, also emphasized the prospects presented by natural sciences and 
reason in order to progress and fulfill the demands of the time
64
.  
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At the beginning of 1860s, a scientific academy/association, Cemiyet-i Ilmiye-i 
Osmaniye (Ottoman Association of Science), was founded by Tahir Munif Pasha
65
. 
The first journal of science, called Mecmua-i Funun (Journal of Sciences) was 
published by this association in 1862
66
. Cemiyet-i Ilmiye also held some public 
conferences on natural sciences “in order to enlighten people” and according to Berkes, 
they succeeded to attract a good deal of public attention
67
. There was a substantial 
growth in popular science writings in the popular journals of 1860s. Darwinism and the 
theory of evolution also became major subjects of discussion in popular journals
68
. 
Scientist, (vulgar) materialist -and even social Darwinist- ideas were also flourishing 
among the elites, like Tahir Munif Pasha or Tahsin Efendi (the director of the 
university). According to Sukru Hanioglu, starting from the early 1850s “modern 
science began to usurp the authority of religious constructs in traditional Ottoman 
thought” and this eventually led to the endowment of science “with a transcendent 
meaning” in the form of a religious belief69. These would soon turn into a critical 
discourse on religion since science was perceived as the sounder guide for humanity 
and expected to replace religion
70
. Now the precursors of the imminent strife between 
the science and religion were in the scene.  
The institutional reforms introduced during the Tanzimat in administrative, 
legal and educational spheres also created a sort of duality between religious and 
secular institutions
71
. This dual nature of the Ottoman system went on till the last 
decade of the empire but steadily the expansion of the secular legal, educational and 
political institutions and establishments worked to the disadvantage of the classical 
religious institutions and actors. The westernization and the introduction of new 
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institutions together with mentioned duality induced deep social structural changes. 
According to Bernard Lewis and Serif Mardin, new institutions that were imported and 
alien to the people‟s culture brought the tearing of the old order and morality, 
solidarities and loyalties while increasing the gap between the ruler and the ruled
72
. 
This duality between the old and the new, religious and the secular, Western and 
Ottoman, a la franca and a la turca, was not constrained in an institutional level but in 
the long run, appeared within society as dual life styles and worldviews. 
There was a large group of people in the society disturbed by the Westernizing 
and secularizing transformations, foremost were the ulema advocating religious and 
traditional values
73
. Not only were some members of the ulema and the supposedly 
“conservative” sections of the society disturbed by the acute social structural effects of 
the Westernization but also a new emerging intelligentsia was uneasy with situation 
and they put the Tanzimat policies under severe criticism. 
 
I.1.b. Emergence of a New Intellectual Coterie: Young Ottomans 
One of the landmarks of the Tanzimat intellectual life was the appearance of a 
school-educated freelance coterie of liberal-minded intellectuals, called Young 
Ottomans
74
. Despite the fact that they were a loose group of intellectuals with quite 
much differentiation in their thought, to Serif Mardin, Young Ottomans were a group of 
self-cultivated homme de letters (men of letters) who were highly idealist and interested 
in a wide variety of topics
75
. These were generally of bureaucratic origins and many 
had been brought up in the chamber of translation. They were generally counted to be 
liberal in politics and conservative in religious issues. Besides the stamp of 
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Enlightenment thought on their political views inspired by Montesquieu, Voltaire and J. 
J. Rousseau, the ideas of progress, science and reason can be discerned as a noteworthy 
component in their proposals, in accordance with the increasing popularity of these 
ideas. They were with differing stresses defending some political and legal principles of 
Western Enlightenment: rule of law, freedom of thought, representative government, 
parliamentarism, Constitution and so on. According to Namik Kemal and Ali Suavi 
who represented a more Islamic sensitivity in the group, these principles were more 
than convenient to Islam since similar principles existed in the origins of Islam. What 
united them was their oppositional stance against the governance of Ali and Fuad 
pashas –generally due to personal collision- which they criticized of establishing an 
autocratic and arbitrary rule. They also charged the imitative Westernizing and 
secularizing reforms of the Tanzimat with superficiality and rootlessness causing 
alienation in the society and thus destroying the traditional foundations of Ottoman 
society. To put it differently, some of them, especially Namik Kemal, were uneasy with 
the unsettling of the traditional social equilibrium incited by the Tanzimat reforms
76
.  
One important development of 1860s and 1870s related to Young Ottoman 
activities was the appearance of quests for ways to erect the state with the increasing 
amount of newspapers, journals and publications; and this opened a new “civil sphere” 
for purposes of discussing Islam
77
. In these discussions, it is interesting that the main 
question implicitly evolved around whether Islam was an obstacle to human progress
78
 
and a source of backwardness for the Islamic societies. Young Ottomans therefore tried 
to impress the public opinion (efkar-i umumiyye), looked for popular support and 
attempted to mobilize common people. First time in the Ottoman history, they 
expressed their resentment towards the government with new media technologies like 
newspapers and journals and Western literary tools, such as novels, plays and stories. 
Their criticism and ideas came to be more influential among some elites and 
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bureaucrats, especially after they returned to Istanbul from exile in Europe following 
the death of Ali Pasha in 1871. The patriotic (pan-) Islamic views of Namik Kemal 
especially gained increasing weight due to increasing Islamic sensitivity in the public 
opinion for the persecution of Muslims in the Balkans and Central Asia. The impact of 
Young Ottoman parliamentary and Constitutional views on the institution of first 
Constitution in 1876 cannot be underestimated. Moreover, the thought of Young 
Ottomans, particularly Namik Kemal‟s, put its stamp on the views of following 
intellectual generation although their intellectual orientations and concerns 
considerably differed. In the eyes of later generation of intellectuals Namik Kemal 
turned into a symbol of freedom and patriotism
79
. 
 
I.2. Intellectual Developments during the Hamidian Years (1876-1908) 
 
The catastrophic outcomes of the Russo-Ottoman War (1877-1878) brought the 
Constitutional rule and relatively democratic atmosphere of the preceding years into an 
end and resulted in the long authoritarian years of the sultan Abdulhamid II. In contrast 
to its infamous reputation, the long reign of sultan Abdulhamid carried the modernizing 
Tanzimat reforms it inherited forward
80
. Hamidian regime carried out a centralistic 
modernization abiding by the taken-for-granted pre-eminence of science, progress and 
civilization
81. The reforms performed under Abdulhamid‟s autocratic rule became 
constitutive for the developments in the intellectual and political life of the 20
th
 century 
Ottoman-Turkish context. The intellectual and educational developments in 
Abdulhamid‟s era added a new dimension to the emergence of a new generation of 
intellectuals whom Şemseddin Günaltay became a part.  
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Abdulhamid regime is likely to display the characteristics of an absolutist proto-
nation-state that aimed to diffuse into the society in every level and looked for its 
(proto)-citizens‟ obedience82. Advanced communication and transportation facilities 
enabled the regime to a certain extent to diffuse its official ideology and to tighten its 
grip over the population. Abdulhamid era was also distinguished by an application of 
drastic censorship on any sort of publication concerning politics or criticism against the 
regime
83
. The centralistic control of the regime stressed the reconciliation of the 
modernization with Islam and sought to accomplish material and civilizational 
progress
84
. Education was the central pillar according to the regime to accomplish this 
goal
85
.  
Education was hence kept to be deemed during the Hamidian era as the 
important recipient and propagator of modern science and thus the means to material-
civilizational progress and modernization
86
. Education was also instrumental to bring 
up obedient citizens
87
 and necessary professional cadres for the empire
88
. One of the 
most important successes of the Hamidian regime, as a result of the prolific efforts of 
grand vizier Kucuk Said Pasha in 1880s, was the spread of public education in primary 
and secondary school levels and the increasing number of professional and higher level 
schools
89
. Opening of Mulkiye (Imperial Civil Service School), the advancement of 
medical and military schools and establishment of the university, Darülfünun (1900) 
were the main successes of the educational reform of the regime. Ironically medical and 
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military schools and Mulkiye ended up being the loci of the opposition against the 
sultan in 1890s
90
.  
The educational understanding of Abdulhamid schools with their curricula and 
pedagogies were one of the main factors behind the emergence of a new intellectual 
generation with relatively more peculiar state of mind. The curricular content of the 
school system introduced during the era made stress on religious and patriotic values 
promoting the loyalty toward the sultan and the state. Nevertheless, this did not produce 
“an anti-positivistic traditionalism” and “utilization of Islam remained mainly within 
the realm of political utility and formality” as Aksin Somel mentioned91. The 
positivistic and non-Islamic line of Tanzimat education was followed in the curricular 
content with “increasing emphasis on the moral aspects of Islamic learning”92. Proper 
to the official discourse on the compatibility of Islam and modern sciences, “rational 
and political learning acquired through modern education was [deemed] essential for 
the continuing strength of Islam”93. In sum, the stress in Hamidian education was on 
material progress, loyalty and Islamic morality. Nevertheless, an opposition to 
Abdulhamid‟s authoritarian rule germinated at the end of 1880s among the student 
body of these schools
94
. One should admit the influence of the circulation of 
unauthorized books and articles by Young Ottomans, European liberals, materialists 
and positivists and even some Young Turks in the emergence of anti-regime and 
revolutionary ideas as well as modernist and Westernist ones
95
. These tendencies were 
also associated with a deep grievance towards “everything which was Oriental, ranging 
with it associations of corruption and backwardness”96.  
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On the other hand, the pedagogical methods instilled into the educational 
system added new dimensions to Tanzimat educational positivist pedagogies and 
became constitutive for the intellectual make-up of the emerging generation. 
Pedagogical measures, namely introduction of the strict functional organization of time 
and space for classes and out-of-class activities like activities of prayer, instruction, the 
rehearsing of lessons, nourishment and sleeping, hierarchically organized class 
promotion system, structurally regulated and centrally controlled instruction through 
textbooks, and the attention paid to proper attire, posture, manners and cleanliness 
provided a temporal-spatial and bodily self-discipline which was also conflated with 
morality
97
. Students were also endowed with a sense of a linear progressive temporality 
and idea of order and authority, i.e. expressed in their respect for the elders
98
. The 
educational pedagogy of the Hamidian schools was therefore seminal for the cultivation 
of “disciplined” Ottoman subjects imbued with a distinguishably new Weltanschauung. 
This intellectual generation had in their minds “temporally” regulated notions of 
progress and order epitomized in the functioning of the cosmos, society and the body.  
Despite the oppressive policies of the regime, there was a decent growth in 
writing culture, especially in 1880s, with the publication of books, pamphlets, 
translations, newspapers and journals
99
. The enhanced literacy and book-centrism in 
learning introduced by the Tanzimat education concerted with the intellectual 
atmosphere of the early Hamidian period. However, due to the aversion and 
suppression of the regime of political subjects, the content of the publications during 
the period revolved around two relatively less dangerous issues: 1) religion, 2) science 
and literature
100
.  
 Abdulhamid regime looking on Islam as a unifying and legitimizing medium 
encouraged religious publications, and translations of Islamic classics from Arabic and 
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Persian101 as well as some on the ancient Turkish and Ottoman history. However, the 
state strictly longed to supervise the process of publication102 and used these translations 
in order to make its Islamic official ideology available to a wide range of readers. This 
initiative allowed the dissemination of these works “in a fashion that had not been 
attempted before in Islamic history”103.  
On the other hand, the established authority of the ideals of science and 
civilization within the elite circles justified in the eyes of the regime the publication of 
works on popular science, literature and/or knowledge of Western civilization. The 
pressure on intellectuals by the regime brought about a type of apolitical public 
intellectual occupied with encyclopedic production and/or with the self-ordained task 
of educating the nation by disseminating practical knowledge in science and 
civilization
104
. Ahmet Midhat Efendi, Şemseddin Sami and Muallim Naci were 
examples of this type of encyclopedist, educationist intellectual
105
. Especially Ahmet 
Midhat‟s undeniable influence over a wide array of urban population through novels 
with an instructive narrative style should be emphasized. Novels, stories, newspaper 
articles and popular science journals became the main mediums that disseminated 
knowledge in sciences and of Western civilization in the society. This was 
accompanied by the use of a simplified language aimed at the population. These were 
important developments intensified the imprint of book culture and growing readership 
on the population. The trend of increasing readership and book culture have been also 
indicative of the changing terrains of knowledge transmission and hence the creation of 
a shared public space by differing strata of the society. Ahmet Midhat Efendi and 
Muallim Naci on the other hand looked for a middle way for the reconciliation of Islam 
and Western civilization while carrying the Islamic message and defending Islam 
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against the Orientalists‟ and materialists‟ discourses of Islam. This also gave birth to an 
anti-materialist struggle in Ahmet Midhat‟s ideas106. 
 
I.2.b. The Positivist and Materialist Views of Young Turks 
 
The modernist and materialist trends among intellectuals of the period were 
more than common. Regime‟s sympathy for ideas of science and material progress 
provided tolerance for popular scientific and materialist publications. This was 
paralleled by the spread of 19
th
 century European vulgar materialist, scientist, social 
Darwinist and positivist ideas
107
 among the intellectuals and students of new secular 
schools, especially in the medical school and the Mulkiye
108
. The esteem flourishing 
since the beginning of the 19
th
 century for modern science, rationality, progress and the 
West reached its heyday towards the end of the century
109
. Corresponding to positivism 
and materialism, deistic and atheistic inclinations among the intellectuals (i.e. Besir 
Fuad, Tevfik Fikret, Ahmet Riza)
110
 were unexceptional. Sukru Hanioglu discussed in 
his influential book, Young Turks in Opposition that science had such a „consummatory 
value‟ that a considerable number of the late 19th century intellectuals strongly believed 
that every aspect of life should be regulated according to science
111
. In this parallel 
even views on society and politics were derived from vulgar materialistic and popular 
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scientific explanations. For instance, the longed-for “progress” had strong materialistic 
and Darwinist connotations
112
. 
On the other hand, the conflict between science and religion was in progress. 
The strong commitment to reason and scientific explanations of the nature and life 
severely impaired the preceding authority of the religious exegesis of the cosmos and 
the human life within intellectual circles. The idea that history was made by the 
ongoing conflict between science and religion proposed in Draper‟s book Conflict 
between Science and Religion found widespread adherence among the intellectuals of 
the time and constituted an axis of discussions
113
.  
The materialist, positivist and modernist ideological tendencies reflected a large 
variety of internal divisions. Many of these intellectuals were hostile to the regime and 
there were numerous camps of these oppositional groups as well
114
. Yet, one group 
widely known as Young Turks (Jon Turkler)
115
, into which diverse views incorporated, 
came to the foreground during 1890s and dominated the intellectual life and 
oppositional movement against the regime after 1902. It is very difficult to cast a well-
defined ideological identity to Young Turks. Young Turk movement was more of a 
loosely organized group for which the opposition to the autocratic rule of Hamidian 
regime was the main binding element for years
116
. “Government‟s severe measures 
against those lacking affiliation with a political organization but propagating liberal 
ideas helped the Young Turk to convert many members of a generation educated at 
western-type institutions in the empire”117. Already Young Turks stated that their 
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ideology galvanized all pro-modernists, regardless of political affiliation
118
. The group 
later organized itself into an activist organization called Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti 
(Committee of Union and Progress). Many of the influential political and intellectual 
figures of the post-1908 and republican era were of Young Turks origins. “The CUP as 
an outgrowth of the Young Turk movement, constituted the major ruling power in the 
Ottoman Empire between 1908 and 1918 except for a brief interlude”119.  
Within CUP positivist and materialist inclinations were widespread but 
increasingly towards the revolution in 1908, the presence of Turkist and Islamist 
ideologies became felt within the organization
120
. The name of the organization 
“union” and “progress” offered by positivist Ahmet Riza was inspired by the key 
concepts of August Comte‟s positivist thought; “order” and “progress”121. Social 
solidarity, orderliness and the integrity of the empire had been central concerns for the 
Young Turk thought despite its internal diversity
122
.  
CUP‟s political and social activism was encapsulated by its top down modernist 
reformism and elitism. This elitist reformism was associated with the central 
preoccupation of saving the nation
123
 which also included social engineering and 
population management policies that were deeply imbedded in a scientist and 
progressivist frame of thought
124
. In other words, society was in some occasions 
perceived as a malleable whole to be forged, reconstructed and galvanized. CUP 
continued to be an umbrella organization during the Second Constitutional period for 
patriotic reformers from politically and socially diverse ideological viewpoints 
including modernists, Islamists, Turkists and Ottomanists. Ottomanism, Turkism, 
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Islamism and modernism as ideological orientations found their place in the CUP 
policies with differing proportions and forms and as intricate admixtures throughout the 
Second Constitutional Period.   
 
I.3. Second Constitutional Period 
 
Young Turk Revolution of 1908 was an important watershed in the late 
Ottoman history and gave way to a crucial period called Second Constitutional Period 
between 1908 and 1918. The intellectual paradigmatic shift that was in the making 
during Tanzimat and Hamidian periods was ripened within Second Constitutional 
Period. Constitutional regime and freedom brought by the Revolution were widely 
acclaimed by diverse sections of the society and there was an air of optimism in 
society. The relative intellectual freedom in the Second Constitutional Period witnessed 
a burgeoning in publications, journalism and formation of associations
125
. This increase 
in intellectual production was by some scholars interpreted as the birth of a “public 
sphere” in Western fashion in the central parts of the empire126.   
Notwithstanding the growth of various ideological and intellectual 
predispositions, the intellectuals during the Hamidian years were remarkably 
preoccupied with the autocratic regime and revolutionary politics. Then the intellectual 
predispositions abundantly diversified and parted into more crystallized ideologies and 
discourses in the Second Constitutional Period 
127
. It is frequently assumed that in the 
intellectual public of the 2nd Constitutional period, three alternative ideological 
positions were straightened: Garbcilik (Westernism), Islamism, and nationalism 
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(Turkism)
128
. The formation of such ideological/intellectual factions cannot be denied; 
however, on the one hand there were important similarities and overlaps between the 
ideas and arguments of intellectuals classified under these three groups. On the other 
hand, the ideas of intellectuals labeled with the same ideological orientation reflected 
considerable dissent. One might also recognize alternative intellectual trends like 
materialism, traditionalism, anarchism, socialism, fascism and so on during the period.  
The relaxation of intellectual atmosphere in the Second Constitutional Period 
not only marked parting of the ways for many intellectuals but also signaled the 
appearance and reformulation of new concerns, discussions and controversies. The 
catastrophic political and social events followed the enthusiasm and optimism of the 
Revolution: the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria‟s 
declaration of independence in 1908, counterrevolution of 31March in 1909, the loss of 
North African territories in 1911, Balkan Wars (1912-1913) resulted in the loss of 
almost all European territories of the empire and waves of hundreds of thousands of 
Muslim refugees from the Balkans and Caucasus pouring into the remaining Ottoman 
territories
129
. Therefore the very survival of Muslim community and the Ottoman state 
was at stake. Saving the nation turned out as a central concern for the intellectuals of 
the period; in Mardin‟s expressions became a “hyper-good” as a collective good130. The 
struggle with the Western powers and brutality of European imperialism also put 
serious doubt on the belief in the Western civilization as the ultimate ideal to be 
followed. Tunaya argued that the serious disasters and loss of territories created a sort 
of strengthening and sharpening in Islamist and nationalist tendencies
131
.  
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 Yusuf (Akcura) (1876-1935) and Ziya Gokalp‟s (1876-1924), two prominent 
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I.4. Analysis: Late Ottoman Weltanschauung 
 
The developments of the 19
th
 century Ottoman intellectual and cultural life 
brought about a new generation of intellectuals, with a new Weltanschauung. Even 
though they might have differentiated in their motivations and ideas and had fervent 
discussions about politics, morality, and religion it can be claimed that a newly 
developing worldview constituted the backbone of the arguments of these intellectuals 
with diverse ideological stances. Trust in the modern science, commitment to rational 
thinking, saving the nation, and material advancement of the society were some of the 
commonly held propositions in their ideas.  
Content and pedagogies of the new secular educational system of the Tanzimat 
and especially Hamidian period were therefore seminal for the upbringing of this 
generation who shared new cognitive codes. A new systematic and standardized 
educational methodology with strict organization of time and space and disciplinary 
measures and the impersonal authority of textbooks (as well as encyclopedias, 
dictionaries, manuals, novels) as a source of learning were replacing the loosely 
organized and highly personalized form of traditional Quranic education
132
. This 
brought new cognitive codes: systematic thinking, rationalization and orderliness, 
coherence and a sense of linear progressive temporality
133. Parallel to Gellner‟s 
deliberation of the modern, industrial world vision, the world was conceived by many 
of these intellectuals as a whole with homogenous time and order, subject to systematic 
and indiscriminate laws
134
. A utopian understanding of constructing the future had 
precedence, according to Mardin, over the past and present
135
. As a result, a 
“speculative”, “abstracting”, “utopian” and “futuristic” cast of thought now separated 
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these educated classes
136. They therefore had in their minds “temporally” regulated 
notions of progress and order epitomized in the functioning of the cosmos, society and 
the body. That is to say, in the eyes of these intellectuals, the “temporal/secular” gained 
precedence over the other-worldly and transcendental.  
The generation of the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century therefore came to share a 
new system of epistemologies, namely a new Weltanschauung. This new 
Weltanschauung I think can be better understood in relation to Gellner‟s depiction of 
“universal cognitive currency”137 distinguishing the new mode of thinking emerging in 
the modern post-agrarian societies:  
“that all facts are located within a single continuous logical space, that 
statements reporting them can be conjoined and generally related to each other, 
so that, in principle, one single language describes the world and is internally 
unitary; or on the negative side, that there are no special, privileged, insulated 
facts or realms, protected from contamination or contradiction by others, and 
living in insulated, independent logical spaces of their own.”138. 
This mode of thought increasingly diverged from the classical Islamic-Ottoman 
world vision. So to speak, this new social basis was since the 19
th
 century replacing the 
“ancient, complex, all encompassing and flexible philosophical and operational 
structures”139 that had an internal mechanism tolerating the coexistence of “multiple 
levels of reality”140, since the beginning of the 19th century in the Ottoman Empire. 
This traditional “order of things” was characterized by its purposive, hierarchical and 
meaningful social organization which was not quite unified, consisting of sub-worlds 
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each with its own idiom and logic, not subsumable under a single overall orderliness
141
. 
Namely, this world was tolerating virtually inconsistent epistemologies, rationalities 
and the existence of specially privileged facts, sacralized and exempt from ordinary 
treatment
142
. Coexistence of differing claims to reality and inner logics in exoteric and 
esoteric structures of knowledge and ontology in this system, described as 
“multiplexity” by Senturk, also explains the esteemed existence of Sufism as an equally 
valid form of life and Weltanschauung
143
.  
In this context, the change during the 19
th
 century was towards a singularly 
enclosed “secular” cognitive framework which is also described by Senturk as a 
“unilayered” system of epistemologies originated from the Western intellectual 
traditions
144
. This secular framework can be described as a logically coherent web of 
meanings made up of a kind of unitary rationality, consisting of “multiple” ideological 
positions interlinked to each other within this unitary logical matrix. Its inhabitants 
perceived themselves as embedded in the homogenous and linearly evolving time, 
which was described by Charles Taylor as the “secular time”, the sine qua non of 
modern secular condition
145
. This brought, according to Mardin, the “carving of a new 
qualitative sphere, i.e., that of the legitimation of knowledge produced in the Western 
post-Cartesian style”146. Now the intellectuals of this period with various backgrounds 
and worldviews were located within a single continuous logical space and speaking of a 
similar language describing the order of things in the world. 
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The evaluation of this paradigmatic shift in the social cognitive codes is 
essential to understanding the central role of the notions of “order” and “progress” in 
the thought of the intellectuals of the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century intellectuals, 
mainly Young Turks. The new Weltanschauung is also reflective of the social 
engineering and population management projects of the CUP in order to regularize and 
bring order to the society. What is also fundamental to this transformation was the 
change in the operative role of Islam from an all-encompassing and underlying social 
dynamic to a contending ideology. Islam took its legitimating place within this frame of 
thought, while serving its vocabulary to the use of various intellectual arguments. This 
fundamental change might be explanatory to understand the widespread authority of the 
science and heavy rationalist tones interwoven with Islamic references, in various 
intellectual discourses of the period.  
The reflections of this mentality valuing objective knowledge and systematic 
coherence can be seen in Günaltay‟s reduction of Islam into a concrete, simple, pure 
and coherent unit that is straightforwardly comprehendible within a unilayered system 
of rationality and thus makes it malleable. Therefore his Islamic understanding is of 
service to a social reform project in the light of the rationally and scientifically inspired 
methods and practical necessities of the time. Mentioned temporality (this-worldliness) 
of the new Weltanschauung does also make itself felt in Günaltay‟s and quite a few 
Islamist intellectuals‟ comprehension of religion.  
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CHAPTER II 
EMERGENCE OF “NEW ISLAM”: THE RELIGIOUS TRANSFORMATIONS 
IN THE 19
TH
 CENTURY OTTOMAN EMPIRE  
 
 
Studies on the Islamic revival of the 19th and 20th centuries mostly focus on the 
Arabic spoken (non-Turkish) context of the Islamic development with special emphasis 
on Salafi and modernist Islamic traditions
147
. In this canon of Islamic studies, 
“Islamist” thinkers like Jamaladdin Afghani, Muhammad Abduh or Rashid Rida have 
acquired a special attention. The main focus of the studies of Islamic renewal and 
revival has been streamlined in this axis and their continuation along the contemporary 
contexts of Islamic radicalism and fundamentalism discourses has been one of the main 
emphasizes in modern studies on Islam. In this literature, Turkey‟s experience of 
modernization, and the Ottoman-Turkish experience of Islam were more or less 
excluded or underestimated. The implicit continuities and the radical epistemological 
ruptures within the historical development of Islamic tradition in Turkey together with 
its “sui generis” cultural framework make the study of Islam more difficult. This 
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situation can be understood as an indication of the “exceptionalism of the Turkish 
Islamic experience among its counterparts”148 which is defined by Serif Mardin as “the 
non-conformist aspect of Turkish Islam for the contemporary scholars of modern day 
Islam”149. The unique characteristics and entangled and multilayered historical flow of 
Turkish Islamic culture from the 19
th
 century to Republican Turkey was therefore 
constitutive for the social and political life of the 20
th
 century Turkish social life. This 
study focuses on a short span of this flow, which encloses the Second Constitutional 
Period, by the examination of the formations of a new conceptualization of Islam, 
through the ideas of a particular “Islamist” intellectual, M. Şemseddin (Günaltay).  
In order to better apprehend the religious context in which his ideas on religion, 
Sufism and superstitions were furnished, the basic outline of the change that religion 
went through in the 19
th
 century Ottoman context should be illustrated. In this regard, I 
will try to provide a brief account of how Islam acquired new meanings and functions, 
and what sorts of underlying transformations took place to create the “politicization” 
and “ideologization” of Islam as well as processes of “(re-)Islamization” in the late 
Ottoman social life. Before getting into analyzing this change I will first try to present a 
very rough picture of the basic features of the classical Ottoman understanding of Islam 
in this chapter. Later I will try to portray the changes in the function and meaning of 
religion during the 19
th
 century Ottoman life as background of the social setting that 
gave color to Günaltay‟s thought. As a part of this task it is necessary to outline a rough 
sketch of transformation of the religious establishment in this period. This demands the 
examination of the ulema‟s and major Sufi orders‟ role in Ottoman politics and social 
life. Later on I will try to give a brief account of Young Ottomans‟ interpretations of 
Islam, and Islamic developments and reinterpretation of Islam during sultan 
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Abdulhamid II‟s reign. This necessitates the examination of the fashioning of orthodox 
Islam and Pan-Islamism by the Hamidian regime and implications as well as regime‟s 
relations with the Sufi orders.  
 
II.1. What was Classical Ottoman Islam like? 
 
In order to better comprehend the changes in the role and functions of Islam in 
the 19
th
 and 20
th
 century Ottoman intellectual and social life, a very brief account of 
what the basic characteristics of the Ottoman Islamic tradition had been should be 
provided. It is difficult to comprehend basic characteristics of Ottoman Islamic 
tradition without also paying attention to its correlations with the Ottoman state and 
quasi-secular Ottoman political thought.  
As the successor of the Seljukid social and political structure, Ottoman rule in 
its formative period mainly revealed the characteristics of a frontier principality
150
. 
Popular and heterodox religious culture of dervishes and gazis – that also held “the 
ideal of spreading God‟s word by conquest”- was the pre-eminent element, both among 
the rulers and the ruled
151
.  As the Ottoman state expanded towards a centralized 
empire -starting from the reign of Bayezid I and intensifying with the reign of Mehmed 
II- the orthodox Sunni trend bolstered in the state organization and a rift appeared 
between the ruling elite and some Sufi dervishes, who opposed this process of 
“Sunnification”152. 
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This tendency in the 16
th
 century Ottoman Empire was accompanied by the 
incorporation of the ulema (Islamic scholars; plural of alim) into the Ottoman state, and 
the increasing political power of the secular authority together with the dominance of 
Sharia (Islamic law) in state affairs
153
. Madeline Zilfi and Serif Mardin claimed that the 
intertwining of religion and the state (din u devlet) had been one of the bases of the 
Ottoman rule
154
.  
The principles of Sharia followed by the Ottoman state were primarily of the 
Hanafi School of Islamic jurisprudence. The official use of the Hanafi School by the 
state made it highly influential throughout the Ottoman Empire while leaving space for 
the application of other schools of Islamic law in different local contexts
155
. The 
Hanafite interpretation of Islam was regarded by Inalcik as the most tolerant and 
flexible school of jurisprudence based on the use of reason and icma (consensus of 
opinion) – as a basis for religious and legal opinions156.  
Both Halil Inalcik and Ahmet Yasar Ocak argued that the dual functioning of 
the Hanafite fiqh with the secular law, (kanun) decrees proclaimed by the sultan under 
certain circumstances and for differing locations, in the Ottoman official religious 
understanding opened room for innovations on some legal issues and adaptability to 
differing circumstances and contexts
157
. Moreover, this made Ottoman Islamic tradition 
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more open to foreign cultural influences while rendering the Ottoman rulers with 
enough freedom in their political and executive authority
158
.  
The emphasis on the combination of intellectual sciences and mysticism in 
famous Muslim philosopher and theologian al-Razi‟s thought in the footprints of al-
Ghazali, was inspirational for the Ottoman Islamic thought and in the organization of 
Ottoman medrese system which was open to the learning of logic and mathematics 
perceived as the essential elements of all the sciences
 159
. On the other hand, from the 
earliest times formal and informal Sufi associations not only played a central role in the 
Ottoman social and political life, but also in the thought of the Ottoman intellectual 
elite, including ulema. Throughout the Ottoman centuries, there had been vital 
interactions and exchanges between the Sufis and ulema; many of the ulema were 
members of various Sufi orders
160
.  
 The flexibility and socially all-encompassing nature of Islamic fiqh with 
annotations, footnotes, reinterpretation around a canonical knowledge and basic 
textuality have been emphasized by various scholars161. Different Islamic legal schools, 
kanun (secular law), and non-Muslim legal systems coexisted and operated within this 
system. Practically oriented dispositions of fiqh were the basis of a system of 
meanings/realities that Islam had been the “all-encompassing and underlying” 
“operative code”162. Recep Senturk describes the classical Ottoman Islamic 
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epistemological tradition in terms of “multiplexity”163 as a coexistence of alternating 
ways of knowledge production, cognitive methodologies, and rationalities, not limited 
within the order of natural phenomena164. Senturk exemplifies the peaceful coexistence 
and dialogue of fiqh and tasawwuf as an indication of multiplexity while being 
configured around even incommensurable interpretations of reality, methodologies, and 
discourses165. This social system was distinguished according to Mardin by the 
interpersonal relations consisting of some sort of arbitrariness and lacking a unilayered 
rationality that can be observed in the operation of jurisprudence and Sharia166. This 
allowed enough elasticity to take into account many different situations167.  
In the formation of the classical Ottoman Islamic tradition, in addition to the 
Hanafi thought we can distinguish the influences of Islamic political philosophy and 
Turkic-Persian-Mongolian theory of secular legislation and state supremacy. Ibn Sina‟s 
ideal of Islamic state under the rule of rightful ruler inspired by Plato‟s philosopher-
king was already integrated to the ideal of state supremacy that had a pivotal place in 
the Iranian-Turkish and Ilhanid political culture in the 11
th
 century Islamic context; and 
had founded itself in the literature of “mirror for the princesses” 168. Through the ideas 
of medieval Islamic thinkers, al-Tusi and Celaluddin Devvani (1424-1502), this 
synthesized thought had been adopted by the Ottoman statesmen into the classical 
Ottoman understanding of the state and religion together with the notion of daire-i 
adalet (circle of justice)
169
. In this view, adalet was the basis of order in the cosmos 
and thus in the society -which was perceived as the reflection of the cosmos. Adalet 
could be fulfilled by the welfare and concordance of four hierarchical estates (erkan-i 
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erbaa)
170
 in the society, and this harmony could be achieved under the guidance of a 
just imam (religious and political leader) acting according to Sharia
171
. Aristotelian 
hierarchical organicist view can be discerned in the parallels drawn between the four 
elements in the cosmos, four classes in the society and four substances in the body. We 
can also find some similarities or underlying connections with the organicist 
conceptions of the society finding some analogies with the body, popular in the late 
Ottoman intellectual scene and especially in Günaltay‟s thought.  
Thus, “through Devvani's and then Kinalizade's works, the means of identifying 
the sultan with the philosopher-king became available”172, and from Mardin‟s 
perspective, this provided: 
“a framework of deep, genuine and all-pervasive concern for the welfare 
of the Islamic community. This feeling was translated, following the Ottoman 
ascendance in the Islamic world, into a profound and sincere devotion to the 
Ottoman state”173. 
This commitment to sublime ideal of the state in the Ottoman culture was combined 
with the dedication to religion
174
 and embodied in the divinely ordained personality of 
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172 Ibid, 99-101. 
173 Ibid, 105. 
174 This coupling of religion and state was expressed in the commonly used expression 
of din u devlet and generally continued with the demands for the protection and well-
being of this pair. 
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the sultan
175
. This synthesis  that emphasized the loftiness of the state as a “hypergood” 
and linked it with religion and Sharia yielded consequences of which impacts could be 
scrutinized even in the late Ottoman intellectual milieu. 
In the institutional level, the representative of the Sunnism in the empire was the 
ulema. They were responsible for the application of the Sharia in the Ottoman state and 
were mainly concerned with practical issues like jurisprudence. Starting with the rule of 
Mehmed II, a loose group of ulema, who came together from the various parts of the 
Muslim lands, gradually became organized as a formally unified body and got 
incorporated into the Ottoman state machinery. Hence, in the higher echelons of the 
social hierarchies, different from the independence of the past ulema from the state, the 
Ottoman ulema and the (quasi-)secular ruling class became more and more 
interdependent on each other. This interdependence in time resulted with a rigid 
hierarchy of ulema, şeyhülislam (the chief judge) at the top of it. Many of the ulema not 
only made careers in religio-legal professions but also attained political and 
bureaucratic positions, even as viziers. Seyhulislam occupied a place equal to the grand 
vizier; and the high ranking ulema owned the authority of confirming and legalizing the 
deposition of a new sultan. In this regard, the seyhulislam and the ulema of the high 
echelons were conceived to provide legitimacy to Ottoman sultan‟s rule as well as his 
decisions and policies. Lower ranked ulema, as imams or some local medrese scholars, 
had influence on the people in the grassroots level. This provided popular support at the 
side of the ulema, that they even occasionally used for and against the Ottoman 
administration. Thus, ilmiyye (class of ulema) became a key component both in the 
operation of the Ottoman state machinery and everyday life through judgeship, fiqh and 
preaching. This rendered ulema an important locus of power. Ideally in Islamic 
political theory, secular state mechanism was to be subordinate to religion as the means 
that the religious law would be executed
176
. Therefore according to Halil Inalcik, 
                                                 
175 Ottoman sultans starting with Mehmed II adopted titles that emphasized their divine 
features as the rulers. Mehmed II was called by Tursun Bey in Tarih-i Ebu’l Feth as the 
zillullah fi’l Arz (shadow of God on earth) and Suleyman I adopted the title of caliph of 
God on earth. Ahmet Yasar Ocak, Turkler, Turkiye ve Islam, 63. Tursun Bey, Târîh-i 
Ebü'l-Feth (Istanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1977). 
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“the ulema class regarded the secular authority as its subordinate and 
strove to put this theory into practice. Nevertheless, in practice, the religious 
head of the Islamic community was always the sultan-caliph, and that the ulema 
at all times exercised religious authority in his name. In the Ottoman Empire the 
power of appointing and deposing the ulema always remained in the hands of 
the sultan and his grand vizier, representing the secular authority”177.  
This situation does not imply a sheer conflict or segregation between the ulema 
and the secular authority. Nevertheless, I think we can talk about an implicit tension 
existed between the ulema and the “ruling institution” (the sultan and the executive 
officers of his household), as Mardin argued, due to uneasiness of the ulema with the 
possible arbitrariness of the extra-Shar’i law (kanun) proclaimed by the secular 
authority
178
.  To various authors including Mardin or Abu-Manneh, this tension 
frequently surfaced in the 19th century, especially between the ulema and the Tanzimat 
bureaucracy, and implications of this tension can be observed in Young Ottomans‟ 
arguments against the “men of the Tanzimat”179.  
 
II.2. Ottoman Ulema Challenged 
 
As mentioned above, the role of the ilmiyye (class of ulema) was vital in the 
functioning of Ottoman legal, educational and political systems. In the 18
th
 century, 
high ulema hierarchy had organized into a quasi-aristocratic family structure and had 
aligned itself with the military and administrative bureaucracy
180
. Ottoman 
modernization in the 19
th
 century induced great transformations in this structure. First, 
ulema gradually differentiated from the military and civil elites in terms of educational 
and cultural outlook
181. “The top echelons of the religious establishment and its major 
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180 Madeline Zilfi, Politics of Piety, 232. 
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institutions were reorganized under the jurisdiction of a ministry headed by the 
Şeyhülislâm” and “their relative weight within the state administration steadily 
decreased from the early nineteenth century”182. Although they were still politically and 
socially influential, the state-led educational, administrative and legal reforms of the 
19
th
 century according to Mardin and Shaw eroded their basic sources of power –
“namely, the endowment revenues, the systems of Muslim education and justice”183. 
The foundation of the Ministry of Pious Foundations (Nezaret-i Evkaf-1826) 
which took over the administration of pious foundations
184
 from the seyhulislamate, 
together with the transfer of the two kazaskers from the Divan (Imperial Council) to the 
Office of the Seyhulislam (1837) which would operate as a “religious” judiciary 
council were the earliest steps in the fiscal and administrative weakening of ulema‟s 
power
185
. In this regard, the foundation of the Ministry of Education that was assigned 
the supervision of the primary and secondary schools (rusdiyes) was signaling the 
relative weakening of ulema‟s influence in the administration of education during 
Tanzimat period. 1869 Regulation of Public Education was a turning point marking the 
suspension of ulema‟s power over Muslim schools except medreses186. Legal reforms 
of the Tanzimat period followed educational ones with an increasing pace. A huge 
corpus of Western laws, regulations and codes, i.e. Commercial and Penal codes and 
new Land law, after 1850 were transferred into the Ottoman legal system in addition to 
the assignment of Council of Judicial Ordinances (in 1870s Ministry of Justice) with 
                                                                                                                                              
military by accommodating the Sublime Porte an unbalanced power in the face of the 
ulema. Consequently, an implicit tension between these secular-minded officials and 
ulema arouse in time. Butrus Abu-Manneh, Studies on Islam, 49. Stanford Shaw, 
History of the Ottoman Empire, 69.  
182
 Amit Bein, The Ulema, Their Institutions and Politics in the Late Ottoman Empire 
(1876-1924) (PHD diss., Princeton University, 2006), 9. 
183 Serif Mardin, Bediuzzaman, 106, 107. Stanford Shaw, History of the Ottoman 
Empire, 69.  
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some legislative and judicial functions. After mixed civil and criminal courts began to 
act in 1840s, the establishment of statutory courts (Nizamiye mahkemeleri-1869) 
operating according to Western criminal and commercial laws heralded the dissociation 
of the public law
187
 from the jurisdiction of the ulema and out of the reach of the 
Sharia
188
 . Hence, Sharia was being reduced into a private law that mostly dealt with 
personal/domestic matters, like inheritance
189
. However, it would be misleading to 
claim that the ulema did lose their power and positions instantly. Many of the cadres of 
instruction in the secular schools or new magistracy positions in secular courts were 
occupied by the ulema, due to the lack of trained personnel
190
. Moreover, many of the 
ulema still held onto their government positions. Some among the ulema also supported 
the Tanzimat reforms and integrated into the reforming elite by defrocking, like Ahmet 
Cevdet Pasha
191
. As a result, it is problematic to perceive ulema as a monolithic group 
that was totally disturbed by the reforms and opposed to it.  
 There occurred a duality between the secular and religious systems but this 
did not imply a total separation or conflict between each other. Rather, there were 
overlaps between the state elites and the ulema; secular -legal and educational- and the 
religious systems. On the other hand, we can talk about contempt at the side of the 
practical-minded Westernizing Tanzimat statesmen for the religious establishment and 
the traditional values. The maintenance of traditional practices and institutions became 
a subject of particular dissatisfaction, subsequent to 1860192. In the educational level, as 
Aksin Somel put forward, “the late Tanzimat [1856-1876] reformist elite … aimed at a 
radical change in the existing educational structure, eliminating the cultural 
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compartments imposed by traditional religious divisions, and secularizing government 
schools”193. Concomitantly, “critics [of the religious establishment] emphasized the fact 
that the medreses remained generally unchanged even as the state schools evolved and 
expanded as institutions of modern learning”194. Notwithstanding their collaboration 
with the ulema against the Porte, Young Ottomans were to charge the ulema with 
ineffectiveness and ignorance in the sciences and religious matters195. This was, to 
Young Ottomans, due to the neglect of the religious sciences in the empire 18
th
 century 
onwards196. As a matter of fact, there were very few efforts to reform the medreses 
(Islamic schools) during the late Tanzimat period197; the men of the Tanzimat 
overlooked the demands for medrese reform both from the ulema and the 
intellectuals198. On the other hand, some reform projects returned empty-handed199. 
Hamidian government ironically continued previous Ottoman administrative 
attitude of benign neglect towards medrese education, although it paid a conspicuous 
attention on Islamic symbols and institutions as the sources of legitimacy for its rule, 
and initiated a series of educational reforms in the state schools
200
. Therefore, 
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according to Selim Deringil, the lower level ulema looked for new avenues of mobility 
through the tekkes and the officially sanctioned media
201
. The negative rhetoric on the 
traditional Islamic institutions, especially medreses and the ulema, took further during 
the Hamidian period. Ulema were regarded by the new emerging Young Turks or 
devout Muslim intellectuals as scholarly and administratively outdated. They were 
hence deemed as the Islamic counterpart of the established –European- churches and 
clergy which positivist and anti-religious movements and revolutions did severely 
assault in Europe. The ulema were aware that these challenges might have come up 
with their ultimate marginalization similar to the European clergy
202
.  
The ulema of the Hamidian era were of course not monolithic; how they had been 
influenced by the changes and their responses (their authoritative positions, views and 
strategies) revealed variations. Quite a few among them admitted the necessity for 
reform in line with the modern sciences and „demands of the time‟ and looked for ways 
to respond to the challenges
203
. While some remained loyal to the sultan and the regime 
from which they petitioned reform, others aligned themselves with the Young Turk 
opposition against the Hamidian regime that they perceived as the main cause for the 
stagnancy of the medreses and the learned class
204. These controversies and ulema‟s 
efforts became conducive to the Islamic politics and discussions of the Second 
Constitutional period. The increasing challenges to ulema‟s position in the state and 
society after 1908 and radical religious reforms carried out by the CUP government 
after 1915 contributed to the marginalization of the ulema and intensified their efforts 
to respond these impacts
205
. 
I think it would not be wrong to talk about the partial alienation of the ulema 
from the administrative, legal and educational affairs throughout the 19
th
 century; yet 
this did not take place at once. Instead, it would be more proper to argue that the 
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process was imperceptibly swinging and its social reverberations were already 
intimidating a fairly large portion of the ulema. This uneasiness at the side of the ulema 
in addition to the sore repercussions of deeply buried transformation of the social fabric 
late 18
th
 century onwards created antagonistic responses among the ulema; first popped 
up during the late Tanzimat
206
. Growing discontent of some members of the ulema 
seems to have been juxtaposed with the increasing frustration in the grassroots level for 
the Tanzimat
207
 which was mostly uttered by the Young Ottomans.  
 
II.3. Islamic Thought of Young Ottomans 
 
The Islamic outlook of Young Ottomans‟, especially Namik Kemal‟s, criticism of 
the Tanzimat regime and political claims was distinctive
208
. Young Ottomans were the 
first circle of intellectuals in the Ottoman history, out of the ulema, to enunciate an 
Islamic message implanted with religious symbols and references. They charged 
Westernizing reforms introduced by the Tanzimat bureacrats with being superficial, 
immoral as well as culturally alien and un-Islamic
209
. According to them, the reforms 
should be in accordance with the social fabric, traditional customs and Sharia since 
Sharia had been the basis of Ottoman society
210
. While they were politically 
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challenging the so-called arbitrary policies of the men of the Tanzimat, they endorsed 
their liberally inspired ideas with Islamic rules, practices and concepts, and with 
reference to Islamic history
211
.  
This resulted with the recasting of some traditional Islamic concepts like mesveret 
or sura, in line with the Western political ideals like representative government or 
democracy. In their view, the Western political principles of representative governance, 
Constitution and Rule of Law should be adopted but this was different from the 
superficial cultural content of the West introduced by the Tanzimat elite. For these 
principles had already concurred with the premises of the Sharia
212
. Namely, the 
idealized Western political system and concepts had already been inherent in the Sharia 
and in the Islamic tradition. At this juncture, the superiority of the cultural and 
civilizational content of Islam was emphasized
213. Then, in order “to free the Ottoman 
Empire of its inferior position”, “going back to the original „unspoilt‟ sources of Islam” 
and revitalizing its spirit were urged, prominently by Namik Kemal
214
. This demand 
was important for being one of the first calls for the original Islam in the modern 
context that would later be a basic maxim of the imminent Islamic modernist and Salafi 
movements.  
Getting rid of the inferior position of the Ottoman Empire and the Muslims 
around the world and providing the welfare of the Islamic community were important 
themes in the Young Ottoman writings. This approach attained a more extensive form 
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in the new setting of balance of European powers in 1870s, also when the saddening 
news of Muslims from the Central Asia were reaching to the Ottoman capital and Pan-
Germanist and Pan-Slavist ideologies were on their ride
215
. This aroused the idea of the 
unification of Islamic people, “Pan-Islam” (ittihad-i Islam), which was assumed by 
Mardin to be a Young Ottoman invention
216. This initially “defensive and cultural” 
invention turned into a more political project till the end of the decade while finding 
stronghold in the Ottoman “public opinion” (efkar-i umumiye)217. In this context, Islam 
had come to be a banner to mobilize the Muslim populations, and a “social cement” to 
bind the Muslim people. It is argued by Turkone that Islam had thereby been 
instrumentally used by the Young Ottomans in a new form and context
218
. They also 
sided themselves with the ulema and utilized the traditional methods like preaching or 
fetwas other than new media technologies to win the public opinion and mobilize the 
masses
219
. 
 The codification of Sharia as Mecelle between 1869 and 1876 was also 
important to understand the change in the function and elaboration of religion in the 
Ottoman context. The codification of Sharia rulings in a Western legal model was 
generally interpreted as an effort to standardize and rationalize the religious code in the 
Weberian sense
220
. Ahmet Cevdet Pasha who was the head of the commission to codify 
Sharia indicated the non-systematic and disarrayed situation of the Sharia
221
. By 
codification the Sharia would be made up to date and applicable to the demands of the 
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modern times according to Ahmet Cevdet Pasha and the Ottoman ruling elite
222
. 
Therefore the Sharia would get organized in contrast to the looseness and arbitrariness 
of its application in the local contexts
223
. This surely signaled a shift from the locally 
diverse and interpersonal nature of the Sharia and religion organically encircling the 
almost every dimension of the everyday life as described by Nathan Brown and 
Murteza Bedir
224
. In other words, religion was gradually turning into a legal and 
religious specialization, being separated from its ritualistic shell as practiced in the 
everyday life
225
 and being “reified” instead of being a socially all-encompassing and 
diffuse structure.  
 
II.4. Sufism and Movement of Re-Islamization 
 
19
th
 century Ottoman modernization created and witnessed noteworthy changes 
in the Sufi life. The endeavors to bring regularization to Sufi orders under clinging state 
supervision during the reign of Mahmud II were one of the earliest changes made to the 
Sufi life. This was indicative of state‟s increasing demand to control religious orders 
and life in grassroots level, and the conviction that Sufi orders needed reform due to 
their disarrayed condition. Nevertheless, Sufi orders more or less maintained their 
autonomous status from the state during most of the 19
th
 century. The abolition of 
Bektashi orders in 1826 which were known with their latitudinarian and unorthodox 
inclinations was a radically important occurrence. This was actually an outcome of the 
annihilation of Janissary corps which had organically associated with the order as its 
religious mentor. After their abolition many of the Bektashi lodges were replaced by 
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Naqshbandi order and Bektashis continued their existence under the roof of different 
lodges till 1860s. However, the influence of Sharia-minded Naqshbandis in the 
abolition of the Bektashi order was undeniable
226
.  
Naqshbandi order needs further comment since it was influential in the 19
th
 
century Ottoman life. Butrus Abu-Manneh in his book, Studies on Islam and the 
Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century (1826 - 1876), asserts the marching of the 
Naqhsbandi order and one of its sub-branches Khalidi Naqshbandiyya in the Ottoman 
religious life in the 19
th
 century. In contrast to the ideas identifying Ottoman 
modernization with Westernization and secularization Abu-Manneh argued that a 
current of grassroots Islamization with the impetus of Naqshbandi order had taken 
place starting from the era of Selim III till the Reform Edict of 1856. The increasing 
leverage of the Naqshbandis was the direct result of the intensified flow of Mujaddidi 
and Khalidi branches of Naqshbandi order into the Ottoman lands, mainly into the 
capital. The commitment to Sharia, prayers and Sunnah, rejection of outwardly ecstatic 
Sufi rites with a missionary activism and commitment to political authority were 
exclusive features of the order compared to other Sufi orders of the time. These 
according to Abu-Manneh created a sort of Sunni orthodox trend in the spheres of 
order‟s influence. The missionary impetus of the order drove their members into the 
higher ranks of ulema and bureaucrats to gain some influence in state matters. 
According to the findings of Abu-Manneh, quite a few members of the ulema including 
seyhulislams, and state functionaries were coming from Naqshbandis or were 
Naqshbandi sympathizers till the proclamation of Reform Edict in 1856. This, 
according to Abu-Manneh, created a sort of Sunni orthodox trend that shaped the 
orientation of the state policies during the first half of the century
227
. These influences 
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came to an end during the rule of Ali and Fuad Pashas in 1860s. The Sufi orders, 
especially the Naqshbandi order, were kept under close scrutiny and the Tanzimat 
regime tried to bring the orders under control by the establishment of an assembly of 
Sufi leaders (Meclis-i Mesayih) in 1866. The recovery of Bektashi order, which was 
illegal since 1826, was condoned and even favored by Ali and Fuad pashas. These 
developments according to Abu-Manneh engendered strife between Naqshbandis and 
the late Tanzimat administration perceiving them as a threat. Abu-Manneh even 
claimed that the Sunni orthodox message of Naqshbandi order was transmitted through 
certain communication channels to the Young Ottomans and the Young Ottomans‟ 
reverence to Sharia might be observed as an upshot of this influence
228
.    
One conclusion shared both by Abu-Manneh and Karpat was that Sufi 
revivalism
229
, which had been under way since the 18
th
 century, had been instrumental 
especially in the 19
th
 century to partially bring a compromise between the values –and 
Islamicity- of the lower and the higher classes, mainly in the Ottoman Empire
230
. These 
had therefore brought an impetus of “Islamization” in Sunni Orthodox lines. These 
movements, argued Kemal Karpat, had provided the local Muslim communities with a 
sense of universal Islamic identity; and acquainted with the codes of the established 
orthodoxy –mostly of the Ottoman state- and later with modern ones231. The 
intermediary role and the mobile and accommodative features of the Naqshbandi order 
have been also emphasized by Serif Mardin
232. Kemal Karpat‟s emphasis on the 
inspiring role of the Naqshbandi order on the religious policies of the sultan 
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Abdulhamid II is noteworthy
233
. The compromise between the values and religious 
culture of the lower and the higher classes and the resultant acquaintance of the lower 
classes with the codes of religious orthodoxy can also be taken into consideration while 
evaluating the religious revivalism of the Abdulhamid regime. This analysis seems 
more thorough, thinking the close affiliations between the Abdulhamid government and 
Naqshbandi order.  
 
II.5. Hamidian Islamic Policies 
 
The growing Islamic ideological affection in the 1870s came under a more 
compact and conspicuous pattern in the official ideology during the Hamidian rule 
(1876-1909). Islam -combined with patriotism- had come to be a constitutive element 
for the official ideology of the Hamidian administration. Especially losing most of the 
European territories that hosted the majority of the non-Muslim population of the 
empire pushed the Ottomanist tendencies of the Ottoman state ideology towards 
“Islamism”234. As Selim Deringil meticulously argued in his seminal work, Well-
Protected Domains, Abdulhamid regime that aspired to penetrate into the daily life of 
the Ottoman society forged a new Islamic orthodox ideology based on the Hanefi 
school of thought as a means of legitimacy
235
. In this scheme, the Sharia was redefined 
as an abstract ideal, and applauded as the foundation of the “imperial/national 
identity
236
. This new official trend towards Islamic orthodoxy
237
 accompanied with a 
demand for loyalty of the Ottoman subjects to the quasi-sacred sultan as the 
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embodiment of the state
238
. This would, according to Karpat, also bear an Islamic 
patriotic identity that would work as a social adhesive among the subject population
239
. 
Sultan‟s position as the caliph of all the Muslims turned out to be an overstressed 
political ideal to sustain the unity of the imagined universal Muslim community
240
. 
The state therefore attempted to make use of differing Islamic symbols, motifs 
and ideological tools to both display and implant its official ideology in the public
241
. In 
this parallel, education was employed as a milestone to clinch the religious and 
authoritarian values in the society
242
. To realize this goal, curriculums and programs of 
public schools were successively reworked through religious content to implement the 
moral disciplining and obedience among the students as discussed above
243
.  
Sultan took pains to tune well with the religious establishment and persona
244
. He 
himself particularly got affiliated with some important Sufi sheikhs who assumed 
intermediary roles between the sultan and his subjects
245
. They were therefore entrusted 
by the sultan with the promulgation and justification of state‟s Pan-Islamic message 
spotlighting sultan‟s status as the caliph of Islam among the people. Foremost among 
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his favorite sheikhs was Abu al-Huda al-Sayyadi of Rifai order
246
. He and other sheikhs 
either published an excessive collection of books and articles or actively involved in 
“defending the legitimacy of sultan Abdulhamid's assumption of the Caliphate and 
calling upon the Muslims to rally behind him and be submissive to him.”247  
One thrust at stake in Abu al-Huda‟s writings was the search for justification for 
absolute rule as the primary system of government in Islam, by sometimes use of heavy 
mystical content and fatalistic attitude of his Sufi message
248
. Abu al-Huda's call was 
basically addressed to the Arabic speaking Muslims of the empire, especially to the 
Syrian
249, while sheikh Zahir‟s message was designated to the African Muslims. Yet, to 
Abu-Manneh, especially Abu al-Huda‟s call was extended to Muslims all over the 
Muslim world with a feeling of pan-Islamic cohesion
250
. The vocation of Abu al-Huda 
and some associate Sufis might have been pivotal in delivering the (proto-national) 
Islamic gist of the Abdulhamid regime‟s ideology to the public and inculcating a 
feeling of universal Islamic belonging among them
251
. Not to this degree but 
Naqshbandis‟ paying homage to the ruler and compliance with the authority of the 
Islamic ruler/state can be juxtaposed with Abu al-Huda‟s submissive call. The fatalistic 
and obedient quietism attributed to Sufi creed, especially in the form of Sufi claims to 
submissive obedience to the absolutist rule, had been one of the principal objects of 
criticism in post-1908 anti-Sufi discourses. This was a salient component of criticism in 
Günaltay‟s thought as well. The close linkages between the sultan and some Sufi 
sheikhs might have been one of the reasons of the disdain among the Sufi critics. 
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Sultan‟s commitment to ensure that the public be exposed only to the sanctioned 
religion
252
 brought the tight restrictions on and rectification of the religious beliefs and 
practices. The Hamidian rule was wary of the freelance religious publication and 
preaching; and tried to keep it under control. This has of course a lot to do with the 
state‟s desire to suppress any political or ideological opposition that can be expressed 
and legitimized through religious mediums against the sultan. This trend was ironically 
furthered to establish official control on the printing of Quran or basic ilmihal 
(catechism) books
253
. Another dimension of this unifying attitude was displayed in the 
organized efforts to inculcate the “true Islam” in the local level by conversion. In other 
words, the heretical and heterodox beliefs of the local communities would be 
“corrected” in accordance with the Hanefi mezheb254. This rhetoric of “correction of 
beliefs” (tashih-i akaid) was a common theme of the Abdulhamid administration and 
the government sought to actualize this enterprise by sending missionary troops of 
ulema or preachers to the provinces, and/or by educating the local imams, in order to 
incorporate the local heretics into the mainstream Islam
255
. One of the most 
comprehensive of these attempts was the campaign conducted in 1891-92 to convert 
Yezidis
256
. This mission entailed an official upbringing of a group of preachers and 
missionaries through a formalized education by the ulema
257
. This was one of the first 
initiatives of constructing the society in line with the official imagination of the 
subjects by the state. It is also worthy to note that the conception of a sanctioned “true 
Islam” integrated to a practical programme of correction of beliefs would be an 
important motif that came across within the discourses of quite a few devout 
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intellectuals after the 1908 Revolution of Young Turks; especially in Semseddin 
Günaltay‟s.  
 
II.6. Analysis: Change in the Conception and Social Operation of Islam 
 
This chapter tried to provide a historical account of how the meanings and 
social operations related to Islam transmuted throughout the 19
th
 century at the central 
parts of the Ottoman Empire. It is argued by Serif Mardin and Mumtaz‟er Turkone that 
Islam had acquired a new cast in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century and this was a 
“newer” Islam which implied a break with the traditional Islam258. Whether changing 
outlook of Islam had been traditional or post-traditional, this change can be observed in 
Hamidian contemplation of official orthodox Islam. This surely had something to do 
with the 19
th
 century transformations in the status of the Ottoman religious 
establishment. In the previous chapter, I made a brief evaluation of the uneven 
differentiation that the religious establishment went through from the administrative, 
legal and educational affairs/domains throughout the 19
th
 century although this was not 
a smooth and outright “disestablishment”259. The weakening of the ulema‟s power and 
disengagement from the administrative –and thus indirectly in the social- affairs 
generated profound transformations in the Ottoman political, social and religious 
fabric
260
. This according to Mardin brought Islam‟s gradual segregation to an 
autonomous sphere distinct from the political, economical and legal domains
261
. In 
other words, towards the end of the century, Islam in the Ottoman context came to be 
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more of a theological matter of which pervasive influence on the political, economical, 
and even legal issues waned
262
. Therefore Islam became more “religious” in the post-
Enlightenment (Cartesian) sense inheriting the dismemberment of religion from its 
social functions within “its self-delineated space”263. This was closely related to 
Tanzimat process of loosening in Sharia‟s pervasive social functions; what Serif 
Mardin and Recep Senturk defined as a process of fiqh‟s reduction into a specialty and 
problem solving technique dealing with private matters, namely familial issues like 
inheritance
264
. This confinement of Islam into its self-lineated space was followed by 
what has been called as “privatization of religion”265. Therefore this new form of Islam 
according to Serif Mardin, Mumtaz‟er Turkone and Ismail Kara diverged from its 
historically formed, socially all-encompassing traditional arrangement composed of a 
web of social relations and obligations
266
. 
On the other hand, this non-unilinear evolvement of the “religious” in its new 
layout generated a certain degree of “reification” in the conceptualization of Islam. 
Namely, the ritualistic, disciplinary and socially imperative sides of religion were 
downplayed and its cultural and civilizational component or essence was prioritized
267
. 
Therefore, a transcultural and transhistorical essence was attributed to Islam. Both 
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Turkone and Mardin argued that this reification provided a certain ideologization and 
intellectualization of Islam which is noticeable in Young Ottomans‟ borrowing of 
Islamic signs and concepts in their political discourses
268
. The reification of Islam was 
also inherent in the codification of Mecelle as a rationalized and standardized univocal 
edition of Sharia which had previously been an organic component of everyday life. 
This univocal-ity and essentialization of Islam was juxtaposed with the necessities of 
the time as explained by Ahmet Cevdet Pasha. By this means, political and ideological 
claims on and through Islam came to be more convenient. In a way, Islam turned out to 
be perceived as a subject matter as a rationally comprehensible unit. This gave power to 
claims on Islamic orthodoxy or true Islam as was in the use of Hamidian regime. This 
reified, transhistorical and non-phenomenological Islamic understanding was the legacy 
of 19
th
 century developments to the 20
th
 century Ottoman discussions on religion. This 
transformation is crucial to understand the ground for the Islamist discourses and 
Günaltay‟s ideas within its context. 
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CHAPTER III 
Islamic Revival In The Second Constitutional Period (1908-1918) 
 
 
This chapter is devised to provide basic developments in the Ottoman religious 
life and Islamic reformist trends following the Young Turk Revolution (1908) in order 
to have a better grasp of the context in which Şemseddin Günaltay raised as an Islamic 
modernist intellectual. Therefore this chapter first concentrates on the CUP policies on 
Islam and mobilization of Islamic groups including Sufis and ulema during the Second 
Constitutional Period. Islamism of the Second Constitutional Period and the impact of 
the Afghani and Abduh‟s ideas on Islamists and Şemseddin Günaltay constitute another 
concern of this chapter. Late Ottoman discourses on Sufi orders and superstitions will 
be also examined.  
 
III.1. Views of Young Turks on Islam 
 
 Young Turks‟ views about Islam were not monolithic. Serif Mardin argued in 
his book Jon Turklerin Siyasi Fikirleri (1895-1908) that leading Young Turk 
intellectuals were less learned about Islam and their arguments concerning religion 
were more or less superficial and instrumental in nature compared to Young 
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Ottomans269. Although there were some Islamists or ulema within the Young Turks and 
Islam still had been paid some attention within the group due to its foundational and 
rhetorical importance, it did not occupy anymore the underlying place in the Young 
Turk thought and their future plans.  Nevertheless, many of the materialist and 
positivist members of the CUP both before and after 1908 Revolution could not 
underestimate the pivotal role of Islam as the underlying social, cognitive and lingual 
foundation in the Ottoman life, especially in terms of providing social solidarity and 
social/political legitimacy270. Ahmet Riza as a positivist or Abdullah Cevdet as a 
materialist therefore brought the socially binding aspects of Islam to the fore. Ahmet 
Riza discussed Islam‟s compatibility with the basic premises and visions of positivism 
like progress or social union in contrast to Christianity‟s inhibitive nature to progress, 
science and modernization271. Yet Islam was the most suitable religion to come into 
terms with modern necessities and developments, and useful for political and social 
ends272. Therefore Islam was seen through a more instrumental perspective by a fairly 
large number of Young Turks such as Ahmet Riza, Riza Tevfik or Abdullah Cevdet273.  
 As a consequence, Young Turks during their oppositional years in 1890s 
looked for cooperation with some Islamic groups against the Hamidian regime. CUP 
collaborated with some Sufi orders and members. Hanioglu indicates the active support 
of some Bektashi, Melami and Mevlevi sheikhs and lodges for CUP274. On the other 
hand, the support of some Sufi sheikhs and orders for the Hamidian regime as well as 
some ulema turned out as a source of criticism against Sufi orders and ulema. As Abu-
Manneh construed, Sufi orders were suggested by some of their anti-Hamidian 
contemporaries as a cause of blind obedience to the despotic regimes, namely 
Hamidian rule, with their quietist understanding revering authority and 
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submissiveness275. This might have been one of the reasons that Sufi orders and sheikhs 
were brought under severe condemnations during the Second Constitutional Period.  
 On the other hand, although they were not natural allies, CUP also got 
cooperated with some members of ulema who were disturbed or unsatisfied by the 
Hamidian policies in general and by regime‟s negligent approach to medreses and 
religious establishment276. Hoca Muhiddin, Hoca Kadri277, and Ubeydullah Efendi and 
Musa Kazim Efendi -who was to be the sheikhulislam after 1908 Young Turk 
Revolution- were some among these ulema. CUP also attempted to make use of some 
fetwas (jurisprudential opinions) against the Hamidian regime278. Ubeydullah and Musa 
Kazim effendis actively participated in the committee after the revolution. Some 
Islamist intellectuals or journals also got affiliated with and supported CUP both before 
and after 1908. Manastirli Ismail Hakki, Musa Kazim Efendi, Serafettin Yaltkaya, 
Mehmet Akif, Seyyid Bey and Semseddin Günaltay were some influential Islamists of 
the Second Constitutional Period who were charged with crucial tasks in CUP as 
members of the Committee279. Many of the Islamic publications celebrated the 
Constitutional regime after 1908 with enthusiasm and decried the autocratic rule of 
Abdulhamid despite its Islamic outlook280. The calamitous political events of the 
following years and the anti-religious views of some members of the CUP faded this 
enthusiasm and augmented critical voices against the committee281. Nevertheless some 
journals like Sebilürreşad, the most important Islamist journal of Second Constitutional 
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Period Ottoman intellectual life, did not entirely cut their support and shift toward a 
severe opposition against the CUP282.  
 Islam acquired a more functional role as a social cohesive, reforming impetus 
and legitimizing tool following the Constitutional Revolution in the eyes of CUP 
administrators. According to Mardin, the Young Turks were sympathetic to a deistic 
approach to religion because it allowed them to praise Islam as the most excellent and 
advanced of all religions while engaging in positivistic reforms of society283. Tunaya 
has remarked that Islamist and Turkist policies had increasingly found more and more 
stress in CUP‟s program following the calamitous losses of Muslim lands in the Balkan 
Wars (192-1913)284. The majority of the Ottoman population was now Muslims and 
pan-Islamic policies emphasizing the caliphate were apparently of more use. Hence 
Islamic symbols were more frequently employed by the government. Hasan Kayali has 
pointed out that the Hamidian policies of conversion and sending missions continued 
during the Young Turk period285. CUP tried to use Islam as a means of propaganda and 
social cement in order to thwart the centripetal forces of the Ottoman ethnic groups286.  
 Islamist journal Islam Mecmuasi started publication in 1913 by the 
government was another undertaking for Islamist policies of the CUP. It can be 
considered in regard to CUP‟s increasing aspirations for an Islamist policy and need for 
a reformist voice and opinions of Islam apart from the classical ulema which they 
deemed as conservative287. In Islam Mecmuasi, some of the intellectuals close to CUP 
like Şemseddin Günaltay, Serafettin Yaltkaya, Mansurizade Said, Seyyid Bey and Ziya 
Gokalp published articles. Especially Ziya Gokalp‟s articles about Islamic 
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jurisprudence through the lens of Durkheimian sociology were remarkable288. The 
journal also became an important means for Şemseddin Günaltay to get closer with 
Ziya Gokalp whose intellectual influences on Şemseddin Günaltay‟s ideas are 
undeniable.   
 However, to Amit Bein, Ottoman administrations of the Second 
Constitutional Period “were much less invested in nurturing a positive image and 
maintaining the influence of the religious establishment” and they implemented a 
modernization program that added to the marginalization of the ulema and Sufi 
orders289. By the enactment of a reform proposal by Ziya Gokalp in 1915 and 1916, to 
further standardize and secularize the organization of the state and the religious 
establishment, a strict government control over the religious establishment was 
sustained. The medreses were given under the supervision of the Ministry of Education, 
Sharia courts under the Ministry of Justice and secular legal regulations turned 
operative over the religious law; seyhulislam‟s position was turned into a purely 
religious one290. Therefore the political and even social influence of the religion was 
technically minimized and confined into a “religious” range which was perceived to be 
purely theological291.  
 Although almost no members of the CUP outspokenly disparaged Islam, 
criticisms to religion still appeared but as an overtone in the form of challenges to some 
allegedly “corrupted” religious institutions and social manifestations of religion292. 
Some intellectuals like Abdullah Cevdet or Ahmet Riza believed that religion was an 
archaic social phenomenon (a form of philosophy or complex social organization) and 
thus incompetent to respond the demands of the time293. The native culture and 
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traditional epistemologies were depicted as outmoded and backward. Sway of the 
atheist and anti-religious views of Buchner or Vogt created an outright “criticism 
against religion but disguised as refutations of superstitions”294. These anti-religious 
challenges, in the footprints of the European criticism of the Church and clergy, were 
leveled against the religious establishment, namely against the ulema, medrese system 
and Sufi lodges295. Superstition and fanaticism were the main impediments before 
progress and civilization just had been in Europe and they had to be wiped out just as in 
the European history296. These challenges continued crescendo after the Young Turk 
Revolution.  
 
III.2. How to Understand Islamism (Islamcilik) 
 
According to Serif Mardin, the increasing amount of newspapers, journals and 
publications after 1908, opened a sphere in which Islam was passionately discussed
297
. 
In this juncture, organizations and publications by a wide group of religiously oriented 
intellectuals flourished and created a movement, named by many as Islamcilik 
(Islamism). Sırat-ı Müstakim (Sebilürreşad), Islam Mecmuasi, Beyanu’l Hak, Volkan, 
Tasavvuf, Ceride-i Sufiye, Hikmet and so on were some of the journals associated with 
Islamist intellectuals, ulema or Sufi orders.  
 A group of intellectuals wrote articles in these journals, especially in 
Sebilürreşad, Beyanu’l Hak and Islam Mecmuasi have been generally acknowledged as 
Islamists, and their non-cohesive but diversely collective intellectual production has 
been called as Islamism298. Yet what late Ottoman Islamism299 had been is a complicated 
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question since there has been no simple definition of or clear-cut boundaries drawn for 
Islamism as an ideology or movement. Answering this question is already an 
overambitious task that goes beyond the objective and scope of this study. Also it is 
almost impossible to regard Islamism as a socially and politically structured project 
with a sui generis and coherent programme300. Intellectuals who were retrospectively 
called as Islamist did not already call themselves as Islamist301. Nevertheless, a self-
consciousness and idealism as well as intellectual attachment pertaining to Islam and 
being a Muslim can be recognized among a group of devout intellectuals after the 
Second Constitutional Period.  
 On the other hand, although there were important commonalities in the 
themes and discourses of some intellectuals wrote in certain journals and thus called as 
“Islamists”, we can talk about internal differentiations in their discourses and themes; 
even there occured crucial alterations in the writings of a particular author in time or 
according to context. The definitional ambiguities of Islamism and internal intellectual 
differentiations of so-called Islamist group led the students of late Ottoman Islamism to 
make distinctions between differing forms of Islamism(s): Islamic modernists (or 
modernist Islamists), traditionalist Islamists, conservatives and so on.   
                                                                                                                                              
299 One of the first uses of the term Islamism in the Ottoman context has been furthered 
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 One discussion has been whether Ottoman Islamism was a phenomenon 
peculiar to Second Constitutional Period or had some precedence in the Abdulhamid 
era or among the Young Ottomans. For example, Mumtaz‟er Turkone has taken the 
emergence of Islamism back to Young Ottomans due to the use of Islam as an 
ideological banner by Namik Kemal or Ali Suavi302. In other words, ideologization of 
Islam understood within a Western intellectual/ideological web of meanings and 
symbols in a Geertzian sense as a sort of “temporalization” and rationalization of 
Islamic legitimacy gives birth to Islamism as an ideological and political movement in 
Turkone‟s contemplation303. Turkone‟s analysis presents useful insights about the 
importance of ideologization of Islam related to its reification -as discussed in the 
previous chapter- for the emergence of an Islamist impetus. Nevertheless, Turkone‟s 
categorical touchstone of ideologization of Islam to define Islamism is too vague and 
unelaborated to define what Islamism is and why it should be attributed to Young 
Ottomans.  
 Ismail Kara also discusses on this issue and concludes that Young Ottomans 
were not Islamists since their thought was not mainly based on Islam –whether 
traditional or as a new ideological form of Islam- but on liberal Western philosophy 
and patriotism as well as Islam304. Despite the insufficiency of Ismail Kara‟s 
counterclaim that Young Ottomans were not Islamists, I think his view implies the lack 
of a more or less self-conscious and organized ideological alignment mainly –and 
singularly- around Islam –at least in rhetoric- and use of it as a foundational ground for 
ideological production that makes it an “ism”. This does not need to reckon without the 
fact that some of the themes that crystallized in the Second Constitutional Period 
Islamist discourse can be identified in Young Ottoman thought and Young Ottoman 
thought lent its intellectual tools and arguments to the Second Constitutional Period 
Islamists like Mehmet Akif or Manastirli Ismail Hakki305. 
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 Both Kemal Karpat and Ismail Kara then look for the roots of Islamism in 
Abdulhamid regime‟s emblematic use of Islam as an ideological credo306. Nevertheless, 
as both indicated this Hamidian official Islamism did not generate an intellectually 
framed current or intellectual body aligned around Islam as an ideological, cultural and 
theological foundation for their ideas. This can be seen as a phenomenon that would 
appear in the Second Constitutional Period. Therefore Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Ismail Kara 
and Serif Mardin all entrenches the ripening of Ottoman Islamism as an 
ideological/intellectual movement into the Second Constitutional Period307. 
 One of the earliest scholarly attempts to provide a relatively more 
comprehensive explanation for Ottoman Islamism was made by Tarik Zafer Tunaya. 
According to Tunaya, Islamism was an ideological as well as politicized cereyan 
(current) of the Second Constitutional Period and it was a quest for an „Islamic 
Renaissance‟ epitomized by the demand to return to the original sources of Islam308. In 
his definition, in the ideological level, Islamism claimed to be a system of belief and 
thought that also looked for social and political institutions; and in the political level, 
attempted to lead the Ottoman Empire to a certain ideal in order to save it and keep its 
integrity309.  
 Despite Tunaya‟s Islamcilik Cereyani (1962) was the first scholarly work that 
could provide an analytical framework to understand the Ottoman Islamist movement, 
it nonetheless lacks to give a satisfying account of content and method of the Islamist 
movement of the Second Constitutional Period in a contextualized manner. Moreover, 
he especially overlooks the considerable differences within the “current” by identifying 
Islamism with a mobilized form of traditionalism and conservatism against the 
modernization movement. What is remarkable in Tunaya‟s account is his 
acknowledgement of a “modernist” group within the Islamist current, personified by 
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thinkers like Ismail Hakki (Izmirli) or M. Semseddin Günaltay since they were partially 
“rationalist” and relatively more “open-minded”, “progressive” and accommodative in 
terms of embracing some modern tools or ideas to perpetuate Islamic ideals310.  
 A similar vein of thought can be distinguished in Berkes‟ Secularization in 
Turkey (1964). Despite its accomplishment of bringing in a huge bulk of knowledge 
about the late Ottoman history, the book presents a teleological account of Turkish 
secularization in which Islamists again appears as reactionaries who reposed in the 
traditional and thus stood against the destined secularization of the Ottoman-Turkish 
society311. In Berkes‟ narrative again Islamists were categorized in a dichotomous 
progressive-obscurantist frame of thought. One important strain in both Tunaya and 
Berkes‟ works is the negative meaning attributed to Ottoman Islamic tradition as 
something corresponded to obscurantism and stagnancy. In this account, despite the 
effort put by Tunaya to partially separate Islamists from Ottoman-Islamic tradition in 
general they were still implicitly identified with an unchanging and remote tradition312.  
 On the other hand, the need to make a more nuanced classification among 
Islamists seems to be taken as an important problematic by Hilmi Ziya Ulken in his 
book The History of Modern Thought in Turkey (1966). Ulken distinguishes Islamists 
into four groups: 1) Traditionalist Islamists (Babanzade Ahmet Naim); 2) Islamic 
modernists who looked for ways to reconcile medrese learning with the secular 
learning (Semseddin Günaltay, Ismail Hakki Izmirli, Halim Sabit, Serafettin 
[Yaltkaya], Ziya Gokalp); 3) Ones tried to find a middle way between traditionalism 
and modernism (Seyhulislam Musa Kazim Efendi); 4) Anti-modernists (Mustafa 
Sabri)313. Despite the ambivalence of this categorization due to lack of explanation by 
Ulken, it still provides a better grasp of the divergences among differing views of 
supposedly Islamist intellectuals. Even with the operation of the dichotomous frame of 
analysis between the traditional and the modern, an important aspect in Ulken‟s 
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account is the emphasis on the modernist tendencies within the Islamist thought. 
According to Ulken modernists looked for ways to reconcile the modernity mostly 
understood in terms of science and reason with basic Islamic tenets314.  
 This modernist pillar in the Islamist thinking has been emphasized both by 
Serif Mardin and Ismail Kara. Serif Mardin in his book on Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, 
named the “forward-looking” flank among the Islamist intellectuals and ulema as 
Islamic „reformists‟ who were in the footprints of Jamaladdin Afghani and Muhammad 
Abduh who have been commonly regarded as the fathers of the modern Islamic 
movement called as Islamic reformism, Islamic modernism or Salafism315. Mardin 
counted some of these reformist Islamists as Mehmet Akif, Mardinizade Ebulula, 
Bereketzade Ismail Hakki, "Manastirli" Ismail Hakki and again our Şemseddin 
Günaltay. To him, the journal Sırat-ı Müstakim (Sebilürreşad) was the mainstay of this 
reformist movement316. The main unifying factor of these intellectuals with Islamical 
leanings was their demand for reform in Islam according to Mardin; and these 
reformers were in disagreement with some traditionalists, namely ulema, led by 
Mustafa Sabri Efendi317. However, different from the literature identifying traditionalist 
Islamism with obscurantism, Mardin interprets anti-reformist inclination in the late 
Ottoman Islamic thought as a defensive response to possible dangers of opening the 
Islamic field to an unprecedented flow of free interpretation and extreme rationalization 
which might have resulted in “bypassing the precedents established by the classical 
commentators of Islam”318. This could also have brought “the destruction of the 
accommodation which Islam had reached with localistic practices”319. This surely 
signals a different approach among its counterparts to tradition and reform within the 
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late Ottoman Islamist thought that partly goes beyond the dichotomy of progressiveness 
and reactionism associated with the modern and the traditional.  
Ismail Kara reveals a more radical but comprehensive approach to contextually 
analyze Islamism. According to Kara, late Ottoman Islamism as a whole was a 
„reformist‟ movement that took place within a modern paradigm instead of being a 
movement of tecdid (renewal), islah (reform) or ihya (revival) that has been perceived 
to take place “within the boundaries of Islamic tradition”320. In this regard, Ismail Kara 
provides a more comprehensive explanation for Islamism: 
Islamism can be described as a movement during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries that would make Islam as a whole (belief, worship, ethics, 
philosophy, politics, law, education) dominant „again,‟ and through rational 
methods would rescue Muslims and the Islamic world from Western 
colonialism and imperialism, tyrannical leaders, slavery, imitation, and 
superstition. It includes a whole range of particularly eclectic, activist and 
modernist approaches to political, intellectual and scholarly work, research, 
proposals and solutions in an effort to civilize, unify, and develop. In the 
Islamic world terms and expressions such as tecdid, ıslah, ittihad-i Islam 
(usually translating „Pan-Islamism‟), and ihya, have been employed to refer to 
Islamism, while in the West such terms as „Pan-Islamism‟ and, especially in 
more recent works, „modern Islam,‟ „contemporary Islamic thought,‟ and 
„reformist thought in Islam,‟ have been used. . . . In this sense then the Islamist 
movement that emerged in the nineteenth century, for all that it professed an 
emphasis on returning to the sources, generally remained far from a thorough 
reform and renewal, and in fact did not even try to carry it out. Since [Islamists] 
were after emancipation, development, power and control, rather than looking to 
the past it was much more attractive to think of the future and find urgent 
solutions to the pressing problems of the day
321
. 
In his understanding, Kara does not reserve any place to modernist, reformist or 
traditionalist strains of Islamism but collect them under the rubric of Islamism as a 
modern and modernist phenomenon. Actually the emphasis in Kara‟s definition on the 
exertion of eclectic, activist and modernist approaches and rational methods as well as 
civilizing and progressive ideals within the „Islamist movement‟ juxtaposes with 
Charles Kurzman‟s definition of Islamic modernism in a more global context as a 
modernist approach that self-consciously adopt “modern” values –i.e. rationality and 
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science- and use Islamic discourse
322
. In this vein, I think Kara‟s characterization of 
Islamism seems more likely to be an Islamic modernism in the sense that Kurzman 
understood.  
According to Basheer Nafi, the Islamic reformist movement of the late 19
th
 and 
early 20
th
 century was primarily an Islamic movement, and to be seen as such it had to 
employ Islamic tools and idioms and to express itself in Islamic discourse
323
. To him, 
Islam was the mere frame of reference that reformist could imagine. They were 
genuinely concerned about Islam‟s position in the modern world against Western 
penetration and thus their call for Islam was not a sheer strategic act
324. Basheer Nafi‟s 
approach is then useful to underline the Islamic aspect of the Islamist movement in the 
transnational context in contrast to the stress on modern aspects of the movement. 
Roxanne Euben approaches Islamic modernism as “an amalgamation of multiple 
cultural influences, an intricate and dense fabric spun not only from the threads of 
Western and Enlightenment influence but also from the „Islams‟, orthodox and 
heterodox, that comprise their indigenous traditions”325. Therefore Islamist ideology 
was fashioned within a „syncretistic context‟ while Islamists were looking for Islamic 
„authenticity‟326. I think Euben‟s explanation gives a more contextually in-depth 
account of Islamist movement and this approach can be reflected to explain the 
complex nature of late Ottoman Islamism as a syncretic movement of modern and 
Islamic influences.  
Here I do not make a strict separation between the modern and the traditional or 
between Islam/Islamic tradition and modernity since they do not hold unchanging, 
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timeless and dichotomous essences; rather they have been overlapped and also 
fashioned and reconfigured reciprocally. I am not in favor of labeling Islamism as an 
untraditional or out-of-traditional phenomenon of renewal like Kara while I do not 
understand „Islamic tradition‟ in the stagnant sense that Berkes and Tunaya referred. 
Rather I am more inclined to see Islamism as a movement brushed by the interactive 
and overlapping resonances of the Islamic tradition and modernity. In this regard, 
Islamism employed both traditionally Islamic and modern intellectual and ideological 
arguments and methods, although again I do not use Islamic and modern exclusively. 
Even more radically one can interpret late Ottoman Islamism as an extended 
“subtradition” of the “Islamic discursive tradition” in the sense that Talal Asad and his 
interlocutors reciprocally defined
327
. Nevertheless, this is a claim that should be 
discussed more elaborately and goes beyond the scope of this study.  
Simply speaking, I hold a view of Islamism similar to Euben‟s syncretism 
argument while taking Kara‟s and Kurzman‟s prioritization of modern impacts on the 
Islamist thought and Nafi‟s emphasis on the Islamicity of the Islamist movement. This 
understanding of tradition and traditionalism is I think in tune with Mardin‟s 
explanation of traditionalist groups‟ reactions. In this regard, I am of the opinion that 
Kara‟s above quoted definition of Islamism also makes enough sense to understand the 
main outline of the late Ottoman Islamist movement but with some reservations about 
his claims on Islamism‟s relation to Islamic tradition. 
I also find it useful to make a distinction between the relatively modernist and 
more traditionally inclined Islamisms. In this regard, I will use the terms Islamic 
modernism (or modernist Islamism) and traditionalist Islamism. I therefore locate 
Şemseddin Günaltay to the modernist side of the spectrum.  
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III.3. Islamist Mobilization in the Second Constitutional Period 
 
As mentioned earlier, Second Constitutional Period witnessed an Islamist 
mobilization thanks to the intellectual freedom of the period and various contextual 
influences and changes. Articulations of Islamist ideological inclinations were forged in 
close connection to changing context of social, political, and economic institutions and 
practices. In other words, the ongoing Ottoman transformations since the late 18
th
 
century furnished the very context in which the gist of Islamist discourses were 
unfolded. More specifically, the new Weltanschauung of the 20
th
 century Ottoman 
intellectual life preceding the Second Constitutional Period brushed Ottoman-Islamist 
discourse with profound strokes. Second Constitutional Period Islamism was indebted 
to the profound transmutations in the position and function of religion within the 
Ottoman context since the Tanzimat period as well as new configuration and 
conceptualization of Islam, especially during the Hamidian period.  
As mentioned earlier, it is difficult to reckon Second Constitutional Period 
Islamism as an organized social/political project which proposed a comprehensive 
reform plan or theoretically discussed the fundamentals and possibilities of change and 
foundations of a modern Islamic reform. Rather, it was more or less contingently 
carved out in relation to the actualities and intellectual interactions/discussions of the 
Second Constitutional Period and enterprises about how to hinder the alarming 
disintegration of the empire
328
. Therefore challenges facing Islam at the beginning of 
the century were also conducive to the configuration of the Islamist preoccupations and 
agendas
329
. Moreover, the Islamic modernist and Salafi ideas made their imprint in the 
Ottoman Islamist discourse. Then I think the dispositions of Şemseddin Günaltay‟s 
thought should be taken into consideration against the background of these formative 
influences. 
The challenges directed against Islam in principle and in life became one of the 
impetuses for a group of devout Muslims to mobilize. The challenges to the religious 
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establishment, even sometimes proposed by some Islamist intellectuals, became a real 
menace for the ulema and the Sufi orders after 1908. More often than not, derogatory 
arguments were brought about representing these groups as socially useless and even 
harmful with a political and unscholarly language. As a result, some ulema and Sufis 
established some associations and published some journals. These factors as well as the 
demand for reform in the medreses and for betterment in their social and political status 
became conducive for the ulema to adopt new media like journalism, and to get 
involved into political and civil activities like parties and voluntary associations
330
. 
Some supported cooperation with the CUP-dominated government while others opted 
for opposition. Some reform-minded ulema like Musa Kazim Efendi or Ubeydullah 
Efendi allied with CUP and occupied important government offices like 
Seyhulislamate
331
. Some others organized themselves into an association called 
Cemiyet-i Ilmiye-i Islamiye (the Ulema Association) in 1908. Shortly after, they 
initiated the publication of a journal called Beyanu’l Hak (Pronouncement of the Truth) 
by which they would try to resist the increasing pressure on the religious establishment 
and stigmatizing attitudes by some intellectuals
332
. Mustafa Sabri Efendi came to the 
fore as the leading figure of the journal in order to defend the ulema. He and major 
contributors of Beyanu’l Hak were represented as conservatives defending the status 
quo and opposing a reform in the religion and religious establishment
333
. However, the 
journal demanded betterments in medreses and the establishment of the ulema although 
they generally approached reformist and modernist Islamic attempts/trends with crucial 
disinclination
334
. The association after a brief support it gave to CUP opposed the 
Committee‟s administration due to the disregarding and even hostile attitude towards 
the ulema by some officials
335
. Later, the association got close ties with a new political 
party, Ahali Firkasi (People‟s Party-1910) and Mustafa Sabri became one of the 
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founders of the party which stayed in opposition against CUP during the following 
decade. Especially Mustafa Sabri Efendi and related ulema put considerable effort 
through publications to distance themselves from the counterrevolutionary incidence of 
31 March (1909) which was perceived as the insurgency of a reactionary group called 
Ittihad-i Muhammedi Cemiyeti (Muhammadan Union Association) led by a Bektashi 
dervish, Dervish Vahdeti
336
.  
Some Sufi orders and sheikhs also got organized and a group among them 
founded Cemiyet-i Sufiye (Sufi Society) in 1909 under the presidency of Seyhulislam 
Musa Kazim Efendi who was also a devout Naqshbandi. Moreover, the governmental 
council Meclis-i Mesayih which was originally founded in 1866 (The Council of 
Sheikhs) was reactivated
337
 and the foundation of a medrese, Medrese-i Mesihat, in 
order to educate Sufi sheikhs in religious sciences was proposed by some Sufis in 1913 
but this project did not work
338
. Some journals
339
 and books were published by the 
Sufis and encyclopedic projects for the history of Sufism were launched in order to 
remedy the deteriorations in Sufi beliefs and practices, to educate Sufis and to spread 
Sufi values in the society
340
. These activities were believed by Sufis to cleanse the 
negative representations of Sufi orders common in the public and therefore to spotlight 
the social services held by Sufi orders to refine morality and advance the society
341
.  
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Surely, the most important among the journals and organizations associated 
with the Islamist movement of the Second Constitutional Period was Sırat-ı Müstakim. 
Starting its publication in 1908 soon after the Revolution, journal continued till 1925 
and changed its name to Sebilürreşad in 1912. Islamist intellectuals, members of the 
ulema, some Sufi-minded intellectuals and during earlier years, non-Islamist 
intellectuals, who were mostly nationalists, constituted the main body of contributors to 
the journal. Some of the most famous of these contributors were Aksekili Ahmed 
Hamdi, Iskilipli Mehmed Atif, Esref Edip, Manastirli Ismail Hakki, Musa Kazim Efendi, 
Semseddin Günaltay, Serafettin (Yaltkaya), Mehmet Akif, Bereketzade Ismail Hakki, 
Babanzade Ahmet Naim, Izmirli Ismail Hakki, Halim Sabit (Sibay), Mardinizade 
Ebul’ula, Sehbenderzade Filibeli Ahmet Hilmi, Ferit (Kam), Ismail Fenni (Ertugrul), 
Mehmet Ali Ayni, Ahmet (Agaoglu), Ahmet Midhat Efendi and Yusuf (Akcura). Many of 
these intellectuals, including Şemseddin Günaltay, had had secular education distinct 
from the traditional Islamic schools. They “were aware of the products of the European 
thought of their time: Le Bon, Comte, Leibniz, Kant, Schopenhauer etc”342. 
Epistemological authority of modern science and reason in the late Ottoman intellectual 
scene was widely acknowledged by the Islamists.  
The discussions that Second Constitutional Period Islamists involved and anti-
religious and Orientalist challenges they tackled were influential in the maturation of 
their ideas. First, we should be reminded that some crucial Second Constitutional 
Period Islamists frequently got into polemics with some popular intellectuals like 
Abdullah Cevdet, Tevfik Fikret or Baha Tevfik
343
. In these polemics, westernization 
turned out to be a burning issue associated with the continuing wars in the north-
western provinces of the empire
344
. While Abdullah Cevdet manifestly argued a 
systematic Westernization entailing the full adoption of Western culture, quite a few 
Islamists led by Mehmet Akif and Manastirli Ismail Hakki harshly opposed Abdullah 
Cevdet and recommended a partial reception of European civilization, namely 
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acquisition of modern sciences and technology
345
. Moreover, both in Sebilürreşad and 
Beyanu’l Hak, “superwesternization” in social life and its supposed consequences like 
moral corruption, excessive consumption, foppishness and transgression of proper 
veiling by women in the public were severely criticized
346
. This brought endless 
discussions on status of woman in the life, veiling, polygyny, proper family life, 
morality and so on
347
.  
Keeping the society and social mores upright was then closely associated with 
the preservation of Islam as a religion. During the Second Constitutional Period anti-
religious criticisms mostly by the „freethinkers‟ or materialists were relatively more 
frankly expressed. In addition to the unorthodox views and disguised criticisms on 
Islam by Abdullah Cevdet or Celal Nuri in Ictihad, Baha Tevfik set forth materialistic 
arguments more manifestly against the existence of God and attacked religious 
establishment in journals Intelligence and Philosophy
348
. The assaults on religion and 
traditional values, institutions created an apologetic sentiment among the ulema and 
non-clerical devout intellectuals to confront the criticisms. Sehbenderzade Filibeli 
Ahmed Hilmi, Ismail Fenni (Ertugrul), Ferid (Kam), Mehmet Ali (Ayni) and Ismail 
Hakki (Izmirli) wrote anti-materialist, philosophical treaties refuting arguments of 
Buchner or similar materialists and re-emphasizing the unity of God by gathering 
evidences derived from Quranic reasoning, anti-materialist philosophy, logic, Western 
spiritualism as well as modern scientific discoveries
349
. Şemseddin Günaltay also 
published two booklets (Isbat-i Vacib and Felsefe-i Ula) based on translations and 
substantiating the existence of metaphysics and God against materialists‟ claims on the 
eternality of the matter.  
                                                 
345 Ibid, 71, 73. 
346 Hilmi Ziya Ulken, Turkiye’de Cagdas Dusunce Tarihi, 207. 
347 Ibid, 207. Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Islamcilik Cereyani, 74. For examples of the 
discussions concerning the issue of women, veiling and feminism during Second 
Constitutional Period see Sadik Albayrak, Meşrutiyet İstanbul’unda Kadın ve Sosyal 
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Islamist circles of the Second Constitutional Period were also quite preoccupied 
with revisionist accounts of Islam in the Orientalist literature and their articulations in 
the Ottoman public. Especially Ernest Renan‟s and Dozy‟s ideas about Islam attained 
important reception in the intellectual circles
350
.  It should be pointed out that Ernest 
Renan‟s famous talk named L'Islamisme et la Science (1883) that questioned whether 
Islam had been compatible with modernity, civilizational progress and modern science 
made profound and long-term impacts on the Ottoman Islamist intellectuals of the late 
19
th
 and early 20
th
 century and created an apologetic
351
 mode of argumentation in 
defense of religion which was novel according to Serif Mardin
352. Abdullah Cevdet‟s 
translation in 1909 of the Dozy‟s renowned book Essai sur l’histoire del’Islamisme 
(1863) and especially his preface praising Dozy‟s book in Ictihad blew a storm about 
the truthfulness of Islam and Islamic sources among the Islamists of the empire
353
. The 
book and Cevdet‟s preface put some doubt on the authenticity of Islamic sources, i.e. 
hadiths, various traditional knowledge transmission channels and Islamic history. 
Various responses and answers in the defense of Islam were written to both Dozy and 
Abdullah Cevdet, by Ferid Kam, Mehmet Akif, Manastirli Ismail Hakki and Ismail 
Fenni
354
. Islamist intellectuals were looking for the ways to substantiate the cultural and 
civilizational adaptability of “Islam” to the modern times while trying to divert the 
challenges. To Kara, this demand led Islamists to attempt to eliminate, modify or 
disguise the suspected or attacked elements in the religion
355
. 
 
III.4. Influences of Salafi/Modernist Islamist Thought 
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Hilmi Ziya Ulken and Niyazi Berkes argued that the thought of Jamaladdin 
Afghani and Muhammad Abduh had been the very source of the proposals of Ottoman 
Islamists
356
. The epoch that Afghani and Abduh opened has been cited with different 
names: Islamic modernism, Islamic reformism or modern Salafism. Whether they were 
the forefathers of Ottoman Islamism or not, it cannot be repudiated that their ideas 
made their impact felt in the contents of the Ottoman Islamist thought. There were 
some translations published in Sebilürreşad of the writings of Egyptian Islamic 
modernist thinkers like Muhammad Abduh, Ferid Vecdi or Qasim Amin
357
. Moreover, 
Mehmet Akif, Manastirli Ismail Hakki, Babanzade Ahmet Naim and some other 
Islamists had followed (and translated) the writings
358
 in Islamic modernist/Salafi 
journal el-Menar edited by famous Egyptian Salafi intellectual Rashid Rida, who was a 
disciple of Muhammad Abduh. El-Menar was the major Islamist journal during the 
early decades of the 20
th
 century in the Arabic spoken Muslim world.  
The impact of Afghani and Abduh‟s ideas on Günaltay‟s thought is conspicuous. 
Şemseddin Günaltay himself outspokenly mentions Afghani as his mentor359 and 
recurrently quotes Afghani and Abduh‟s ideas in his writings. Apart from his 
statements and references, their touch can be easily felt in his texts. This chapter does 
not attempt at an analysis of Afghani‟s and Abduh‟s lives and thought in their entirety, 
nor does it aspire to be a full account of Islamic modernism. Although I am well aware 
that Afghani and Abduh diverged in their comments on some issues and even their 
ideas evolved in time, I will just try to outline the basics of their views which had very 
much in common. Here is just a brief review about their ideas and the way these ideas 
swayed Şemseddin Günaltay‟s Islamist thought.   
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What distinguished the modernist movement of the late nineteenth century from 
earlier attempts at Islamic “purification” was its profound engagement with the external 
threat posed by Europe. Afghani and Abduh were both distressed about the decay of the 
Muslim community in the face of the encroachments of Western imperialist power and 
were devoted to find some panacea for this deterioration. The main reason of Muslim 
decadence in their eyes was not „true Islam‟ but the deviance of true Islam from its 
truthful core symbolized in the golden age of the earliest generations, Salaf-i Salihin 
(pious forefathers). Then Islam was the main force, both socially and politically, to 
meet the pushing challenge of Western power, and modernity. Afghani and Abduh thus 
believed in the necessity to revitalize and reform Islam in the image of its golden age. 
In other words, there was an urgent need to return to the original sources of Islam: 
Quran, Sunnah (traditions of the Prophet) and traditions of the Salaf (pious 
forefathers)
360
.  
Afghani and Abduh‟s ideas about Salaf, true Islam, prevalent Islamic traditions 
and renewal I think need further attention. They both argued that the current state of 
Islam in Muslim societies was far from the ideal Islamic community of the Salaf, 
namely the community of the Prophet and three generations of his successors. Due to 
inability of Islamic scholarly tradition to adapt to changing needs after the formative 
period of Islam, Islamic community had sunk into inertia by which religious life had 
been filled with bidats (innovations), superstitions and irrationalities. For Afghani and 
Abduh, this divergence from true Islam was then the main reason for Muslim 
decadence. According to Abduh, one major reason of this decline was the passivating 
influences of Sufism and superstitions. In this juncture, the true-corrupt Islam 
dichotomy displayed an apologetic function: the lived, corrupt Islam, which replaced 
true Islam, was the main cause of decline and real Islam was immune to any charges for 
hindering Muslims from progress
361
.   
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Afghani and Abduh also argued that the Islamic legal traditions and scholarship 
had been stagnant, and juristic opinions developed hundreds of years ago could not 
have met the demands of radically changing times. They strictly challenged taqlid 
(adherence to past legal opinions and methods in Islamic tradition) in the Islamic 
tradition supported by the ulema, and the “closure of the gate of ijtihad”362 
(independent interpretation). They frequently iterated the urgent need for adaptation to 
the modern condition and Islam was originally dynamic and unclosed to change. 
Therefore ijtihad was regarded as the means by which general Islamic truths are 
realized and adjusted to the demands of the times. Ijtihad was not only recommended 
but also imperative for Muslims and it was not an innovation but purely Islamic. While 
Afghani was more enthusiastic about encouraging ijtihad by individuals, Abduh was 
more cautious by delimiting its exertion in compliance with Islamic law supported by 
requisite scholarly knowledge and intellectual acuity. The quest for ijtihad was then 
turned into a challenge by Afghani and Abduh against the authority of the ulema that 
held the scholarship under their superintendence
363
.  
In Abduh‟s frame of thought, the return to the original sources and opening of the 
gate of ijtihad would supersede the disarray of Islamic beliefs and legal schools and 
unify them in the basic Islamic idea of tawhid (unity in the Oneness of God) as the 
main source to liberate man from superstition, myth and irrationality while being the 
road for Western progress
364
. The idea of returning to the Salaf, and ijtihad and tawhid 
signaled the revitalization of Muslim societies morally and politically by circumventing 
the prevalent Islamic traditions which were deemed by both Afghani and Abduh as 
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corrupt and stagnant. This would entail a reinterpretation of the basic sources and 
application of ijtihad in line with the results of the modern sciences and reason
365
.  
As a result, Afghani and Abduh highly respected reason and science as sound 
epistemological sources if basic Islamic sources do not provide sufficient guidance in 
particular circumstances. However they were also deeply convinced that knowledge 
and science were prerequisites to the power of the West and the decay of Muslim 
societies was inextricably bound to disregard for science and rational thinking. Both 
Afghani and Abduh attempted to persuade their audience that Islam when properly 
understood was not only compatible with science, reason and progress but these were 
inherent in the true Islam and even commanded by it. Both saw the use of rational 
methods essential to a proper understanding of religion and interpretation of Quran. In 
this regard, Afghani sought to display that the results of science were not culturally 
specific to West but self-evident and universal. This emphasis worked two sided: first 
to sidestep any charges of infidelity from their opponents; second to explain their 
Western audience that Islam was compatible with reason and science and thus not a 
hindrance to progress. Abduh claimed that reason was inherent in human beings, thus it 
was God-given like revealed truth and as a result the Scripture and reason should not 
have contradicted with each other. He proposed a similar argument for the harmony of 
natural and divine laws since natural law was the book of nature and Quran was the 
book of revelation. Afghani radically claimed that when Scripture apparently 
contradicted reason or findings of science on a specific matter Scripture should have 
been reinterpreted in the favor of reason
366
. Günaltay held the same hermeneutical 
approach when he favored reason over the traditional interpretations of revelation. 
When juxtaposing reason and science with Islam and setting the limits of 
religious interpretation, according to Roxanne Euben, Abduh was more attentive than 
Afghani
367
. He was then relatively more aware of the “costs and dangers of unchecked 
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reason for the religious truths beyond human comprehension”368. According to Abduh 
reason had certain limits in religious matters and it must have conformed to the Islamic 
law as some knowledge was entirely inaccessible to man like the existence of God and 
there had been knowledge in Quran beyond the level of current scientific knowledge
369
. 
Nevertheless, they both commanded that the Quranic premises and religion had been in 
accord with reason, the findings of new sciences and natural law. In short, in Afghani 
and Abduh‟s vision true Islam was a religion of reason and science. Therefore Islam 
was represented by Islamic modernists as a crucial associate of modernity and 
civilizational advancement
370
. 
Nevertheless, they argued that Muslims need not and should not turn to 
secularism because Islam, properly understood, is adequately suited to modern needs. 
Christianity might be authoritarian, intolerant and obscurantist, but Islam was rational 
and encouraged science and learning, rejected the blind acceptance of authority and 
allowed a wide range of interpretation. This illustrates the apologetic tendency that 
characterizes much Islamic modernism
371
. 
In this respect, Roxanne Euben argued that Afghani and Abduh‟s reformist 
rationalism and scientism, and their opposition to the authority of the ulema and the 
leverage of habit and tradition were highly influenced by European Enlightenment
372
. 
Nevertheless, their thought was a coalescence of various cultural influences of the 
thread of Western thought and Enlightenment and „Islams‟373. Therefore their ideology 
was fashioned within a „syncretistic context‟ while ironically they were looking for 
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Islamic „authenticity‟374. The same syncretism argument seems accurate for Ottoman 
Islamist thought and Şemseddin Günaltay in particular. 
Moreover both Hourani and Euben interpreted Afghani‟s ideas less theologically 
and theoretically oriented but defensive of the culture compared to theological and 
philosophical nature of Abduh‟s work375. Abduh also as a scholar in Al-Azhar was 
hence more theologically and scholarly concerned about the outcomes of his ideas and 
this provided him with a kind of self-reflexive boundedness to comply with the Islamic 
tradition. Afghani was then perceived by Hourani and Euben as more libertarian in his 
Islamic reformism and open to unconventional interpretations by the use of self-
delineated rationality
376
. Even Nikki Keddie argued that Afghani valued Islam for its 
usefulness as a source of a cohesive political identity for the uneducated masses, rather 
than as a true religion
377
. This interpretation seems a little bit overstated yet the relative 
volatility of Afghani‟s thought is remarkable while thinking his inspirational position 
for Şemseddin Günaltay‟s thought. It is arguable if Günaltay found a fertile example in 
the latitudinarian rationalism and modernism of Afghani‟s thought for his protean and 
accommodative ideas and conceptions for an Islamic reform. 
 
III.5. Basic Pillars of Ottoman Islamist Thought 
 
Many of the threads and concerns of Afghani and Abduh‟s ideas can be detected 
in the discourses of the Ottoman Islamist intellectuals. The Ottoman Islamists had a 
real concern about Islam‟s position in the modern world and the deepening sense of 
self-decline and more specifically about survival of the Ottoman Empire as the sole 
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independent Muslim nation
378
.  On the other hand, they felt self-obliged to 
counterbalance the intellectual, theological and political challenges leveled against 
Islam
379
. Therefore they sought to chart a way between accommodating the new 
condition and preserving the Islamic identity of society by reviving the meaningfulness 
of religious beliefs and maintaining the relevance of Islamic faith to the radically 
changing times
380
. Then reaching reconciliation between the modern condition and 
what they perceived to be Islamic was an urgent call to fill the opening gap between the 
West and the Muslim world
381
.  
Science, modern techniques and reason were the most vital and justifiable 
mediums which Muslims needed to survive and progress while protecting the very core 
of the Islamic identity of the Muslim societies
382
. Therefore they engaged into arguing 
that not only modern sciences and rationality were compatible with Islam but also the 
revelation in its nature inhered rationality and scientific truths and Sharia obliged the 
application of rational thinking and scientific endeavor
383
. Sehbenderzade, Said Halim 
Pasha, Mehmet Akif, Said Nursi, Seyyid Bey, Ahmet Hamdi Akseki, Şemseddin 
Günaltay and even Mustafa Sabri Efendi –who was deemed as more conservative 
compared to other Islamists- passionately argued the central place of reason in Islam. 
Said Halim Pasha argued that Islam actually contained positivism in itself
384
 and 
Ahmet Hamdi Akseki
385
 embarked upon writing a treatise on the central place of reason 
in Islam by demonstrating how frequently reason (akil) was referred and promoted as a 
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foundation of religious knowledge and individual responsibility in Quran and Sunnah. 
They also promoted Islamic reasoning since it encouraged skepticism towards, rather 
than an unquestioning obedience to, the authority of tradition. Reason and science were 
also important means for arriving at a better understanding of Islam and freeing 
Muslims from the shackles of taassup (fanaticism), hurafat (superstitions) and taqlid 
(blind imitation) of the current Islam
386
. 
Islamist modernists also complained about the current degeneration in Islamic 
tradition and narrow-mindedness of the Islamic scholars. Centuries of taqlid of 
predecessors and the effects of innovations and superstitions had resulted in a disarray 
and corruption of the latter-day Islam, drawn apart from the pristine Islam of the early 
ages
387
. Islamic scholarship had fallen into the clutches of irrational dogmatism and idle 
scholasticism. Islamists also severely criticized clericalism as an irrational and 
monopolistic exploitation of religion by a privileged class and argued that there had not 
been any sort of clericalism in Islam unlike Christianity. By this rejection of clericalism 
they were actually defending Islam against the anti-religious criticisms originally 
sprang in Europe to challenge the Church but transferred to Islamic context by some 
freethinkers or materialists. In other words, Christianity was a serious impediment to 
progress as an irrational, anti-scientific, dogmatic, power-seeking and exploitive 
religion but Islam was untainted by any similar association. This anti-clerical discourse 
was also formulated as a challenge to the authoritative religious position of the ulema 
that were now archaic; and they could thereby contest the ulema and Sufi sheikhs for 
the interpretation of religious issues
388
. Popular beliefs were in the grip of superstitions, 
innovations (bidats)
389
 and quietist convictions of Sufism. The outcomes of 
degeneration in Muslim community were claimed to be the scattering of ignorance and 
deviant beliefs/mezhebs among the populace by Ahmet Hamdi Akseki, Mehmet Akif, 
Ismail Hakki Izmirli, Seyhulislam Musa Kazim, Seyyid Bey, Sehbenderzade, Elmalili 
Hamdi, Mehmet Ali Ayni and Günaltay.  
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The cure for the corruption and decline was returning to the basic sources, the 
Quran and Sunnah, by modeling the Islam of the early ages of Islam called Asr-i Saadet 
(Golden Age)
390
. This entailed the reinterpretation of Quran and other Islamic sources 
in the light of advanced knowledge and vision of the time. That involved a call for 
ijtihad, which would make room to accord religious matters with the necessities of the 
time, not being bound by the ijma (consensus) of the legal schools (mezhebs; plural, 
mezahib – madhabs in Arabic form) of Islamic jurisprudence. This would help rejoin 
tawhid (unity) (of the mezahib
391
) which was a basic tenet of the “true Islam”. 
Therefore, returning to the original Islam and the use of ijtihad would sustain the 
creation of an ideal Islam dissociated from the unwelcome bearings of traditional 
religious life
392
.   
There emerged the rhetoric of “true Islam” among Islamists counterposed to 
degraded modes of traditional Islam.  The call for returning to the early Islam and 
original sources was commonly associated with uncovering of the “essence” or “spirit” 
of Islam. Similar to Şemseddin Günaltay; Said Halim Pasha393 and Sehbenderzade 
Filibeli Ahmet Hilmi
394
 mentioned the necessity to bring out the essence of Islam while 
Mehmet Akif
395
 and Seyyid Bey
396
 expressed this essence as ruh-i Islam (spirit of 
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Islam). Ruh-i Islam should have been the substantive inner logic of Islamic religion 
which would operate like a backbone through which drift of Islamic reform would have 
been derived and out of which the destructive shell of traditional practices would be 
eliminated. In this regard, Sehbenderzade bid to single out the very logic/essence of 
Islam out of the subsidiary (tali) ideas and taassup
397
. Therefore superstitions, taassup, 
deteriorated customs of Sufism, taqlid, dogmatism, ignorance and so on had been 
represented as the harmful shell of the Islamic traditions that adulterated the 
quintessence of Islamic message
398
. Therefore an exclusionary and dichotomous 
discursive mode was rendered to pinpoint the Islam in its unspoilt form within the 
Islamist thought. The result was not only a dichotomous idealism of Islam but also the 
essentialization of Islam as a “religion”, in line with its reification as previously 
presented. This essentializing approach can be observed as a crystallizing tendency in 
the Islamist circles during the Second Constitutional Period.  
In my opinion, in Günaltay‟s ideas and language we can find the most 
conspicuous exemplar of essentialized conceptualization of Islam. One salient feature 
which makes him noteworthy is the instrumental use of the exclusionary dichotomy of 
true and corrupt Islam.  
 
III.6. Views on Sufism and Superstitions in the Late Ottoman Period 
 
It should be noted that the anti-Sufi and anti-superstition discourses were not 
new to the Islamic intellectual milieu. There was a centuries old indigenous tradition of 
internal criticism towards Sufi practices and beliefs as well as superstitions
399
. The 
earliest example of this criticism can be distinguished in the ideas of famous Hanbelite 
scholar Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) who has been received as the forefather of the Salafi 
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thought. Ibn Taymiyya launched a serious criticism denouncing the practices and 
beliefs, which were incorporated into the Islamic tradition after the time of the Prophet 
and the Salaf-i Salihin (pious forefathers of Islam) and contradicted with the basic 
premises of Islam. These were labeled as bidat, innovations that diverged from the 
basic akaid (creeds) of the Salaf. His criticisms were particularly leveled against some 
folk beliefs like reverence to saints, tomb visits; pantheistic Sufi beliefs, mostly 
instilled within the Sufi tradition by Ibn Arabi, and ritualistic aspects of Sufi orders like 
zikr (ceremonial mentioning of God) or sama (dervish whirling). His criticisms became 
influential within the latter-day Islamic thought, especially among some Hanbelite 
scholars and major Sufi orders like Naqshbandiyya, as well as Salafi modernist 
thought. For instance, in 18
th
 century Hanbelite scholar Muhammad Ibn Wahhab and 
his followers with a radicalized interpretation of Ibn Taymiyya‟s rhetoric on bidat 
staged an offensive ostracizing campaign against all the practices that cannot be trailed 
back to the Prophet‟s time within the Islamic tradition400.  
Anti-Sufi criticism following Taymiyyan line of thought found adherence in the 
central Ottoman territories 16
th
 century onwards. An alim, Mehmed Birgivi Efendi
401
 
came up with a puritanical challenge to some practices in the Sufi circles as well as 
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superstitions and bidats in the social life
402
. His followers Kadizade Mehmed, Ustuvani 
Mehmed and Vani effendis popularized and radicalized his criticism through preaching 
in some major mosques of Istanbul
403. Recent scholarship displayed that Birgivi‟s and 
Kadizade Mehmed Efendi‟s main arguments revolved around the realignment of Sufi 
practices and beliefs within the boundaries of orthodox Islam with reference to original 
sources and by purging of degenerative elements within traditional Islam
404
. This trend 
can be juxtaposed with the tendency towards Sunni orthodox Islam during the 
sheikhulislamate of Ibn Kemal and Ebu Suud effendis. Their belligerent religious 
opinions (fetwas) on heresy and blasphemy (zindiklik and ilhad) to describe what is 
truly Islamic, and on some Sufi orders/sheikhs or practices and rites like sama reminds 
us the centrality of the internal controversies about Sufi practices and endorsing the true 
beliefs within the Islamic tradition. Also one important aspect in the rhetoric of Ibn 
Taymiyya or Imam Birgivi is the diligence to detach „true Sufism‟ from the false which 
can be also scrutinized as a common approach in the modern anti-Sufi and anti-
superstition discourses
405
.  
The pre-modern bidat and hurafat language inherited by modern Salafi and 
Islamist thought was in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries combined with new 
Western-inspired anti-Sufi tools and discourses
406
. According to Itzshak Weissman: 
In the wake of the increasing consolidation of the state and the spread of 
Western rationalism, Sufis came to be regarded as a major cause of the so-called 
decline of Islam and an obstacle to its adaptation. In the Arab world, the anti–
Sufi feeling was generally associated with the Salafiyya trend … discrediting 
the latter-day tradition, which was described as cherishing mystical superstition 
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as well as scholarly stagnation and political quietism. Under the burden of this 
critique, and as a response to the general expansion of education and literacy, 
Sufism has been forced to assimilate new ideas and to make room for a new 
form of organization; the populist Islamic association
407
. 
Starting from 1870s, Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Afghani voiced serious 
condemnations of the Sufi orders for encouraging laziness, inactivity, fatalism and 
blind obedience to sheikhs and authorities among people and running counter to 
reason
408
. According to Abduh much of the existing Sufism had departed from the 
authentic Islamic faith and they were contributing to the social malaise and decline of 
the Muslim societies. Sufis had Muslims retreat from the worldly affairs and working, 
while assuming intermediary roles between the believers and the God
409
. Even 
conservative sheikh Abu al-Huda admitted that Sufism was in decline and he thus 
attempted to distinguish true Sufis from the degenerated ones
410
. Anti-Sufi critique was 
sharpened at the outset of the 20
th
 century by Rashid Rida‟s famous avant-garde Salafi 
journal al-Menar which was also quite influential on the Ottoman Islamist intellectuals 
of Second Constitutional Period 
411
.  
As Casanova claimed, the militant secularist branches of the post-
Enlightenment thought, degrading the religious knowledge and worldviews as pre-
scientific and pre-logical, had even gone further to identify religion with superstition 
                                                 
407
 Itzchak Weissman, “Between Ṣūfī Reformism and Modernist Rationalism: A 
Reappraisal of the Origins of the Salafiyya from the Damascene Angle”. In Die Welt 
des Islams, New Series, Vol. 41, Issue 2, (Jul., 2001), p. 39. 
408 According to Sirriyah, Afghani‟s impressions of the Sufi orders in the Ottoman 
capital between 1869 and 1871 led him to a more severe criticism of Sufi orders in 
contrast to the true Sufism in Afghanistan and Herat region. Afghani mentions his 
impressions of Sufis of the capital as follows: „Later these people sank into ease and 
laziness. It remained in the corners of the madrasas and the dervish convents; to such a 
degree that the lights of virtue were on the point of being extinguished; the banners of 
education were about to disappear. The suns of prosperity and the full moon of 
perfection began to wane.” Elizabeth Sirriyah, Sufis and Anti-Sufis, 68, 72. 
409 Elizabeth Sirriyeh, Sufis and Anti-Sufis, 92-94. 
410 Ibid, 80. 
411 Ibid, 101. 
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and ignorance
412. Therefore the “light” of reason and science was perceived as the cure 
to “the darkness of religious ignorance and superstition”413. The idea that Sufi orders 
and superstitions are one of the main impediments before Muslim regeneration and 
progress was a discursive outcome of these intellectual trends mostly found adherence 
in the Ottoman versions of the materialist/positivist anti-religious criticism. Post-
Enlightenment rationalist critique of religious mysticism, metaphysics and religious 
establishment had already started to make their weight felt in the Ottoman Empire since 
the Tanzimat period
414
. Ali Suavi denounced Sufi orders as the main cause of 
civilizational backwardness of Muslim people
415
. Similar views were held by some 
Young Turk intellectuals, despite the fact that Young Turk group included some Sufi 
members, and secular Young Turks were mostly cautious about religious issues. While 
Ahmet Riza Bey in 1896 depicted sheikhs as agents degenerating the morality and ideas 
in the society in Young Turk journal Mechveret
416
, Abdullah Cevdet was frequently 
tilting at superstitions and folk beliefs in Ictihad
417
.  
In the Second Constitutional Period intellectual setting, the intellectual tools and 
methods of post-Enlightenment and Salafi anti-Sufi and anti-superstition criticisms 
were amalgamated. A negating rhetoric on Sufism and hurafat (superstitious beliefs) 
became more visible. The discussions around the Sufi lodges and superstitions mainly 
took place in some important journals of the period: Ictihad, Sırat-ı Müstakim 
(Sebilürreşad), Islam Mecmuasi418. Materialist Baha Tevfik involved into the 
discussions with his writings in journals his Philosophy and Intelligence. Abdullah 
Cevdet was a severe critique of superstitions while Kiliczade Hakki, Celal Nuri harshly 
                                                 
412 Jose Casanova, Public Religions, 31. 
413 Ibid, 32. 
414 Sukru Hanioglu, Young Turks in Opposition, 12. 
415 Mustafa Kara, Metinlerle Osmanlilarda Tasavvuf ve Tarikatlar, 316. 
416 Serif Mardin, Jon Turkler, 136. 
417 Sukru Hanioglu, “Blueprints for a Future Society” in Late Ottoman Society: The 
Intellectual Legacy, ed. Elizabeth Ozdalga (New York: Routledge-Curzon, 2005), 34. 
418 Some contributors to Islam Mecmuasi like Serafettin Yaltkaya also involved into 
these discussions.  
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attacked Sufi orders
419
. Ahmet Hamdi (Akseki), Seyyid Bey, M. Şemseddin (Günaltay), 
Manastirli Ismail Hakki, Sehbenderzade Filibeli Ahmet Hilmi, Mehmet Akif, Mehmet 
Ali Ayni and Said Halim Pasha were some of the Islamists/Islamic modernists who 
were concerned about Sufism and criticized the degeneration in the Sufi lodges, and 
superstitions. Nevertheless, unlike materialists, they were looking for a reform in the 
Sufi orders
420
. In relation to the generic view that Muslim societies were in decline, it is 
prevalently discussed by these Islamists and materialists that Sufi orders were in a 
downfall and superstitions infested the social life in the Muslim world
421
. Even it is 
argued that superstitions and the deteriorations in Sufi orders were of the reasons of the 
social/political decline and backwardness in the Ottoman Empire
422
.  
There were visible similarities between the language on Sufi orders and 
superstition of the Islamists and authors of Ictihad. According to Sukru Hanioglu, 
Abdullah Cevdet and Baha Tevfik‟s criticisms of superstition were disguised 
challenges originally targeted to religion
423
. According to Kiliczade Hakki tekkes and 
zawiyas, had become a source of laziness/passivity and weakness and ignorant sheikhs 
who knew nothing but superstitions and incantations like hu, eyvallah, erenler had 
                                                 
419 Mustafa Kara, Metinlerle Gunumuz Tasavvuf Hareketleri (Istanbul: Dergah 
Yayinlari, 2002), 53-56. 
420 Ismail Kara, “Sufism and Sufi Orders as a Target of Criticism”, 549. 
421
 An example of this view can be observed in Halim Sabit (Şibay)‟s article named 
“Dinin Sekl-i Aslisine Irca‟i Luzumu (The Reversion of Religion to its Original Form)” 
in the 278th issue of Sebilürreşad in 1913:  
“Our beliefs have mixed up with many superstitions; many of the things, which we 
teach and apply, thinking that they spring from our beliefs, are nothing more than 
problems deriving from the passage of time, enmities and misguided policies. In this 
way we have made the simple beliefs of Islam more complex. As this complexity has 
increased we have moved farther and farther away from the spirit of Islam and from the 
words of the prophet”. In Ismail Kara, “Sufism and Sufi Orders as a Target of 
Criticism”, 548.  
422
 The rhetoric interlinking superstitions and decline can be observed in Sırat-ı 
Müstakim’s 176th issue in 1911 quoted from an article, “Muslumanlari Hayata Davet” 
originally published in Hak Yolu journal published in Baku:  
“For a long time one has been hearing in the mouths of the public some superstitious 
statements that are the main cause of our decadence and decline. One of these and 
maybe the most destructive is the statement “the world is theirs (infidels), but the other 
world is ours.” Ismail Kara, “Sufism and Sufi Orders as a Target of Criticism”, 554. 
423 Sukru Hanioglu, “Blueprints for a Future Society”, 34. 
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harmed the population both mentally and spiritually while tricking people
424
. In this 
narrative, Sufi orders and so-called superstitious beliefs were portrayed as 
contaminated -and thus as the main sickness of the society- and as “enemies” of the 
social life and progress
425
. Even Celal Nuri went further to claim that Sufism had been 
the spiritual opium for the society
426
. Similar views about the contaminating effects of 
superstitions and some Sufi orders were set forth by some Islamists like Sehbenderzade 
Filibeli Ahmet Hilmi, Ahmet Hamdi Akseki, Seyyid Bey and Şemseddin Günaltay. 
The discourse of proliferation of superstitions and deterioration of Sufi orders 
can also be discerned in Islamists‟ writings. Similar to Günaltay‟s historical inquiry for 
the emergence of superstitions, Said Halim Pasha evaluated the leading cause for the 
                                                 
424
 Kiliczade Hakki‟s social reform proposition disguised as a dream explained in the 
article with the heading of “Pek Uyanik bir Uyku” (A very Awake Sleep) published in 
the 6
th
 and 20
th
 of March issues of Ictihad in 1913:  
“tekkes and zawiyas, which nowadays have become a source of laziness, have up to 
now been considered subsistence income for the sons of sheikhs, instead of being 
transferred to benevolent institutions to the needy. The other ignorant sheikhs who have 
inherited their positions (learned and virtuous sheikhs) and who know nothing but 
superstitions and incantations like hu, eyvallah, erenler and that have harmed the 
population up to now, will be made to work to earn their living and those among them 
that persist in the dishonorable trick of nefes etmek (spells done to cure illnesses by 
breathing on people) will be punished”….”Offers to saints will be forbidden and 
channeled towards the Navy or National Defence Associations”. Ismail Kara, “Sufism 
and Sufi Orders as a Target of Criticism”, 545. For the articles of Kiliczade‟s reform 
proposal see Hikmet Bayur, Turk Inkilabi Tarihi cilt II, kisim IV (Ankara: Turk Tarih 
Kurumu Basimevi, 1991), 441-443.  
425 In his article “Itikadat-i Batilaya Ilan-i Harb”(Declaration of War to the Superstitious 
Beliefs) published in Ictihad, issue 51, in March 27, 1914, Kiliczade declared dervishes 
as „internal enemies‟.  “softalarla dervişlerle ilan-ı cihad etmek artık farz olmuştur. Bu 
iki düşman-ı dahiliyyeye...” “…Diyebilirim ki Muslumanlarin tedenniyat-i avamilinden 
ve ehemlerinden birisi de şu softalik ve dervişlik efkarinin ruh-u millete sirayet 
etmesidir”. See in Hikmet Bayur, Turk Inkilabi Tarihi cilt II, kisim IV, 447. Seyyid Bey 
also expressed superstitions as the biggest sickness of Muslims. For Seyyid Bey‟s 
views see Ismail Kara, Turkiyede Islamcilik Dusuncesi, 305. This article was originally 
published as “Ictihad ve Taklid” in Islam Mecmuasi’s 4th and 5th issues in 1914. 
426 In order to express the narcotic effects of contemporary Sufi beliefs Celal Nuri used 
the expression “adeta sinirleri uyusturmustur” in his book Tarih-i Tedenniyat-ı 
Osmaniye published in 1913. Hikmet Bayur, Turk Inkilabi Tarihi cilt II, kisim IV, 444. 
For similar views by Şemseddin Günaltay proclaiming the narcotic effects of 
degenerated Sufi practices, please look at Semseddin Günaltay, Hurafattan Hakikate 
(Hurafeler ve İslam Gerçeği). (İstanbul: Marifet Yayınları,1997), 304. 
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degeneration of Islam as the penetration of superstitions to Islam from other Middle 
Eastern beliefs during its classical period
427
. Said Halim Pasha, Sehbenderzade Filibeli 
Ahmet Hilmi and Seyyid Bey like Şemseddin Günaltay argued that syncretism of 
cultural elements from local religions, ungrounded customs, traditions and Islam 
created superstitious beliefs in Islam
428
. Degenerate Sufi orders, some ignorant sheikhs, 
unlearned imams and ulema were argued to be the agents that generated superstitions in 
Islam by Manastirli Ismail Hakki, Seyyid Bey, Ahmet Hamdi (Akseki) and Şemseddin 
Günaltay
429
. In addition to Manastirli, Seyyid Bey and Ahmet Hamdi (Akseki), 
Sehbenderzade Filibeli Ahmed Hilmi argued that folk beliefs were under the yoke of 
superstitions and digressions from Islam
430
. According to these Islamic modernist 
intellectuals, the populace was ignorant and prey to delusive effects of the superstitions 
that kill the spirit of Islam
431
. As a result Islamists advocated educating people as a 
necessary measure to fight superstition. Superstitions were not only perceived to be 
contrary to the spirit of Islam but they were also incompatible with the modern 
knowledge, sciences and reason
432
.  
On the other hand, tekkes and dervishes/sheikhs were held responsible for the 
emergence of superstitions that harmed the Islamic beliefs and rites by giving way to 
                                                 
427 Said Halim Pasa, Buhranlarimiz, 195-197. 
428 Ibid, 196. For Sehbenderzade‟s views on the issue of syncretism see Ismail Kara, 
“Sufism and Sufi Orders as a Target of Criticism”, 553. For Seyyid Bey‟s views see 
Ismail Kara, Turkiyede Islamcilik Dusuncesi 2, 304.  
429 For Manastirli‟s views look at Ismail Kara, “Sufism and Sufi Orders as a Target of 
Criticism”, 560. These views were originally explained in the article “Vucub-i Intibah”, 
Sırat-ı Müstakim, 136, p. 85-86. For Seyyid Bey‟s views see Ismail Kara, Turkiyede 
Islamcilik Dusuncesi 2, 305-306. For Akseki‟s views, See Ismail Kara, Turkiyede 
Islamcilik Dusuncesi 2, 361, 369. The original article: “Dini Muesselerimiz Hakkinda 
Bir Rapor”, Islam, 34 (1960). (This was a report presented to the government by the 
Chairmanship of Religious Affairs in 1950). This is also important to show continuity 
of anti-Sufi discourses into the Republican realm in the religious and governmental 
level.  
430 For a sample of Sehbenderzade‟s‟s views on the agents of degeneration see Ismail 
Kara, Turkiyede Islamcilik Dusuncesi 1, 73-75, 82.  
431 Ismail Kara, Turkiyede Islamcilik Dusuncesi 1, 82, 305-306. 
432 Ismail Kara, “Sufism and Sufi Orders as a Target of Criticism”, 559.  
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pre-Islamic beliefs in Islamic tradition. Dissimilar to mentioned views on superstitions, 
it is quite difficult to talk about the existence of a wholesale negative vision on Sufism 
among Islamists. According to Ismail Kara, Sufism was perceived as a legitimate way 
of comprehending and interpreting Islam and part of Islamic sciences and life style
433
 
and it was also necessary for social life, namely social morality and solidarity
434
. For 
example, Ziya Gokalp emphasized the functionality of Sufi orders for creating social 
cohesion and ethical foundations for individuals in his articles
435
. In the meetings for 
the foundation of Dar’ul Hikmet-i Islamiye (Academy of Islamic Knowledge/Wisdom) 
in the parliament in 1918, Bahri Efendi, the director of Council of Sheikhs and 
Şemseddin Günaltay insisted on the pivotal function of Sufi orders to elevate the 
national spirit by solidarity and by maintaining social morality
436
. However, a 
distinction was made between Sufism in its true form and current form of Sufi life. In 
other words, “true Sufism” that was valuable in the past and helped building Muslim 
community, had now lost with reality and caused the decline of Islam
437
.  
In the Islamist discourses, fatalism, passivity, resignation and laziness were seen 
as main features of the contemporary religious orders. Ismail Kara argued with various 
examples that the Sufi dictums bir lokma, bir hirka (one piece of bread and a cloak), 
dunyadan el etek cekmek (resignation from the world) expressing kanaat (contentment), 
tevazu (humility) and riza (compliance) were reinterpreted as the symbols of passivism, 
laziness, abasement and extreme poverty inflicted by misinterpreted Sufism
438
. Main 
Sufi morals like acquiescence (teslimiyet), ascetism (zuhd) and contentment were 
downgraded in the face of the increasing importance of new values like enthusiasm, 
                                                 
433 Ibid, 553. 
434 In this respect for example Mehmet Ali (Ayni) interpreted Sufism as a moral police 
for the individuals to kkep them from the evil. For further details, see Mehmet Ali 
Ayni, “Bizdeki Tarikatlar”, Intikad ve Mulahazalar, 1923, p. 140; in Ismail Kara, 
Turkiyede Islamcilik Dusuncesi 2, p. 86.  
435 Elizabeth Sirriyeh, Sufis and Anti-Sufis, 119. 
436 Mustafa Kara, Metinlerle Osmanlilarda Tasavvuf ve Tarikatlar, 315. 
437 Ismail Kara, “Sufism and Sufi Orders as a Target of Criticism”, 553. 
438 Ibid, 554. 
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perseverance, richness, owning property which previously had not been given much 
emphasis
439
. Manastirli Ismail Hakki, Seyyid Bey, Mehmet Akif and Şemseddin 
Günaltay argued that Sufi orders enjoining indolence, fatalism and otherworldliness 
had distorted the ideal Islamic community composed of active people giving necessary 
weight to the worldly living
440
. This influence was the main reason for the decay of the 
Muslim societies. Another question arose about the Sufi orders was related to their 
methodologies like inspiration, miracles or spiritual exploration which were deemed as 
irreconcilable with modern sciences and rationality
441
. 
These claims were even –partially- appropriated –or admitted– by some 
intellectuals with Sufi inclinations and by some Sufi sheikhs in the empire. Mehmet Ali 
Ayni who was a Sufi devotee wrote with an apologetic language that the current state 
of Sufi orders was a consequence of misinterpretations and abuses not Sufi institutions 
and precepts
442
. The writings of sheikh Naili Efendi in the journal Muhibban gave a 
clear indication of the state of mind of the Sufis in the Second Constitutional Period. To 
him, under the control of Meclis-i Meşayih (Council of Sheikhs) some measures should 
have been taken: 
1. Steps should be taken to refute the widespread belief that “the lodges are 
havens of idleness”.  
2. In addition to the true, genuine dervishes there are also fake, bogus dervishes.   
3. One must therefore confess that the lodges are in need of reform.   
4. Inspections should be carried out and guidance given to ensure that life in the 
lodges is kept at a certain standard
443
.  
                                                 
439 Ibid, 554, 560. 
440 In this respect Manastirli Ismail Hakki presented a negative picture of otherworldly, 
resigned and indolent people. To him, such people could not be considered as being 
part of a human community. To refer to them as “people” was nonsense and they could 
not be considered members of this society. Ismail Kara, “Sufism and Sufi Orders as a 
Target of Criticism”, 560. 
441 Ibid, 557. 
442 For his views on this issue, see his article called “Bizdeki Tarikatlar” in Ismail Kara, 
Turkiyede Islamcilik Dusuncesi 2, 88.  
443 Mustafa, Kara, Din, Hayat, Sanat Acisindan Tekkeler ve Zaviyeler (Istanbul: Dergah 
Yayinlari, 1999), 587. 
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There was a general view among the Islamists that Sufi lodges were in need of 
reform to recover their original true forms and to conform to the “necessities of the 
time”444. Therefore healing or reforming (ıslah) the lodges by purging the superstitions 
became one of the objectives of Islamists. Tekkes and zawiyes should have been 
reorganized in order to prevent from becoming an impediment to the progress of the 
society and their members should be mobilized and educated in order to enlighten the 
society.  
Here, Günaltay is an important representative of the late Ottoman Islamists to 
understand anti-Sufi and anti-superstition rhetoric running interdependently with 
religious essentialism in the late Ottoman context. The exclusionary dimension of his 
attitude depends on the portrayal of the “un-Islamic” elements in the prevalent Islamic 
practices and behaviors in social life. This dichotomy operated through the negative 
representation of popular Islamic beliefs, Sufi customs, institutions and superstitions. 
Therefore a closer scrunity of his ideas on superstitions and Sufi orders might provide a 
more detailed account of late Ottoman anti-Sufi and anti-superstition discourses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
444  
116 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
Semsettin Gunaltay’s Ideas on Superstitions, Sufism and Conception of “True 
Islam” 
 
 
In this chapter, I will try to analyze Günaltay‟s ideas on the general role of 
Islam in the society, superstitions and Sufi orders. First I will discuss his ideas on the 
assumed correlation between Islam and decline of the empire, and discuss how this laid 
the groundwork for his interpretation of the superstitions and Sufi orders. Later I will 
go on with the analysis of the role of the rhetoric of superstitions in his narrative. In 
that subsection, the issues of ignorance and inertia (atalet) will be uncovered in order to 
give a better grasp of the place of superstitions in his understanding. Later, attention 
will be paid to the anti-Sufi discourses in Günaltay‟s writings. These will provide us 
with a general body of material about his intellectual profile and worldview and will 
help locate my analysis in the context. 
In this context, Günaltay‟s approach to Islam necessitates a very brief 
theoretical reconsideration before going into detailed analysis of his viewpoints. 
Similar to the descriptive approaches to Islam by various Islamists of the 2nd 
Constitutional period, Günaltay tends to apply an exclusionary approach to construct a 
category of true Islam. Here the exclusionary dimension of his attitude depends on the 
portrayal of the “un-Islamic” elements in the prevalent Islamic practices and behaviors 
in social life. In this narrative, superstitions, religious fanaticisms and corrupted 
institutions of Islam, mainly tekkes (Sufi lodges) and tarikats (Sufi paths) constitute the 
backbone of the excluded. Then I think it is necessary first to make a descriptive 
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analysis of superstitions and Sufi orders in Günaltay‟s writings in order to understand 
his conception of true Islam.  
Here I would like to carry out my analysis through the scrutiny of two 
prominent books of Şemseddin Günaltay, published in the Second Constitutional 
Period: Zulmetten Nura (1913, 1915, 1925) and Hurafattan Hakikate (1916). In order 
to look for the change in his views after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, I will also 
try to make some correlations with another book reflecting his political and ideological 
views: Maziden Atiye (1923).  
Zulmetten Nura seems to be designed by Günaltay to outline the backbone of 
his social reform plan ingrained within an Islamist and rationalist/modernist 
understanding. In this regard, the book was devised to systematically expose the 
reasons of the decline/decay in the Ottoman Empire and the Muslim world. This fact 
should be thought together with the pessimist and defeatist air in the book as well as its 
offensive nationalist tone, and social Darwinist contemplation. In this context, 
Hurafattan Hakikate is more likely to be an auxiliary book to elaborate the content, and 
support the arguments in Zulmetten Nura by historically unfolding the emergence of 
superstitions within the Islamic culture. Maziden Atiye in this respect can be 
interpreted as a clear divergence in Günaltay‟s frame of thinking from a more salient 
Islamist position to an overtly Turkist viewpoint. 
 
IV.1. Basic Features of Gunaltay’s Superstition and Sufism Discourse 
 
IV.1.a. Islam and Decline: Saving the nation by saving Islam 
In line with the intellectual and political agenda of the late Ottoman period, the 
decline of the Ottoman Empire and the Islamic world was the central problematic in 
those books of Şemseddin Günaltay. This theme of decline evolved hand in hand with 
the idea of “progress” as a commonly applauded social ideal. This dichotomy of 
progress and backwardness/decline was conceived in terms of modernization in 
Şemseddin Günaltay‟s thought. In other words, the progress he sought designated 
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betterments in institutional, educational, bureaucratic, military and social levels, social 
prosperity and advancement in science and technology.  
Besides, the supposedly disastrous situation in the Muslim world was expressed 
in despair, in terms of inertia/immobility, stagnation and bankruptcy. This desperate 
condition of the Muslim lands was metaphorically reiterated numerous times by 
Günaltay as misery, abasement/degradation (zillet), servitude, darkness (zulmet), 
sickness or a deep sleep; just as the title of his book points out: Zulmetten Nura (from 
darkness to light). In this book he aims to render the goal pointed out in the title 
possible: to reveal the ways to enlighten and save the Muslim world from darkness and 
decadence; thus, to achieve advancement, and to raise the level of society.  
In this respect to better comprehend his metaphorical language, it should be 
indicated that Günaltay had written in an organicist/vitalist, and social Darwinist frame 
of thought. To him, life is a struggle and the aim of the life is survival; the organisms 
that do not fit to the natural laws (kavanin-i fıtriye) undergo atrophy445. Human societies 
are not exempt from this rule and they should conform to the necessities of the time 
(asrın icabati) to survive446. In this paradigm, Şemseddin Günaltay contemplates the 
society as an organism and draws parallels between the society and the human body447. 
More specifically, society is portrayed as a large embodiment of the members that it 
was composed of. Then, he attributes sickness to the Muslim/Ottoman social body 
which was once upon a time robust (gurbuz)448. Even this body (personified as Muslim 
community and/or Anatolian people in differing sections) is illustrated as almost dead 
or as zombie-like449; and Şemseddin Günaltay asserted that “ramshackle lands [of ours] 
                                                 
445 Zulmetten Nura, 53, 91. 
446 Ibid, 53. Here the social order described by Günaltay in social Darwinist terms also 
resembles the “state of war” used to explain the “state of nature” in Hobbesian terms. 
This naturalist and social Darwinist style of narration can be also conceived related to 
his educational background in natural sciences.  
447 Ibid, 203. 
448 Ibid, 203. 
449 Günaltay explained this zombie-like situation with the statement that “the members 
of the nation transformed into a corpse that is in reality dead but seemingly animated”. 
Ibid, 84, 213, 214. 
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turned into a graveyard embedded within misery”450 or into a “hospital infected by 
microbes”. Here the tragic and pessimistic narration of Şemseddin Günaltay to describe 
the social condition might have something to do with the traumatic effects of the 
Balkan Wars and WW1. 
 I think from this perspective, the general mood and intention of Şemseddin 
Günaltay‟s writings can be better comprehended. Perceiving the current social situation 
of the Ottoman Empire in terms of disease, he himself assumes the function of a doctor 
as a social observer.  In the foreword of the second publication of Zulmetten Nura, he 
was already praised as a “doctor of society” by Mehmet Akif451, and in the foreword of 
the first publication, Ferid (Kam) asserted that Şemseddin Günaltay diagnosed (the 
social) disease and prescribed its cure
452
.  
The organization of Zulmetten Nura is likely to follow a similar order in an 
evolutionary structure: first to diagnose the social malaises, and then to find out 
remedies for them and to make a social surgery if necessary. In this regard, Hurafattan 
Hakikate is functional to expound the sources and evolution of these malaises in the 
Islamic social body more elaborately. This action of healing the social body can also be 
juxtaposed with the ideal of saving -and elevating- the empire/nation as the 
“hypergood” that I mentioned to be a common denominator of the intellectual trends in 
the Second Constitutional Period. Therefore social scientific observation based on a 
Durkheimian sociological understanding was loaded with constructive and pragmatic 
functions in order to solve the social problems and diseases by exposing/diagnosing 
them and then restructuring a healthier social body.  
Then what were the maladies in the Muslim social body according to Günaltay? 
What were the reasons of decadence of the Muslims and the impediments to their 
progress (mani-i terakki)? These questions regarding the causes of the decline was also 
particularly important for Günaltay‟s political agenda. According to a particular 
conviction in the intellectual circles of Second Constitutional Period, the main cause of 
                                                 
450 Zulmetten Nura, 84. 
451 Ibid, 14. 
452 Ibid, 13. 
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the social decay was perceived to be related to Islam, which was also indirectly 
represented as the impediment to development. This argument, as I explained in the 
previous chapter, was surely related to the discussions took place in the Western 
intellectual debates (especially Orientalist ones) concerning religion and particularly 
Islam. Moreover, the receptions of these Western discourses in the Ottoman intellectual 
milieu of Second Constitutional Period concerning Islam‟s social role should also be 
considered. Similar to a considerable number of intellectuals of the period, especially 
Islamists, Günaltay grappled with this question of Islam and decline:  
“Is religion the main factor preventing our progress and causing our 
decline? If one looks at the miserable situation in which Muslims living in 
various continents of the world find themselves, one cannot dismiss out of hand 
such a question. The fact that Muslims all over the world are condemned to a 
life of servitude and live in degradation and misery is an incontrovertible truth. 
Nevertheless reaching a judgment merely by looking at the shape religion had 
acquired in our times … will not be correct or logical.”453  
Therefore he was rigorously striving to refute the assumed correspondence between 
Islam and decline. To him, contrary to these claims, Islam was completely convenient 
to material progress that basically manifested itself in Europe, primarily in science and 
technology
454
. In his overall understanding, religion should be able to progress (tekamül 
etmek) as a pair to the spiritual and mental development of the society
455
. When 
Muslims understood religion truly and religion was exalted in society, advancement 
and prosperity were realized in the Muslim history but when religion regressed and 
Islam was misunderstood, Muslims went down as well
456
. Even he argued that it had 
been a prophetic message that it was the cause of the wrath (gazab) of God to claim to 
be a Muslim despite not pursuing material (maddi) and spiritual (manevi) progress 
(terakki) and evolution
457
. These propositions were enough according to Günaltay to 
prove that Islam had not been an obstacle in front of development. On the contrary, 
                                                 
453 Zulmetten Nura, 99-100. 
454 Ibid, 83. 
455 Ibid, 69. 
456 Ibid, 71. 
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Islam actually possessed the potential to be the main driving force of progress. Thus, 
the causes of the decline and ineptitude to progress should be sought in factors other 
than Islam.  Therefore to discredit anti-religious arguments Günaltay insisted that 
Islam, bona fide, must be examined
458. This kind of a scrutiny would ratify Islam‟s 
congruity with social progress. In this regard, to Günaltay: 
“…one has to analyze religion itself to see if religion is an obstacle for 
progress…It will be only after such a study that one will understand that the real 
obstacle in front of our progress is not true Islam, but the superstitious beliefs 
and myths that are very far from natural religion and held by contemporary 
Muslims.”459 
In other words, the main causes of decline were corrupted beliefs and practices 
in Islamic tradition, namely superstitions; but not “true Islam”460. Yet in addition to 
superstitions, Günaltay counted ignorance and inertia (atalet) prevalent among the 
Muslims‟ lives as the main sicknesses that decomposed original Islam and caused the 
decadence in Muslim populations
461
.  In Günaltay‟s contemplation, superstitions, 
ignorance and inertia/laziness were vitally interconnected to each other by being the 
cause and consequence of each other. Through this historically deployed 
interconnectedness of superstitions, ignorance and inertia in his contemplation, he 
provided a macro-level explanation to how Islam strayed away from its origins/essence 
and transmuted into a corrupt cultural entity that prevented Muslim nations from 
progress. The superstitions occupy a focal place in this deliberation. In order to 
understand the appearance of the anti-superstition discourse in Günaltay‟s thought 
analyzing his understanding of ignorance and superstitions is crucial. Then in the 
following pages I will try to give a brief analysis of the place of ignorance and inertia in 
their relations to superstitions in the understanding of Günaltay. I believe that this 
surely assists us to further analyze the meanings of reason, science and activeness in his 
thought together with the deliberation of true Islam.  
 
                                                 
458 Zulmetten Nura, 100. 
459 Ibid, 100. 
460 Hurafattan Hakikate, 34. 
461 Zulmetten Nura, 53-55. 
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IV.1.b. Superstitions as the other of “True Islam” 
In Günaltay‟s books the rhetoric of hurafe (superstition) holds a central place; 
however, not a clearly elaborated description of superstition has been provided in these 
books. Rather, hurafe seems to acquire a rhetorical function. In other words, in his 
narration, hurafat / batil itikatlar (superstitions) intermixed with bidats (innovations) 
come out as a category to name all sorts of divergences from Günaltay‟s conception of 
true Islam. The superstitious beliefs and practices were mainly described in his books 
in the form of reverence to saints, tomb visits, lighting candles, tying cloths to trees or 
tombs assumed as sacred, drinking healing water, mythological stories, fortune-telling, 
muska (written charms), cifir hesabı (mystical calculations from Quran), 
beliefs/practices of pervert sects and tarikats, and so on
462
. The term hurafe was usually 
used interchangeably or together with the expressions yanlış kanaatler (wrong 
convictions), münasebetsiz itiyadlar (inappropriate customs), esatir (myths) and 
uydurulmuş bidatlar (fabricated innovations) in his writings463. Yet he does not 
differentiate between the expressions given above and differing forms of superstitions. 
I think superstition stands as an umbrella term that consists of various forms of un-
Islamic practices and beliefs in the manner that Günaltay understood them. In this 
regard, this category of superstition of which boundaries were not clearly cut is 
represented by Günaltay as “totally evil” as the perversion from truthful core of Islam. 
In the following sections I will try to analyze how this rhetoric of superstition has been 
described in Günaltay‟s narrative together with its relation to the notions of ignorance, 
laziness, reason and science; how this rhetoric has been instrumentalized in his thought 
in order to construct the imaginary category of true Islam. 
Seemingly, the problem with the superstitions according to Günaltay was the 
divergence that they rendered from the basic premises of the original Islam. However, 
the significance of the proposed incompatibility of superstitions with reason and 
science as a central problematic in Şemseddin Günaltay‟s writings should be 
underlined. I will later theoretically analyze this relationship between science, reason 
                                                 
462 Hurafattan Hakikate, 305. 
463 Zulmetten Nura, 98. Also for similar terms used by various other intellectuals see 
Ismail Kara, “Modernlesme Donemi Turkiyesi‟nde Ulum, Funun ve Sanat 
Kavramlarinin Algilanisi Uzerine Birkac Not”, Kutadgubilig 2 (2002), 252.  
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and superstitions in more detail; however, it should be admitted that this consideration 
of incompatibility had something to do with the widespread assumption of superstitions 
as source of ignorance, passivity, lack of wisdom, abasement, misery and decline in the 
Muslim world. In this regard, in line with Şemseddin Günaltay‟s organicist 
understanding of society, superstitions were depicted as “pathologies” decomposing 
and infecting the Islamic truths. To Günaltay, superstitions were the biggest disease of 
the Islamic society
464
 and they were killing the spirit of Muslims
465
. Günaltay argued 
that superstitious convictions had diffused into Islam and had settled down in Muslim 
societies for centuries
466. Thereby these “rotten” convictions were deeply ingrained 
within the beliefs of the avam (populace) for years and had become cradle of microbes 
radiating seeds of sicknesses
467
; sickness of laziness and ignorance
468
. Therefore to heal 
the society by unraveling the core of true Islam, there was an urging necessity to purge 
the pathological superstitious elements diffused into the social life. This could be 
achieved by picking the superstitious and corrupt practices out of the Islamic truths and 
thus disinfecting the Islamic core from the harmful shell
469
. The (truthful) core and 
(harmful) shell dichotomy is imminent to understanding the relation between 
superstition and true Islam in Günaltay‟s narrative.  
According to Günaltay, in order to achieve disinfection, the superstitions should 
be detected. In this level, the characteristics that distinguish these superstitious 
dispositions from the true Islam acquired great importance as there had been a need to 
clarify how they could emerge in Islam. His book, Hurafattan Hakikate (From 
Superstitions to Truth) in this regard was dedicated to reveal a genealogy of the 
formations of superstitions in Islam, and to explain how so-called “true Islam” was 
corrupted. The book gives a historical account of how superstitious beliefs, practices 
                                                 
464
 Hurafattan Hakikate, 136. 
465 Ibid, 319, 320. 
466 Ibid, 27. 
467 Zulmetten Nura, 26. 
468 Hurafattan Hakikate, 321. 
469 M. Semseddin, “Muslumanlik Aleminde Intibah Emmareleri”, Islami Mecmuasi, 1:4 
(1916); in Kara, Turkiye’de Islamcilik Dusuncesi 2, 571. 
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and irrational religious rites diffused into Islam. It also deals with the emergence of 
heretical sects and corruption in religious institutions that were believed by Günaltay to 
“poison the essence of Islam”470. The book in its methodology and arguments likens to 
the classical Islamic literature trying to identify heretical sects and beliefs
471
. 
To Günaltay, the main cause was the additions to the original Islam –lived in 
Asr-i Saadet (the lifetime of the prophet and the first 2 caliphs
472
) - by various cultures 
and religions on Islam‟s route of expansion. In Hurafattan Hakikate, Günaltay 
proposed that the first degenerations in Islam had started in the Umayyad period and 
had speeded up with the succeeding generations. In this account, the original Islam 
could not resist the long-term degenerating effects of the Mesopotamian and Iranian 
cultures because the new converts to Islam were carrying their local beliefs and 
superstitions to Islam
473. Quoting Jamaladdin Afghani‟s views, Günaltay argued that 
“ungrounded beliefs, practices and myths” from Indian and Persian cultures and 
religions, Christianity, Greek mythology, shamanism and so on were blended with the 
Islamic doctrine and practices
474. The “syncretism” produced by this mixture had been 
presented by Günaltay as the basis of deterioration in the genuine Islam. In this 
narrative of syncretism, it is asserted that Eastern, mainly Indian beliefs had caused 
Islam to stick into a deep and irrational mysticism
475
. To Günaltay, together with the 
penetration of the Indian mysticism and Christian pietism, Islam had acquired a more 
ascetic, esoteric and otherworldly (and inner-worldly) character that resulted in 
                                                 
470 Hurafattan Hakikate, 320. 
471 For the systematic and organized pre-modern examples of this literature we can be 
reminded of the genre of el-Milel ve’n- Nihal or books of Elfaz-ı Küfür ve Kebair as 
mentioned earlier. 
472 Asr-i Saadet was described by Günaltay as the lifetime of the prophet and the first 2 
caliphs, controversially diverse from the inclusion of 4 caliphs in the traditional view. 
This might be related to the increasing breaches within the Islamic community, 
intensifying interactions with peripheral cultures, and augmenting Arabic influences 
and tone starting with the reign of the third caliph Osman, from Günaltay‟s perspective. 
473 Hurafattan Hakikate, 80. 
474 Ibid, 134, 325-327. 
475 Ibid, 130-147. 
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passivity and fatalistic tendencies in the lived Islam, especially in the Sufi culture. 
Moreover, reverence to saints and the construction of tombs (türbe), which are alien to 
true Islam, had been plunged into Islam from the cult of the sainthood in Christian 
culture
476
.  
Yet Günaltay‟s criticism for the influences of Persian culture is more severe. 
Employing the tools of traditional criticism of heresy, Günaltay denounced Persian 
culture as the earliest and most effective source of the coming out of the deviant 
mezhebs (sects) and heresies as well as bidats in Islam. While dealing with the Persian 
influences and the emergence of deviant sects in Islam, I think Günaltay‟s analysis 
converges to an indigenous line of criticism of heresy
477
. For instance he more 
elaborately discusses the theological fallacies of these heretic beliefs by using 
traditional Islamic historical sources and arguments like the rhetoric of bidat. 
In Hurafattan Hakikate, Iran is presented as the center that the debauched 
ancient philosophical/theological views and comprehensions of divinity were 
deliberately stitched into an Islamic jacket and enveloped with an esoteric/mystic aura. 
This gradually resulted according to him in the appearance of Batıni (namely esoteric) 
sects or underground heretic organizations like Ismailites; or religio-political 
groups/states like Qarmatians and Fatimids. These sects and states according to 
Günaltay –sometimes intentionally- filled the religion with superstitions and 
undermined the true Islamic beliefs. In this narrative, the Rafizi
478
 communities in 
                                                 
476 Ibid, 279. 
477 Here the fatwas by sheikhulislams Ibn Kemal and Ebu Suud Efendi on ilhad and 
zındıklık to describe what is truly Islamic and what heresy is can be reminded. 
Especially some Sufi practices and rites like some versions of zikrs in some Sufi orders 
or Melami and Bektashi ways of lives were condemned as un-Islamic. It should also be 
kept in mind that these efforts to determine heresies had vital connections with the 
political circumstances and power struggles of the period. Wahhabi arguments that 
linked bidats and the Islamic understanding of the Ottoman Empire as the source of 
degeneration in Islam after its Arabic origins can be considered in this parallel. We can 
also see Ebu Suud‟s fatwas condemning the insurgent heterodoxy in the Anatolian 
lands of the empire with blasphemy in this parallel. For further detail, please see, 
Ahmet Yasar Ocak, Osmanlı Toplumunda Zındıklar ve Mulhidler: 15-17. Yuzyillar, 
(Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yayinlari, 1998). 
478 Rafizilik is literally a Shiite sect but its usage changes depending on the political and 
religious context. It sometimes refers to the group of Shiites that deny the caliphate of 
Abu Bakr and Umar; in some occasions it consists of all Shiite subgroups. It has been 
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Anatolia were the offshoot of these pervert Iranian and Shiite communities and they 
have been represented by Günaltay as ignorant communities that sunk into superstitions 
and heretical syncretic beliefs. In this respect, Iranian Islam was laid counter to true 
Islam which would later be bracketed with “Turkish Islam” in Günaltay‟s narrative. 
Therefore Turks were exculpated from the responsibility for the emergence of 
superstitions. 
In addition to these sects, Günaltay also emphasized the impact of specific 
actors that degenerate religion by inventing some bidats and causing the superstitions to 
grow in Islam. Some so-called hypocrites like Abdullah ibn Sebe or the founder of the 
Ismailite belief, Hasan Sabbah were exemplified by Günaltay as the apostles of the 
intentional creation and spread of superstitions to damage the truthful essence of Islam. 
In this regard, a linguistic distinction can be noticed, in Günaltay‟s books, between the 
deliberately invented superstitions and superstitions that emerged in the course of 
history in a more contingent manner. He is likely to attack the intentionally produced 
ones and their agents more severely.  
Moreover, fabricated hadiths (written accounts of prophet‟s sayings and deeds) 
were the most influential medium of the production of superstitions according to 
Günaltay. These were called as mevzu hadith in the Islamic literature and many of the 
irrational beliefs and absurdities that are contrary to science were transferred into Islam 
in the form of a fabricated hadith
479
. Especially many of the popular beliefs and stories 
about the natural happenings and ancient incidents attributed to hadiths of prophet were 
claimed by Günaltay to originate from Judaistic beliefs (Israiliyat)
480
.  
                                                                                                                                              
also used to depict Kizilbas/Alevi communities in Anatolia. Parallel to these meanings, 
the term was also used by the Ottoman orthodoxy to depict the unorthodox religious 
creeds and groups in Anatolia. Günaltay uses the term in this sense to refer to 
heterodox religious groups in Anatolia like Alevis and some Bektashis, and clearly 
separates Rafizilik from Shiism. For further details on Rafizilik see Ahmet Y. Ocak, 
Turkler, Turkiye ve Islam, 49-50. 
479 Hurafattan Hakikate, 251. 
480 Ibid, 265. This Israiliyat rhetoric that means calling a specific conviction or practice 
as Israiliyat was not specific to Günaltay but it had a history in Islamic tradition. 
Similar to the syncretism with other belief systems, the inclusion of Israiliyat was seen 
as one of the basic causes of the appearance of superstitions in Islam. Especially in the 
late Ottoman period, Israiliyat was identically used to indicate a superstition by various 
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IV.1.b.i. Ignorance and superstitions  
Here it should be highlighted in Şemseddin Günaltay‟s comprehension that the 
historical evolvement of superstitions was accompanied by the scattering of ignorance 
in the Muslim societies. The flood of superstitions in Islam nurtured the ignorance in 
society; and ignorance of the people induced the blossoming of superstitions in Muslim 
societies. So to speak, to Günaltay, ignorance and superstitions were reciprocally both 
the cause and consequence of each other. The main cause of the mushrooming and 
spread of ignorance was the regression of the ilm
481
 (science) and ilmiyye (class of 
Islamic scholars) according to Günaltay. In this narrative, scientific knowledge, critical 
thinking and curiosity flourished in “the golden age of Islam” were assumed to be lost 
by Muslims. Moreover, scientific institutions like medreses had deteriorated and 
learned classes had disappeared or substituted by illiterates
482
. These illiterates in the 
garment of sheikhs or scholars like Sivasi Efendi had occupied the positions of Gazalis, 
Ibn Sinas (Avicenna), Ali Kuscus and Molla Guranis and instructed the superstitions to 
people as religion, indolence as religious fortitude, and abasement and misery as 
consequences of fate
483
. What is also noteworthy here is the criterion Günaltay exerted 
in order to distinguish the golden age of Islam which is not only confined to the early 
years of Islam. The classical period of Islam and early Ottoman years that scientific 
observation, philosophy, critical and free thinking, and curiosity flourished were 
represented as the golden age of Islam by Günaltay. Therefore, the golden age was 
evaluated through Günaltay‟s lens of scientism, free thinking and rationality. This 
approach in Günaltay‟s writings seems to be stemmed from Afghani and Abduh‟s 
ideas. 
                                                                                                                                              
intellectuals including Günaltay. Ismail Kara, “Modernlesme Donemi Turkiyesi‟nde 
Ulum, Funun ve Sanat Kavramlari”, 252. 
481 In Günaltay‟s understanding ilm not only meant religious sciences but also included 
natural sciences.  
482 Zulmetten Nura, 151. 
483 Ismail Kara, Turkiye’de Islamcilik Dusuncesi 2, 569. 
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In this regard, the ignorance and lack of knowledge of the populace and men of 
religion was repetitively emphasized by Günaltay. To him, avam (populace) in the 
current Muslim world -and especially in Anatolia- was deprived of the religious 
knowledge and necessary education, and therefore they had fallen into clutches of 
erroneous convictions, superstitious beliefs and practices. In this regard, the folk is 
depicted by Günaltay as illiterate and docile enough to believe in every superstition 
presented them as religion because superstitions were quite proper to the people‟s low 
level of understanding
484
. Especially Rafizis were attacked by Günaltay as the most 
ignorant community that submerged into superstitions, by being tricked by their 
religious leaders, dedes
485
. Folk was actually innocent because they of course could not 
understand anything from the books of great scholars, from Quran‟s commands, and 
clear statements of true hadiths
486
. This was why they were easily deceived by the 
ignorant men of religion
487
.  
In addition to the people, almost all men of religion in Anatolia, without 
providing any specific historical data, were portrayed by Günaltay as devoid of 
religious –and scientific- knowledge. Some ulema (religious scholars), sheikhs, imams 
(prayer leaders) and vaizs (preachers), had usurped the ranks of real alims and spiritual 
guides by pretending to be scholars, dervishes or sheikhs, even though they knew 
nothing of science and knowledge
488
. These illiterates according to Günaltay were the 
most dangerous enemies of true Islam and the main agents of the scattering of 
superstitions in the society
489
. Especially through vaazs (sermon) and sohbet halkaları 
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487 Ibid, 313. The ignorance of the people was also held by Seyyid Bey, Ahmet Hamdi 
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(circles of religious conversations) they were inculcating superstitious stories/tales and 
Israiliyat to the populace
490
. These superstitions, mythological rumors and ungrounded 
stories were tricks to narcotize the minds of Muslims and kill the sense of curiosity, 
free thinking and necessity of examination which were counted as the commands of 
Islam
491
.  
The population that was deeply buried in the darkness of ignorance and 
superstitions should be enlightened and thus saved. Therefore, enlightening the men of 
religion with the positive sciences of the day and appointing them to villages by the 
government came to be an indispensable measure to eradicate the filth of superstitions 
and ignorance
492. By education, the “darkness” of the superstitions and ignorance could 
be dissolved and the “light” of the true Islam enriched with reason and sciences could 
be acquired. 
Besides, ignorance and superstitions had been promoted by the despotic rulers 
because they occasioned extreme docility and submissiveness of the Muslims to the 
religious and political authority. In this regard, Sufism turned into an instrument in the 
hands of despotic rulers in order to perpetuate their rule over an acquiescent population 
and to provide legitimacy. In this frame of thinking, Günaltay explained that ignorance 
and superstitions killed the spirit of Islam and of courage, and thus laid the ground for 
the heavy defeat of Muslims in the hands of Western powers and resulted in the 
occupation of the Muslim lands by imperialist powers
493
.  
Related to these effects of ignorance and superstitions, Günaltay‟s interpretation 
of ignorance on the one hand designated the lack of knowledge or misinformation 
about the Quran and Sunnah and the practices and writings of Salaf-i Salihin 
(forefathers of the Islamic doctrine). On the other hand, this criticism of ignorance and 
superstitions prioritized the lack of knowledge of the recent explorations of the modern 
sciences and inability to use reason as a fundamental problem. This understanding also 
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implies a manifest challenge to the dependence on taqlid by the scholars and the folk 
instead of aql (reason) and ictihad (or ijtihad - independent interpretation). In this 
regard, Günaltay‟s criticism is also directed to the oral sources of the reproduction and 
dissemination of Islamic knowledge like sermons or sohbets. This can be also 
interpreted as a challenge to the traditional forms of religious authority, maintained 
through oral channels in local contexts, of sheikhs, vaizs, and imams and so on. I will 
discuss in the following chapter how authentic ways of acquiring religious knowledge, 
reason and religious authority underwent a critical reconsideration in Günaltay‟s 
contemplation of true Islam.  
 
IV.1.b.ii. Passivity as a sin  
Another outcome of superstitions according to Günaltay, as important as 
ignorance, was atalet (inertia/inactiveness) into which Muslims were dragged. To 
Günaltay, superstitions had withered the spirit of Muslims, and Muslims had forgotten 
say u gayret (zeal and ardor), izzet (dignity), hardworking, determination and 
acquisition of wealth and prosperity. Meskenet/miskinlik (passivity/inactiveness), 
tembellik (laziness), zillet (abasement), fakr (poverty), and lack of determination had 
become the characteristics of Muslim societies. Muslim lands were depicted by 
Günaltay as places where people were happy to lazily live and ascetically worship in 
the corners of tekkes, medreses or kahvehanes (coffeehouses). People were 
indoctrinated with the understanding of bir lokma bir hırka [Müslüman’a kafidir] (one 
bit and one dervish‟s coat is enough for Muslims). In this understanding, living in 
poverty (fakr) and dünyadan el etek çekmek (resignation from this world) were 
promoted while working for this life and acquiring wealth were underrated. According 
to Günaltay, these had been the fundamental cause in the downfall of Muslims in the 
face of hardworking, wealthy and determined European nations. 
This imagery of Muslim societies as inert and inactive and hence weak and 
backward was quite popular within the intellectual circles of the Second Constitutional 
Period. Aside from its relative validity, this imagery seems to be forged under the 
influence of materialist, organicist/vitalist and Social Darwinist contemplations of 
nature and social life. At least this seems to be the case for Günaltay. To him world was 
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a field of struggle and only the societies consisted of zealous and hardworking 
individuals were able to survive and progress
494
. In this social Darwinist frame of 
thought Günaltay assumed that societies in the clutches of inertia, passivity and 
ignorance would be swallowed by hardworking, determined and affluent nations
495
. In 
a vitalist/organicist frame of thought he also proposed that all non-living and living 
things were in motion and struggle, they were working; except [us] Muslims
496
. 
Günaltay thought the order and laws in nature as the basis of the social and political 
necessities of modern time; and that advanced societies were fulfilling the necessities 
of this order. In this order that Günaltay proposed, hardworking, initiative, 
determination and wealth accumulation were fundamental virtues and there was no way 
of survival for Muslims other than fitting to these rules. Namely, the only means to 
salvation for Muslims was their own zeal and ardor
497
. Therefore there was no place in 
the [today‟s] world for meskenet, extreme tevekkül, resignation from the world and the 
understanding of bir lokma, bir hırka.  
In relation to his understanding of natural laws and society, Günaltay had 
established a dichotomy between passivity and activity and realigned various Islamic 
values and concepts in this dialectical relationship. On the one hand, norms like 
hardworking, activeness and wealth accumulation were prioritized and glorified as 
fundamental virtues that true Islam actually demanded from Muslims by Günaltay. On 
the other hand, concepts like bir lokma-bir hırka, tevekkül or meskenet were given 
negative meanings as fatalism, laziness or docility, or reinterpreted by being 
decontextualized from their own frame of meaning in the Islamic tradition and Sufi 
culture. Ismail Kara interprets this realignment as a selective reconfiguration in the 
Islamic normative hierarchy through the lens of a foreign logic
498
. In order to 
demonstrate the Islamic authenticity of his revaluation of concepts like activity, servet 
(wealth), hardworking and inactiveness, meskenet and laziness, Günaltay resorted to 
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498 Ismail Kara, “Sufism and Sufi Orders as a Target of Criticism”, 547. 
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Islamic sources, basically by referring to hadiths and exemplifying the life of sahabe 
(companions of the prophet). Yet here we should be warned about the conspicuously 
selective and decontextualized use of hadiths with lack of sufficient examination of 
authenticity in Günaltay‟s examples.  
In accordance with this understanding, referring to some hadiths, notions like 
meskenet, resignation from the world, uzlet (resignation from people to worship God) 
and tevekkül were presented as sinful or alien to the true Islam; or some of them were 
interpreted different than traditional Islamic meanings by Günaltay. For instance 
meskenet
499
 and laziness were denounced by the prophet as the greatest dangers to the 
ummah
500
. Prophet had also banned Muslims from worshiping in uzlet; inactively alone 
in a corner. There was no Muslim in prophet‟s life time that resigned into a corner in a 
miskin (inactive) manner
501
. This view surely neglects the role and importance of 
Ashab-ı Suffa that was a group of people constituted by the Prophet himself and 
resigned from all worldly affairs and devoted to religious studies and worshiping. 
However Günaltay discusses that all Aşere-i Mübeşşere (ten companions of the prophet 
promised with paradise in their lifetimes) were faal (active) people”502. Tevekkül had 
been also misinterpreted by Muslims; in Günaltay‟s account of “true Islam” the 
meaning of tevekkül in its correct form was redefined as conforming to the natural laws 
(namely God‟s laws [sunnetullah]) and esbab (natural causes) and then trusting in God. 
Quoting Muhammad Abduh, Günaltay considered that this misinterpretation had led 
Muslims to submissiveness and extreme unconcern to the worldly affairs. This at the 
end had acquired the shape of fatalism in Muslims‟ lives; and Günaltay complained that 
                                                 
499 Here the meaning of the term meskenet (miskin as its adjective form) were 
consciously changed by Günaltay. Ismail Kara provides a useful account of conceptual 
history about how the meaning of miskin gradually turned into negative in the late 
Ottoman period. From a meaning to refer to be “in need” and also spiritual quite, it was 
turned into a word implying laziness and personal insufficiency. For further analysis 
look at Ismail Kara, “Sufism and Sufi Orders as a Target of Criticism”, 549. 
500 Hurafattan Hakikate, 76.  
501 Ashab-ı Suffa was also perceived as a model for the tekkes and tarikats and 
medreses in the traditional Islamic culture.  
502 Hurafattan Hakikate, 278, 279. 
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this was used by the Westerners to criticize Islam
503
. This understanding of 
otherworldliness and tevekkül was surely out of Günaltay‟s understanding of Islam.  
In this sense, working for worldly ends or acquisition of wealth had been 
elevated to the level of religious obligations in Islam in Günaltay‟s writings. For 
instance working was perceived as a farz (obligatory deed in Islamic fiqh)
504
 and people 
demanding this world were equal to martyrs. In this regard, bir lokma, bir hırka 
understanding was quite contrary to the so-called true Islam in Günaltay‟s scheme of 
thinking; and fakr (poverty) was a sinful state of human life. According to the prophet, 
the life was a struggle and every Muslim was charged with striving to win in this 
struggle. In this understanding of the prophet, “working and endeavor were the spirit of 
Islam”; and affluence was the most important principle for the ummah. This world was 
actually as important as the other world in “true Islamic understanding”. By this way 
the extreme importance attributed to the otherworld was being challenged by Günaltay 
because the otherworldliness of the Muslims had led them to passivity and to resign 
from the world; and the outcome was surely the decline of the Muslims in this world. 
This did not only mean a clear subversion of the hierarchical superiority of the 
otherworld over this-world in Islamic understanding but also signified a clear 
“temporality” in the interpretation of the life and cosmology, and even religion in 
Günaltay‟s thinking. This surely signals the new Weltanschauung of the late Ottoman 
intellectual. 
This worldly understanding of religion and life resulted in construction of an 
idea of active individual by Günaltay. This individual who was educated with modern 
pedagogical tools would abstain from lazily spending life in a corner of tekke or 
medrese and would continuously work in order to make use of his lifetime according to 
Günaltay. This individual would be industrious, have an entrepreneur spirit and only 
depend on his capacities with a complete self-confidence. In this respect he interpreted 
the “good servants” in the verse “the earth has been inherited to good servants of mine” 
as people that are able to properly live and survive on the earth
505
. His notion of active 
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individual reminds the Protestant worldly asceticism in which working for this world 
turned into a religious practice. What Günaltay was imagining with activeness and 
working for this world was also related to the ideal of material progress which is also 
interpreted as an industrial advancement in a capitalistic sense. Laziness and passivity 
becomes an instrumental “evil” in this respect in order to crystallize his “true Islam” in 
the spirit of Protestantism and capitalist industrialism. These ideals of activism, 
material progress and excessive importance given to this-worldliness were not peculiar 
to Şemseddin Günaltay but these were some visible proposals among the Young Turks.  
 
IV.1.c. Rhetoric on Sufi orders: Under the garment of a sheikh, in the corner of a 
tekke  
The criticism of superstitions in Günaltay‟s writings displays a more abstract 
characteristic; in other words, the notion of superstition has a more abstract function to 
depict the cultural, ideational and normative deviations from the so-called “true Islam”. 
The criticism directed against Sufism constitutes the institutional dimension of anti-
superstition criticism of Günaltay. So to speak, his criticism focused on the institutional 
and practical deteriorations in tekkes and tarikats, instead of a philosophical or 
theological debate on the authenticity of Sufism as a legitimate field of Islamic life. On 
the contrary he overtly refrains from involving into discussion of theological and 
philosophical aspects of Sufi doctrine like Vahdet-i Vucut (simply oneness of all beings 
in God) or so on. Günaltay approved the truthfulness and necessity of Sufism as a 
pedagogical institution in Islam for spiritual education and cultivation of Muslims. 
During the discussions that he attended, about the reform of Sufi lodges in 1918 in the 
Meclis-i Mebusan (parliament), he appreciated the necessity of the mystical life for the 
society
506
. However, he also mentioned that the decay and corruption in the Muslim 
societies had infected the dervish lodges. In this rhetoric of decay, Günaltay proclaimed 
                                                 
506 Mustafa Kara, “Social and Cultural Activities of the Dervishes under the 2nd 
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Sufi lodges as the locus of passivity and laziness and the sheikhs and dervishes as the 
means to disseminate superstitions and ignorance in the Muslim world. 
To explain the decay of Sufism, Günaltay makes a distinction between the past 
examples of tekkes that were loyal to their origins, and corrupt Sufi institutions of his 
times. According to Günaltay, tekkes were formerly established as centers of irfan 
(wisdom) in order to help the spiritual and mental advancement and enlightenment of 
the people by instructing the essence of moral virtues and spiritual purity. He 
repetitively indicated in his books that in the course of time the tekkes and tarikats 
swerved from their original purposes and original Islamic principles, and as a result 
they deteriorated. This idea was also associated with the assumption that Sufi orders 
loyal to the premises of true Islam were left in the past.  
In this narrative of decay, Günaltay represented tekkes of his times as “dens of 
passivity” that “killed the spirit of living and working in the society”507. When the Sufi 
orders deteriorated, lazy and ignorant people had got established in them according to 
Günaltay, had substituted positions of rightful sheikhs and obtained weight on the 
populace.  These deceitful people under the guise of Sufism and sheikhdom looked for 
ways of amply abusing the ignorance and credulity of people, condemned their minds 
and bodies to passivity and pushed them to a “narcotic” submissiveness508. This was 
the main reason to Şemseddin Günaltay that condemned part of the Muslim populations 
to a passive life. As a result, tekkes were not able to carry out their missions
509
 defined 
by Günaltay as enlightening the people, consolidating the social order, providing 
solidarity and strengthening the morality in society. In contrast to their missions, they 
had turned into places that produce and maintain superstitions, erroneous convictions 
and passivity. The situation of these orders was totally irreconcilable with the 
necessities of the time and science. To Günaltay this decay in the orders became the 
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508 Ibid, 304.  
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“most” effective factor causing the decline of the Islamic lands (maybe more “most 
effective” than other “most effective” factors he described).  
This idea of decay of the orders was associated with the discussions in 
Günaltay‟s books or in his speeches in the Ottoman period about the possibility of a 
reform for the tekkes and tarikats in accordance with the necessities of time by the use 
of the methods of modern “sociology”. In the discussions in Meclis-i Mebusan about 
the situation of tekkes and tarikats in 1918, he seems to be more hesitated about a 
possible betterment of Sufi orders towards a modern institutional structure; and he 
argued that the money and efforts spent to these institutions could have been better 
used for other purposes for the good of nation. In this respect, it is noteworthy to 
underline the serious change in his views on Sufi orders after the establishment of 
Republic. In 1925 publication of Zulmetten Nura, exemplifying the uprising of Sheikh 
Said against the Republican government, he added a passage arguing that Sufi orders 
had completed their missions and they became harmful to the society “as abscesses on 
the social body”510. Therefore similar to the views of the ruling elite he advocated that 
their abolishment in the same year was inevitably essential and just
511
.  
On the other hand, Günaltay‟s generalized and reductive representation of Sufi 
orders in a complete decay sweeps all the differentiations and specifications of Sufi 
orders that took place in the historical flow and in different contexts. Günaltay does not 
elaborate which tarikats or tekkes –except the indication of Bektashis once - paved the 
way for corruption or how the corruption occurred. Collecting all possible and quite 
diverse practices and mores of tekkes and tarikats under the reductive vocabulary of 
corruption of tekkes and tarikats seems to be instrumental to explain the decline in 
Muslim world and to construct his understanding of true Islam. This approach might be 
the reason behind his omission or maybe unawareness of the Sufi revivalist movements 
of his time, called as “Neo-Sufism” by Fazlur Rahman, especially of the Naqshbandi 
movement. These revivalist movements reflected some correspondence with 
Günaltay‟s puritanical and activist ideals of rejuvenating the original Islam with their 
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missionary or anti-imperialist activism in contrast to his stereotype of the passivity of 
the members of the tekkes
512
. 
I think Günaltay believed that the historical transmutation of Sufism created an 
incommensurable gap between the condition of tekkes and tarikats in his times and 
their idealized past examples. Therefore similar to his distinction between real and 
corrupt Islam, he separates between the categories of “true Sufism” that was left in an 
ideal part of history and “corrupt Sufism” prevailing in the Sufi orders in his times513. 
In short, Sufism as an ideal methodology and institution might have been included into 
his idealized conception of true Islam but current condition of Sufi lodges and orders 
were completely incongruous to his category of true Islam. Sufism in its “true spirit” 
was perceived by Şemseddin Günaltay to be essential for deriving individual ethics for 
the members of the liberal society he imagined and thus it was instrumental to keep the 
social order and morality. This is surely a functionalist interpretation of Sufism for 
societal ends distinct from its native form and functions consisting of esoteric and 
other-worldly spiritual techniques and institutionalization.  
Günaltay also targeted the sheikhs and dervishes as the agents of the 
degeneration in Sufi orders. To him they were leading the minds of people astray from 
Islam while hiding their political and worldly ambitions under the garment of a sheikh 
or dervish
514
. They were using their positions to obtain political or economic profit; in 
other words, they were making the religion an instrument to the politics (dini siyasete 
alet etmek)
515
 or acquisition of wealth. Instead of serving for the regulation of social 
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life and the elevation of the masses they helped them corrupt and decay
516
. This might 
in Günaltay‟s account be an indication of the tendency to crystallize the newer Islam by 
personifying the un-Islamic counterparts of it as the stereotypical “other”. 
Although this sweeping negative representation of bigot imams, deceitful 
sheikhs or cinci hocas was not an innovation of Şemseddin Günaltay - they had roots in 
the 31 March Incident with the emergence of the rhetoric of irtica
517
 (reaction)- 
Günaltay‟s reiteration of these imageries contribute to the reproduction of these 
representations. It should be reminded that the representation of a type of malevolent 
sheikh has been the main means to the representation of religion as evil in the anti-
religious and anti-Sufi imagery. This also seems to have vital connections with the 
legitimization and construction of the similar otherizing discourses of the Republican 
ideology towards sheikhs and imams (prayer leaders), yobazs (fanatics), murtecis 
(reactionaries) or cinci hocas (witch doctors). This issue is also related to the discourses 
of irtica and using religion for political/economic ends. In this regard, these negative 
stereotypical imageries of pervert and radical Muslims accompany the discourses of 
irtica and dini siyasete alet etmek (similarly din bezirganligi-“selling religion”). It 
should be scrutinized how these discourses were inherited and also did become such 
popular discourses.  
 
IV.2. Semsettin Gunaltay’s Attempts to Design a Modern Islam 
 
After the introduction of Günaltay‟s ideas about Muslim decline, superstitions 
and Sufi orders, this second part of the chapter will conduct a theoretically concerned 
examination of Gunaltay‟s methods to distinguish superstitions and basic guidelines of 
his conceptualization of true Islam.  
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IV.2.a. How to Determine Superstitions: Problem of Sources and Methodology  
The essential question about the nature of superstitions concerning Günaltay‟s 
understanding arises about the methods to distinguish superstitions: What are the main 
criteria determining one belief or practice to be superstition? What were sources and 
the methodology of Günaltay‟s thoughts in order to differentiate superstitions from his 
contemplation of “true Islam”? In other words, what were the sources of true Islam? 
First, it should be mentioned that Günaltay did not provide a theoretically 
satisfactory ground for labeling a particular cultural practice as superstition. Only the 
rhetoric of returning to the “origins” or “sources” of Islam can be discerned in relation 
to this grounding in Günaltay‟s books. These sources were Quran and sunnah 
(traditions of the Prophet). However, it is remarkable that even though he announced 
that main religious guide of Muslims is Quran, Quranic verses were hardly quoted in 
his books in order to distinguish basic dispositions that make a cultural element un-
Islamic. Günaltay‟s excessive use of hadith (accounts of prophet‟s sayings and deeds) 
quotations should be also remarked. Yet as I mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
authenticity of these hadiths is quite questionable since Günaltay did not provide 
sources of the hadiths in Zulmetten Nura and Hurafattan Hakikate
518
. These hadith 
quotations seem to be picked out as single sentences from their frames, without 
sufficient information about their social contexts. Besides, they were given 
overinterpreted meanings conforming to Günaltay‟s insights. 
Here another -and even more important- criteria that Günaltay deemed 
necessary to check the truthfulness of cultural practices were science and reason. 
Reason and irfan (wisdom/science) were proposed by Günaltay as the worldly guides 
while Quran as the religious guide of Muslims. Looking for a mürşit (guide) other than 
science and reason would not accord with both the spirit of Islam and the mentality of 
the age
519
. It is also frequently reiterated by Günaltay that Islam was based on reason, 
and according to a hadith –of which authenticity is doubtful by the way- Muslim‟s 
                                                 
518 In the 1996 publication of Hurafattan Hakikate the editor of the book provides 
sources of the hadiths Şemseddin Günaltay used from Camiatü‟s Sagir and most of 
these hadiths are weak ones.  
519 Hurafattan Hakikate, 316. 
140 
 
religion was his reason
520
. In this regard, by the excessive exemplification of hadiths, 
the use of reason and study of science
521
 had been dragged into the place of 
fundamental tenets of Islam by Günaltay. However, he perceived ilim mainly as the 
highest form of knowledge of times and thus it came to mean mainly the modern 
science in his view mostly separate from the knowledge of the classical Islamic 
scholarship and Sufi teaching. Here it can be also asserted that fitting to the 
mentality/necessities of the age/civilized world came to be an underlying premise to 
determine Islamic and un-Islamic practices as well. What is remarkable here in 
Şemseddin Günaltay‟s approach is the idea of examining the authenticity of hadiths by 
their compatibility to reason. Namely, the hadiths that do not fit to reason should be 
proclaimed inauthentic according to Günaltay. Manifestly in the footsteps of Afghani 
and Abduh
522
 he was also prioritizing the aql (reason) before naql (-oral- transference 
of traditional religious knowledge) and Scripture when a contradiction emerged 
between them
523
.  
Moreover, similar to the change in the meaning of the understanding of ilim, it 
is possible to discuss that the characteristics of aql were reconfigured in line with the 
post-Enlightenment understanding of instrumental reason, different than its 
connotations in the Islamic tradition. In this frame of thinking, reason came to be 
perceived as an underlying criterion to examine the validity of the traditional sources of 
knowledge in Islam. The authoritative role reason acquired in Günaltay‟s thinking is 
also indicative of the challenge he pointed at the traditional methodologies and sources 
of knowledge. By prioritizing the authoritative role of reason, Günaltay brought 
traditional discursive/oral channels of knowledge like taqlid or naql under scrutiny due 
to their lack of epistemological impersonality and openness to critical rational scrutiny. 
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In other words, from Günaltay‟s lens, these were discordant to Günaltay‟s ideals of free 
thinking, impersonal (textual) learning, systematic thought and internal logical 
coherence promoting the authority of reason in the interpretation of religious/worldly 
matters. In this frame of thought, Quran was emphasized as the sole authoritative 
source against traditional religious methodologies like ijma (consensus) or 
reinterpretive but restrictive methods of fiqh like commentaries. This envisioned a new 
hermeneutical approach to Quran proposing the interpretation of the revelation through 
the lens of reason and scientific knowledge with an awareness of the necessities of 
modern times. This view was centralizing an intellectually enlightened and self-
dependant subject competing for authority in religious matters with the traditional 
religious authorities. Therefore Günaltay pressed against conventional religious 
authority, maintained through oral channels in local contexts, and held by sheikhs, 
alims (classical Islamic scholars) or vaizs (preachers) and so on. From a different point 
of view, this rearrangement of the hierarchies of epistemological tools like hadith, 
reason, science, commentaries, naql or taqlid can be interpreted as an attempt to narrow 
down and dominate the valid forms of epistemologies in Islam in line with Günaltay‟s 
agenda.  
In this realignment of epistemological hierarchies his critical lens had been 
directed to the belief in the supernatural phenomena and trust in occult powers and 
metaphysical elements as was the case for the beliefs in veli kerametleri (miracles of 
saints) and appealing saints for the fulfillment of wishes. These beliefs and practices 
alluding to alternative orders of things and realities beyond the natural order and 
causality of this world, even at the expense of rationality, were quite contrary to the 
naturalist cause-effect relation and rationality of Günaltay, which was framed in a plain 
terrestrial and scientific “episteme” of knowledge and existence. 
Then, the main concern here about the popular beliefs, superstitions or Sufi 
practices seems to be their incompatibility with scientific findings and rational 
thinking. In this new paradigm of rationalism, superstitions, some popular beliefs and 
convictions within the Islamic culture were identified as irrational and unscientific
524
 
although this “rationale” overlooked their inner logics, and practicalities or 
methodologies that might have given way to their emergence. They were constructed as 
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totally unrelated to religion as well as to reason since Islam was based on reason
525
. By 
excluding them from the imagined autonomous field of true Islam, the elements 
incompatible with the findings of natural sciences and reason would be eliminated and 
thus the full convenience of Islam with science and reason would be proved. Therefore 
there is a continuous repetition of the compatibility of Islam and sciences and reason in 
Günaltay‟s writings. As a result, Islam was overtly rationalized in Günaltay‟s scheme 
of thinking; in other words, rationality and science became indispensable components 
of the so-called “true Islam” of Şemseddin Günaltay. 
 
IV.2.b. What is True Islam? 
In the beginning of the chapter dealing with superstitions I mentioned that 
superstitions had a rhetorical function in Günaltay‟s thought. This is actually related to 
the ambiguous nature of the superstitions as a category containing the un-Islamic 
cultural elements represented by Günaltay as “totally evil”. Nevertheless, it is difficult 
to say that a comprehensive theoretical or methodological analysis of the dispositions 
or a clear-cut definition of superstitions was rendered by Günaltay. Günaltay also 
hardly discusses how the cultural elements that he described as superstition were 
improper to Islam and how some specific social practices/beliefs diverged from the so-
called true Islam with thorough theological arguments and references. To evaluate the 
properness of a cultural fragment to Islam he just employs some hadiths of which 
authenticities were doubtful, or examines that cultural fragment according to its 
convenience to reason or findings of the science. The notion of superstition is more 
likely to be used arbitrarily to determine all sorts of divergences from true Islam as 
Günaltay understood it. He appears to be more interested in the social outcomes of 
superstitions, instead of what they are. The descriptive ambiguity and arbitrariness of 
the discourse of superstitions in Günaltay‟s narrative seems to be instrumental in two 
ways. First, by arbitrarily deciding on what the deviations from the true religion were, 
what corrupted the society and caused decline in Islamic societies would be revealed. 
Second, by arbitrarily excluding or including these elements, the ambiguous category 
of true Islam would be fashioned. To put differently, clear exclusionary approach of 
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Günaltay to the superstitions makes the delimitation of an essentialized category of true 
Islam more explicit in contrast to superstitions. In this frame, exclusion applied to 
specific cultural practices, in line with a certain political and social agenda, comes to be 
the main characteristic of Günaltay‟s analysis of superstitions.  
Nevertheless, this sort of an ideational segregation and exclusion does not seem 
to be easily applicable for the premises and rites of tasavvuf (Sufism). This was 
probably due to the fact that Sufism in a level of abstraction had been commonly 
considered within the Islamic tradition as an authentic Islamic way of spiritual learning, 
despite centuries of discussions in Islamic tradition about its legitimacy. In this respect, 
Şemseddin Günaltay cannot declare Sufism as the ultimate negative other of his 
essential true Islam, like superstitions, simply by assuming as un-Islamic. Therefore, he 
makes a distinction between Sufi practices in their so-called truthfulness or corruptness 
in terms of their suitability to true Islam. Thus, his criticism was directed to the 
practices and beliefs that he perceived as corrupt in Sufism. Instead of being deployed 
as an opposite category to true Islam, Sufism and Sufi orders were portrayed -in their 
corrupted form- as a significant source of the emergence of superstitions and bidats by 
Günaltay. In this respect, Sufi orders became more instrumental in the institutional 
level of Günaltay‟s analysis (criticism) to crystallize a category of superstitions.  
In this regard, some mixed and complex folk beliefs and religious practices that 
might also contain some syncretism, superstitions and so on were also homogenized as 
an ambiguous category of “lived Islam” or “folk Islam” in Günaltay‟s contemplation. 
El-Zein argues that the idea of “local islams”, namely “local variants of Islam as a 
diluted form corrupted by magic and superstition”, implies that a “pure and well-
defined essence of Islam” exists, even if it cannot be readily found526. This ambiguous 
category of lived/local/folk Islam in Günaltay‟s contemplation implies such a “pure and 
well-defined essence of Islam”. In other words, the conception of Günaltay‟s true Islam 
as a “transhistorical and transcultural phenomenon” is constructed in contrast to the 
historically and culturally embedded popular beliefs, superstitions and corrupt Sufi 
practices. In this sense, we can mention a binary opposition between the “ahistorical” 
“true Islam” and the corrupt “historical Islam”/“lived Islam” in Günaltay‟s narrative. 
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This dichotomy can be aligned with similar binary oppositions proposed to describe 
Islam in Muslim societies by various social scientific disciplines like “scholarly Islam” 
and “folk Islam” or “little tradition” and “great tradition” (like Gellner defined527) or 
orthodoxy and heterodoxy.  
In this regard, El-Zein describes the dichotomy of folk Islam versus elite Islam 
as part of and Islamic [intellectual] elite‟s attempt to dominate the discourse about what 
constitutes real religion
528
. In my opinion, Günaltay‟s definition of true Islam based on 
a dichotomy might be comprehended in relation to a similar attempt for domination and 
power relations. Günaltay‟s conception of real and lived Islam has vital connections 
with the dominant discourses of the period. In one level, this might be to deal with the 
Western/Orientalist and anti-religious claims against Islam; and in another level, to 
streamline Islam with the values of a new mind set came out of a new cognitive 
paradigm. In this regard, the discourse emphasizing the existence of superstitions and 
corrupt cultural practices within the lived/historical Islam in Günaltay‟s narrative seems 
instrumental to shield the original Islam from the contemporary charges of corruption 
pointed by Orientalist and anti-religious/materialist discourses. According to Günaltay 
the reason behind the backwardness of Muslims was not the true Islam but the 
superstitions of the past societies and today‟s religion that lost its origin529. Therefore 
he reiterated statements like “(real) Islam cannot be condemned”, “the fault does not 
belong to true Islam”, and “all the flaws should be searched in our living of Islam”530. 
In this regard, the idea of an idealized and nostalgic origin, Asr-ı Saadet, devoid of a 
substantive content, became a safe ground to escape from an undesirable baggage of 
cultural elements –like superstitions, popular practices or some Sufi beliefs- 
mushroomed in Islam in the course of history. 
I think Günaltay‟s emphasis on superstitions as the historically and culturally 
defected “other” of true Islam is also functional to address an essence of Islam 
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compatible with the “necessities” of the modern times. As I mentioned before, 
Günaltay had excessively written that Islam was totally compatible with the necessities 
of the civilization; it was based on reason, supporting science and elevating the level of 
the society by supporting progress
531
. Therefore in order to ensure this compatibility, 
the meanings of Islamic concepts like tevekkül, meskenet or ilim could be redefined; or 
the hierarchies of values in the classical Islamic understanding like hardworking or 
ascetism could be reconfigured in Günaltay‟s model of Islam as previously analyzed. In 
this regard this study argues that Günaltay stretches the basic tenets and concepts of 
“traditional Islam” in order to devise his “purified” and “reified” concept of “true 
Islam” in accordance with modern sciences and rationality532. Beyond being exempt 
from any negativity, Islam would contain all the positive features and open to positive 
developments according to Günaltay. This approach, I think, proposes Islam as an 
obscure and universal entity, adaptable to changes and even going beyond the changes 
in the hierarchies of normative values, good and bad.  This new ambiguous perception 
of Islam as a universal framework of “good” is more likely to be useful for political 
ends, instead of a concern for theoretical and theological methodology. Then what 
makes this approach towards Islam noteworthy is the split that it implied in the 
perception and use of Islam as a “thing” loaded with moral and political meanings in 
more interchanging forms, especially during the process of transition from the 
“traditional Islam” towards its newer cast.  
 
IV.2.c. True Islam as “Natural Religion” 
In this regard, Günaltay envisioned a homogenous and universal religion which 
is ictimai (social), sade (simple) and especially fıtri (natural). Günaltay‟s emphasis on 
Islam‟s being a natural religion; la religion naturelle (din-i fıtri, Hanif dini) draws close 
parallels to the Enlightenment conception of “Natural Religion” developed in the 17th 
and 18
th
 centuries‟ European context. Natural Religion presumed an abstracted and 
universalized religion, and implied a shift in attention from “God‟s words” to “God‟s 
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works” and a clear separation from the institutional religion. In this contemplation of 
natural religion, morality had replaced the disciplinary practices as its central tenet. To 
Talal Asad, this was by Kant transformed into a “fully essentialized idea of religion533 
which could be counterposed to its phenomenal forms”. Kant‟s contemplation as an 
extension of Natural Religion was a crucial step according to Asad in the formation of 
the modern concept of a universal religion in terms of belief, conscience and morality 
rather than a concrete set of practical rules and discipline, detached from its 
institutional organization like Church. To him this conception would later lead to 
understanding of religion “as a mode of consciousness” or a “belief as a state of mind 
rather than as constituting activity in the world” 534. 
 I think we can find clear similarities with this idea of religion in Günaltay‟s 
abstraction of Islam distant to institutional religion and disciplinary practices. It is clear 
that Günaltay‟s perception of religion was influenced by Jul Simon and Kant‟s views 
on religion. In Zulmetten Nura, he mentions Kant‟s argument that the only true religion 
should be unadulterated by myths and superstitions and should contain some laws and 
regulations dependent upon absolute knowledge
535
. This view seems to be inspiring for 
Günaltay to detach Islam from all the cultural and institutional deficiencies. To him 
original Islam was a sade (simple) and natural religion that would respond to the 
natural dispositions and necessities of people but it was made complicated by the 
intrusion of various practices, cultural habits and superstitions by the time past
536
. Its 
being natural was presented as a proof by Günaltay that true Islam must fit to reason -as 
the nature of human beings- and to natural laws -explored by the science.  
It is here conspicuous that despite his pages long discussion of the place of 
reason, science and morality in religion Günaltay hardly talks about the place and 
necessity of ibadet (religious practicing) in Islam. Even ibadet has been reduced to a 
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formal and secondary procedure after principles of reason, ilim or virtues like 
hardworking and activeness. Quoting a hadith Günaltay mentioned that ilim was 
superior to ibadet; and praying not only 5 times but 15 times in a day or continuously 
fasting (oruc/savm) would not be sufficient for the salvation of the ones sitting in the 
corner of tekkes or coffeehouses lazily
537
. 
In this respect, ahlak (morality) becomes a constitutive element in his 
understanding of true Islam which was consisted of reason and science. Quoting a 
hadith he argued that Islam had been made up of moral virtue. In his understanding, the 
meaning of morality underwent a serious transformation together with religion. In this 
deliberation all the principles that drive humankind to progress and evolution were 
asserted by Günaltay to fit to true Islam
538
. The outcome of this fickleness in his 
definition of true Islam was a radical changeover in the moral hierarchies as I argued in 
the previous chapter. Therefore, zeal and ardor (say u gayret), dignity (izzet) and 
acquisition of wealth (servet), (contributing to) worldly happiness (of people) have 
been described by Günaltay as basic moral tenets in true Islam in contrast to meskenet 
or the understanding of  bir lokma, bir hırka.  
More remarkably, similar to the deliberation of Natural Religion morality has 
been understood in a manner detached from ibadet and even put contrary to it. Quoting 
again a hadith Günaltay claimed that someone characterized by moral virtues would 
attain elevated ranks in the otherworld even if he had very little ibadet; and someone 
deprived of moral virtues even if he practiced day and night would fall down into 
lowest layers of the hell
539
. In this frame of thought, I think spiritual interconnectedness 
between ibadet and ahlak in religious methods and pedagogies of discipline and self-
cultivation has been disavowed. The promotion of this sort of a moral understanding 
can be interpreted as a quasi-secular morality conflated with the cultivation of a new 
form of modern subject –as a citizen540.  
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One can perceive this modern subject as a liberal/secular and/or Protestant 
subject seen through the lens of worldly working, free entrepreneurship, wealth 
accumulation and material progress in Günaltay‟s viewpoint. This can be juxtaposed 
with the pedagogies and disciplines of the active productive individual model of the 
CUP and especially republican regime; in order to delineate the new emerging 
imagination of the citizen as a vital and disciplined member of the nation-state, also in 
its service. 
Another strain of thought in his structure of morality was constituted under the 
manifest influence of Durkheimian sociology. In this structure, religion has been 
promoted by Günaltay as a moral system to protect the humans from social violations 
and to keep the order and harmony in the society
541
. In this frame, religion was 
perceived as a totally social (ictimai) phenomenon and he overtly announced religion as 
a solidarist system from the perspective of Durkheimian sociology which was 
enunciated by Günaltay as the best way to comprehend religion
542
. Namely, the aim of 
the religion was just to provide the saadet (happiness) and selamet (safety) of human 
society, by driving people to fazilet (virtue), ahlak-i hasene (morality) and say u gayret 
(zeal and ardor). In this understanding, religion was reduced into a functional unit of 
morality to keep the human society sound and safe and to provide solidarity among the 
members of society
543
, since religion was indispensable for a nation to live
544
. “True 
Sufism” took its part in this functionality as a spiritual institution to supply people with 
personal ethics and morality. 
Şemseddin Günaltay in this sense also employed Muhammad Abduh‟s unifying 
notion of tawhid
545
 that proposes a coherent belief forged in a singular rationale of 
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Islam. This unifying principle was therefore practical to construct a more simple, 
coherent, graspable and applicable totality of Islam. This was a more formulaic, and 
malleable categorization. However, his category of “true Islam” is mostly deprived of a 
“real” substance. It can be claimed that this categorization did not provide a program 
for the fundamentals of living original Islam. In other words, he cannot give a 
satisfying explanation for what this category of Islam was made of, except redefined 
notions of science, morality and reason in a high level of abstraction. Paradoxically, in 
contrast to the ambiguity and internal emptiness of the concept of true Islam it was 
quite practical as a formulaic ideological tool. This enables Günaltay to strategically 
use the concept to include or exclude social practices/beliefs, in line with their 
rationality or worldly advantages. For example, he can claim that “the means resulting 
in misery and degradation in this world cannot be included into the conception of 
Islam”546 or he can equate Islam with reason while identifying ilim with modern 
science, especially by the employment of the overinterpreted verses or hadiths.  
Günaltay‟s concept of true Islam also sustains a sort of functionality for social 
and political ends. The functional homogenization of true Islam was ready to be used in 
the service of politics for bringing religion under central state control and for reform 
projects targeting a large national population
547
. Educating the population in recent 
sciences and knowledge, saving people from superstitions and wrong convictions; 
removing poverty and misery, and remedying public health were some of the reform 
objectives to save and advance the nation, proposed by Günaltay. Religion and 
religious figures were the basic means to diffuse into the society and maintain these 
objectives. In compliance with Hamidian and CUP religious policies, this entailed 
sending of missionary troops to the countryside in order to render tashih-i akaid 
(correction of beliefs); educating the imams (mosque leaders) and vaizs (preachers); 
and converting heterodox communities to true Islam. This also comprised the -top 
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down model of- modernization of the subject population, which was perceived as an 
ignorant and docile mass by Günaltay, through the use of religion which had a strong 
social basis.  
The change in Günaltay‟s understanding of Islam into the Republican period 
also signifies the utility of the concept of true Islam. Günaltay conspicuously Turkified 
the notion of true Islam in his Maziden Atiye in 1923. In this book Turk‟s sade (simple) 
spirit was amalgamated with the sade essence of true Islam by Günaltay
548
. In this 
regard, he anachronically argued that Turks had met Islam before it was corrupted, and 
that its essence could easily fit with Turks‟ sublime spirit. Therefore the spirit of 
Turkness and Islam fused into each other; and superstitions deteriorated both true Islam 
and the high spirit of brave and active Turks. Thereby true Islam was given a Turkish 
ethos by Günaltay and even Islam acquired a secondary and complementing status in 
Günaltay‟s account. Moreover the disinfection of religion by the elimination of 
superstitions was declared as the most vital mission of the new established national 
state to provide the progress by Günaltay. Disinfection of religion would also align 
religion with its true nature which implied Islam as the Natural Religion. Namely, 
Islam as the Natural Religion was identified with Turkish spirit in order to fulfill 
political ends.  
This does not only display the change in Günaltay‟s intellectual outlook but also 
the accommodating nature of his understanding of Islam due to its substantive 
emptiness. This can also be ascribed to the deliberate ideological utility of the 
ambiguity and functionality of “true Islam”. This arbitrary use of the constructed ideal 
of Islam as a legitimating package by stretching the meanings of religious symbols can 
be searched in the policies of the CUP or Republic utilizing the social basis of Islamic 
symbols
549
. 
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IV.2.d. Where to Locate True Islam? 
Günaltay aspires to propose a universally applicable model of “natural religion” 
based on a singularly objective structure of knowledge similar to Kant‟s proposal of 
true religion containing some laws and regulations dependent upon “absolute 
knowledge”550. The worldview in which Günaltay‟s model of true Islam was framed 
was quite dependent on a rationalistic and scientific plane of epistemology and 
ontology. In other words, this Weltanschauung was a post-Cartesian “unilayered 
cognitive space” based on the supremacy of knowledge acquired through empirical 
ways and rational deduction. Therefore this unilayered framework had a monopolizing 
effect in terms of knowledge acquisition and reasoning
551
. In a related manner, 
Şemseddin Günaltay also understood the nature and universe through the lens of this 
new cognitive currency; namely, in a quite terrestrial plane, which implies a heavy 
dependency on the natural laws and cause-effect relationship. His understanding of the 
cosmos/nature fashioned under the influence of vitalist, vulgar materialist and 
evolutionary views fits to this unilayered discursive framework. In this sense, he 
extends the operations of the natural order into the social life in the form of social 
evolutionary and social Darwinist views. He questions and even belittles the presence 
of heavenly orders, supernatural phenomena or logical systems extending beyond the 
boundaries of natural laws and casual relations. In this regard, Günaltay‟s unitary 
cognitive model was quite discriminatory to differing beliefs, logics and 
Weltanschauungs referring to alternating forms/layers of realities and cosmologies, as 
was the case in Sufi practices or folk beliefs and customs. For example, Sufi methods 
of meditation, like spiritual knowledge, keşif  (discovery), ilham (inspiration) which 
can contradict with the ways of rational thinking or reaching to alternative levels of 
realities like in the seyr-i süluk were seen by Günaltay as unreliable, aberrant or even 
dangerous ways of knowledge. Trust in the occult powers both in transcendental forms 
and in the personality of sheikhs or saints was also similarly denied in an exclusionary 
manner by Günaltay. These methodologies or pedagogies were tested by Günaltay 
through the logic of the new frame of thought, tools of which were mainly attained 
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through interactive encounters with Western intellectual traditions. The result was 
typecasting of various folk beliefs as superstition or ignorance; and thus discriminating 
from the domains of Islam newly demarcated through the lens of a non-native form of 
thought. From this perspective, his exclusionary and essentialized interpretation of 
Islam seems to be forged within this singular and unilayered worldview using “one 
universal cognitive currency” which was “located within a single continuous logical 
space” as Gellner phrased, in order to explain the underpinning cognitive and 
epistemological ethos of secular modernity
552
. The normative ground furnished by this 
framework of thought I think became the ultimate indicator to determine good and bad 
in Günaltay‟s thought.  
The ambivalences and discrepancies in Günaltay‟s contemplation of Islam can 
be read as a sign of the epistemological split of his intellectual positioning from the 
traditional paradigm toward a new intellectual/cognitive setting. In this regard, 
Günaltay‟s transhistorical and abstract entity of Islam as a unifying principle is 
indicative of the paradigmatic change during the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century in the 
understanding and operation of Islam. What is fundamental to this transformation was 
the change in the operative role of Islam from its traditionally all-encompassing and 
underlying social niche to an essentialized and reified “natural religion” of 
Enlightenment within a new cognitive currency.  
In other words, Günaltay in conformity with the idea of the supremacy of 
science and reason viewed a unitary Islam through the lens of a rationalized and unified 
Weltanschauung. In this regard, his intellectual stance representing a new state of mind 
implies a more radical split from the traditional content of Islam compared to for 
example Namik Kemal. Young Ottomans also had similar views to Second 
Constitutional Period Islamists like returning to the original sources of Islam. Yet they 
were openly adhering to Islamic tenets and institutions like fiqh or Sharia in a more 
traditionally oriented manner compared to Günaltay and many of the Islamist 
intellectuals of his generation like Sehbenderzade Filibeli Ahmet Hilmi or Ismail Hakki 
Izmirli. Namik Kemal or Ali Suavi can be regarded in this respect as intellectuals in 
between the traditional Islamic social episteme and a newly emerging Weltanschauung. 
For example Namik Kemal was emphasizing that hundreds of years of evolvement of 
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Sharia through traditionally constituted channels of knowledge production was 
providing its very soundness and perfection. This perspective surely diverges from 
Günaltay‟s clear negation of the Islamic historical traditions as a source of 
degenerations and deviations in Islam.  Günaltay‟s definition of Islam is more in line 
with Hamidian regime‟s and CUP‟s authoritative and functionalist approach to religion 
while defining it as Islamic orthodoxy and exclusionary attitude to the heterodox 
religious elements and folk beliefs as well as their population management and 
conversion policies. They also share a singularized understanding of religion which 
was brought under a centralized and monopolized control of the state which is modern 
in nature and that makes claims on its population by control, supervision, and 
construction.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
This study attempted to analyze how the negating rhetoric on Sufi orders and 
superstitions was instrumentally utilized by Şemseddin Günaltay as an excluded 
category to portray true Islam. This study thus aimed to take a snapshot of the 
framework through which Islam was essentially and monolithically conceptualized in 
the Second Constitutional Period through preliminary observation of some of its basic 
manifestations. It was later argued in this work that Şemseddin Günaltay tried to 
superpose Islam with an essential and singularized thrust of rationalism and science as 
a “natural religion” in the Western Enlightenment sense. True Islam as a natural 
religion was conceived in Günaltay‟s thought to be a “privatized” religion concerning 
personal ethics and useful for social solidarity and keeping social morality. Therefore 
this study discussed that true Islam conception of Günaltay on the one hand turned 
Islam into an ambiguous and functional entity for various social ends like adjusting 
Islam to the necessities of the time, meeting the challenges leveled against Islam as 
well as devising some Islamic reform projects. On the other hand it signified the 
underlying transformations in the social, cognitive and mental states of the late 
Ottoman society.   
In order to understand Şemseddin Günaltay‟s contemplation of true Islam this 
study examined the newly emerging Weltanschauung and the new cast Islam acquired 
at the end of the 19
th
 and beginning of 20
th
 century of the Ottoman Empire.  
Therefore this study attempted to present a rough picture of the formation of a 
new Weltanschauung on the eve of the 20
th
 century in the Ottoman intellectual 
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landscape which resulted in the emergence of a new “cognitive currency”. The 
interactions with the Western culture and thought, education in the Tanzimat and 
especially Abdulhamid periods were some seminal developments of the 19
th
 century 
that made their imprint on the appearance of a progressive, forward-looking and 
“temporal” intellectual mind that highly respected science, reason, progress and natural 
laws and helped the creation of a more rationalized and standardized way of 
understanding the world, society and religion. The world was conceived by a 
generation of intellectuals in the last three decades of the Ottoman Empire proposing 
“temporally” regulated notions of progress and order with homogenous time and order 
and subject to systematic and indiscriminate laws. These helped to spin the intellectual 
and social fabric within which new Islamic understanding was given a shape. Upon this 
new cognitive currency Şemseddin Günaltay based his conception of true Islam. True 
Islam was thus assumed to be in conformity with science, reason and the demands of 
the time. It was also functionalized within a social Darwinist and this-worldly 
intellectual setting proposing an active and disciplined modern subject whose work was 
committed for this-worldly ends. This mental engagement also laid the ground to 
condemn and exclude epistemologies and ontologies that seemed to unfit the 
rationalistic, temporal and partly capitalistic social and intellectual codes. In this 
regard, Şemseddin Günaltay‟s contemplation of true Islam and superstitions and Sufism 
is indicative of the new state of mind and changing scale of priorities and values.  
This study also tried to provide a historical account of how the meanings and 
social operations related to Islam transmuted throughout the 19
th
 century in the central 
parts of the Ottoman Empire.  It was argued in this thesis that “newer” Islam which 
implied a partial break with the traditional Islamic culture had something to do with the 
19
th
 century transformations in the status of the Ottoman religious establishment. The 
weakening of the ulema‟s power and their disengagement from the administrative, legal 
and educational affairs/domains brought profound transformations into the Ottoman 
political, social and religious fabric. Islam gradually segregated to an autonomous 
sphere distinct from the political, economical and legal domains. Towards the end of 
the century, Islam in the Ottoman context came to be more of a theological matter of 
which pervasive influence on the political, economical, and even legal issues withered. 
This new form of Islam diverged from its historically formed, socially all-
encompassing traditional arrangement. Islam turned out more “religious” in the post-
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Enlightenment sense within “its self-delineated space”. This generated a certain degree 
of “reification” in the conceptualization of Islam which can be partially observed in the 
Islamic ideas of Young Ottomans and Hamidian official ideology. The cultural and 
civilizational component and essence of Islam came to be more and more emphasized 
over its ritualistic, disciplinary and socially imperative aspects. Therefore, a 
transcultural and transhistorical universal essence which was assumed to be in 
compliance with the necessities of the time was attributed to Islam. This brought a 
political and ideological instrumentality and monopolistic interpretation of Islam which 
was more manifest in Hamidian contemplation of the official “orthodox Islam”. This 
reified transhistorical and non-phenomenological Islamic understanding was surely a 
crucial transformation in the meaning and function of Islam. Şemseddin Günaltay‟s 
true Islam was indebted to these profound transmutations in the position and function 
of religion and the new configuration and conceptualization of Islam, especially during 
the Hamidian period. His ideas were also instrumentally analyzed in this study in order 
to take a snapshot of these transformations within the intellectual context of the Second 
Constitutional Period. 
On the other hand, it is argued in this study that in line with the Islamist trends 
of the Second Constitutional Period, Şemseddin Günaltay‟s social and political ideas 
about Islam, Sufism and reform were more or less contingently given shape in relation 
to the actualities and intellectual discussions of the Second Constitutional Period like 
the alarming disintegration of the empire. Therefore challenges facing Islam at the 
beginning of the 20
th
 century were also conducive to the configuration of the Islamist 
preoccupations and agendas of the Second Constitutional Period. Şemseddin Günaltay 
as an important figure of this period revealed these contextual marks. Moreover, the 
imprint of Islamic modernist and Salafi ideas can be overtly distinguished in 
Şemseddin Günaltay‟s thought. Especially, his rationalized and scientific understanding 
of true Islam and his exclusionary rhetoric on Sufi orders and superstitions reflect the 
direct impacts of Afghani and Abduh‟s Islamic modernism. Then this study tried to 
analyze the very dispositions of Şemseddin Günaltay‟s thought against the background 
of these formative influences.  
In order to understand true Islam and how it was configured, this study focused 
on how superstitions and Sufi orders/belief/practices were elaborated in Şemseddin 
Günaltay‟s overall thinking. Concerning Günaltay‟s use of superstitions, this study has 
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come to the conclusion that superstition had been an umbrella term of which 
boundaries were not clearly cut and thus consisted of various forms of so-called “un-
Islamic” practices and beliefs represented as “totally evil” out of the truthful core of 
Islam. Therefore this study aimed to analyze how the superstition rhetoric in its relation 
to the notions of ignorance, laziness, reason and science had been instrumentalized in 
Günaltay‟s contemplation in order to construct the imaginary category of true Islam.  
In Günaltay‟s view superstitions were the biggest disease of the Islamic society 
causing ignorance, passivity, inertia and thus decline in the Muslim world. They were 
depicted in an organicist frame of thinking as pathological elements killing the Islamic 
truths and the “spirit” of Muslim societies. In this frame of thought Günaltay 
“diagnosed” ignorance, the intrusion of ungrounded beliefs, practices and myths from 
various cultures into Islam and the syncretism as the cause of superstitions. As a result, 
he proposed the eradication of superstitions through “proper” religious education and 
instruction of modern knowledge and sciences. The rhetoric of superstitions was also 
associated with the imagery of Muslim societies as inert and inactive and hence weak 
and backward. Günaltay established a dichotomy between passivity and activity and 
realigned various Islamic values and concepts while promoting activeness against 
passivity. On the one hand, hardworking, activeness and wealth accumulation were 
prioritized as fundamental virtues of true Islam; on the other hand, values like 
resignation from the world, acquiescence, patience and humbleness were negatively 
reinterpreted out of their traditional contexts and downgraded in Günaltay‟s narrative. 
In this thought, the material progress and worldly welfare prevailed over the 
otherworldliness which according to Günaltay led Muslim‟s to passivity, resignation 
from the world; and thus resulted in Muslim decline. Laziness and passivity became an 
instrumental “evil” in this social Darwinist and organicist mentality in order to 
illuminate “true Islam” in line with activeness, material progress and capitalist spirit. 
The temporal understanding of religion and life in Günaltay‟s thought resulted in 
construction of an idea of active individual who would be industrious, and have an 
entrepreneur spirit and self-confidence.  
Without a comprehensive theoretical or methodological analysis or a definition 
of superstitions, the notion of superstition is used by Günaltay to arbitrarily determine 
all sorts of divergences from true Islam. This study argued that this ambiguity of the 
use of superstitions had two practical outcomes in Günaltay‟s thought: first, 
158 
 
determining the deviations from the true religion and causes of decline in Islamic 
societies. Second, by arbitrarily excluding or including some fragments of culture 
related to belief, delimiting an essentialized category of true Islam explicitly against 
superstitions.  
Unlike superstitions and folk beliefs, Şemseddin Günaltay did not denounce 
Sufism as the ultimate negative other of his essential true Islam but Sufi orders were 
portrayed as the agent for the emergence of superstitions by Günaltay. In this respect, 
Sufi orders became more instrumental in the institutional level of Günaltay‟s analysis 
to crystallize a category of superstitions. The criticism directed against Sufism in 
Günaltay‟s thought paid particular attention to the institutional and practical 
deteriorations in tekkes and tarikats, instead of a philosophical or theological debate on 
authenticity of Sufism in Islam. In this narrative, lodges were pictured as the locus of 
passivity and laziness and the sheikhs and dervishes as the propagator of superstitions 
and ignorance in the Muslim world. According to Günaltay, Sufi orders had swerved 
away from their historical missions of enlightening people, consolidating social order, 
providing solidarity and strengthening the morality in society. However, although 
during the late Ottoman period he advocated the view that tekkes and tarikats were in 
need of an urgent reform, in the Republican era he argued that the Sufi orders had 
completed their missions and became harmful to the society; and therefore he defended 
their abolishment. Similar to his distinction between real and corrupt Islam, he 
separates between the categories of “true Sufism” that was left in the golden age of 
Islam and “corrupt Sufism” that contemporarily prevailed. In other words, Sufism as an 
ideal methodology and institution might have been included into his idealized 
conception of true Islam but current condition of Sufi lodges and orders were 
completely incongruous to this true Islam.  
As a result, this study discussed that the conception of Günaltay‟s true Islam as 
a “transhistorical and transcultural phenomenon” was constructed in contrast to the 
historically and culturally embedded category of lived/local/folk Islam. Günaltay‟s 
emphasis on folk beliefs, superstitions and some Sufi rites and beliefs as the historically 
and culturally deviated “other” of true Islam was forged vis-à-vis the actualities of his 
time and various power relations. In one level, this dichotomy was rhetorically used to 
cope with the Western challenges leveled against Islam by safeguarding original Islam 
from any charges of corruption. In another level, it was functional to address an essence 
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of Islam totally compatible with the “necessities” of the modern times: reason, science 
and progress.  
In this frame of thinking, the main concern according to Günaltay was the 
incongruity of popular beliefs, superstitions or Sufi practices with scientific knowledge 
and rational thinking. Popular beliefs and superstitions were represented by Günaltay as 
totally discordant to ideals of free thinking, objective knowledge, empiricism and 
internal logical coherence. By excluding popular beliefs, superstitions or Sufi practices 
from the imagined autonomous field of true Islam, the elements in Islamic tradition 
incompatible with the findings of natural sciences and reason would be eliminated and 
thus the full convenience of Islam with science and reason would be proved. As a 
result, rationality and science became indispensable components of the so-called “true 
Islam” of Şemseddin Günaltay as the authority to interpret religious/worldly matters. 
However, this approach overlooked the rationale and practicalities and methodologies 
of folk beliefs and narrowed down and dominated the valid forms of traditional Islamic 
epistemologies in line with Günaltay‟s agenda.  
Moreover, in order to ensure this compatibility, the meanings of Islamic 
concepts like tevekkül, meskenet, aql or ilim were redefined; and the hierarchies of 
values in the classical Islamic understanding like hardworking or ascetism were 
reconfigured in Günaltay‟s model of Islam. In this regard this study argued that 
Günaltay had stretched the basic tenets and concepts of “traditional Islam” in order to 
devise his “purified” and “reified” concept of “true Islam” in accordance with modern 
sciences and rationality. In this scheme of thinking Islam would not only be exempt 
from any negativity, but would also contain all the positive values of the day and would 
be open to “progressive” developments according to Günaltay. This new ambiguous 
perception of Islam as a universal framework of positivity is more likely to be useful 
for political ends, instead of a concern for theoretical and theological methodology.  
Günaltay‟s unitary cognitive model was quite discriminatory to differing 
beliefs, logics, pedagogies and disciplinary methods referring to alternating 
forms/layers of realities and cosmologies, as was the case in Sufi practices or folk 
beliefs and customs. These methodologies and Weltanschauungs were tested by 
Günaltay through the logic of the new cognitive currency and were thus discriminated 
by being typecast as superstition or ignorance from the domains of Islam newly 
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demarcated through the lens of the new Weltanschauung. From this perspective, his 
exclusionary and essentialized interpretation of Islam seems to be forged within the 
singular and unilayered worldview using “one universal cognitive currency”.  
This study also argued that Şemseddin Günaltay‟s true Islam had been devised 
as a “natural religion” of which moral and social functional aspects were overstressed. 
To Günaltay original Islam was a sade (simple) and natural religion that would respond 
to the natural dispositions and necessities of people but it was made complicated by the 
intrusion of various practices, cultural habits and superstitions by the time past. In this 
contemplation of natural religion, Islam was divorced from its disciplinary practices 
and socially obligating aspects. These were replaced by morality and personal ethics as 
the central tenets of Islam, and religion was reduced into a “private” matter concerning 
the personal conscience. In the social level, true Islam as a natural religion was 
conceived through the lens of Durkhemian sociology as a solidarist system providing 
social harmony and keeping social morality and order. This new casting of Islam was 
also highly convenient with the CUP reforms of religion after 1915 and Republican 
ideal of religion as a private matter. Moreover, a Turkish ethos was amalgamated with 
the simple and homogenous essence of true Islam in Günaltay‟s account. Günaltay 
conspicuously Turkified the notion of true Islam in his Maziden Atiye in 1923 and 
Islam as the Natural Religion was identified with Turkish spirit in order to fulfill 
political ends. The change in the conceptualization of Islam surely signaled a 
functionalist understanding of religion which was quite different than the traditional 
Islam.  
In this regard, Günaltay‟s transhistorical and abstract entity of Islam as a 
unifying principle is indicative of the paradigmatic change during the 19
th
 and early 
20
th
 century in the understanding and operation of Islam. What is fundamental to this 
transformation was the change in the operative role of Islam from its traditionally all-
encompassing and underlying social niche to an essentialized and reified “natural 
religion” of European Enlightenment thought within a new cognitive currency. This 
study argued that Günaltay‟s understanding of Islam furnished by this framework of 
thought was indicative of both the changing framework in which Islam was understood 
and conceptualized, and the Weltanschauung that this framework was constituted 
within the late Ottoman intellectual context.  
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The homogenous and unifying aspect of true Islam was also practical to 
construct a more simple, coherent and comprehensible totality of Islam as a formulaic, 
and malleable categorization. This enabled Günaltay to strategically use the concept to 
include or exclude social practices/beliefs, in line with their rationality or worldly 
advantages. The functional homogenization of true Islam was ready to be used in the 
service of politics for bringing religion under central state control and for reform 
projects targeting a large national population. Educating the population in recent 
sciences and knowledge, saving people from superstitions and wrong convictions; 
removing poverty and misery, and remedying public health were some of the reform 
objectives to save and advance the nation, proposed by Günaltay. Religion and 
religious figures were the most convenient agents to fulfill these social and political 
objectives. This arbitrary use of the constructed ideal of Islam as a legitimating package 
by stretching the meanings of religious symbols can be searched in the policies of the 
CUP or Republic utilizing the social basis of Islamic symbols.  
Against this background, Günaltay can be seen as an intellectual 
accommodating to the changing sociopolitical necessities of his time with a mélange of 
Islamic ideas and ideological/intellectual tools of his time derived from the new system 
of universal cognitive currency. In this regard, Günaltay‟s conception of Islam 
decontextualized from its cultural and historical setting can be comprehended both as 
an outcome of this transition and as a response to adapt this transformation.  
In sum, beyond Günaltay‟s intellectual personality this study conceived 
Günaltay‟s ideas on Sufism and superstition and conception of true Islam as discursive 
dispositions that can be traced in the intellectual circles of the Second Constitutional 
Period. In this respect, the scrutiny of Günaltay‟s ideas has been deemed as an 
important task by this study in order to provide a general picture of these discourses. 
However, it should be admitted that methodologically a wholesale grasp of these 
discursive dispositions is far beyond the scope and mission of this study. This study 
also cannot -and does not aim to- provide an account of the inroads of these discourses 
into the Republican period both in the official discourses and in the popular level due to 
the extensive demands of such a research and the limited scope of this study. Therefore 
this thesis tried to bring out a modest and limited cross-section of anti-Sufi and anti-
superstition discourses and concept of true Islam with their political and social 
outcomes through Günaltay‟s vision and intellectual/political position. This endeavor 
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was juxtaposed with the task of taking a snapshot of the changing lanes of the concept 
of religion during the Second Constitutional Period.  
Concomitantly, we can think of Günaltay as a prominent intellectual and 
political actor of the new emerging public spaces contributing to the construction of 
anti-Sufi and anti-superstition rhetoric as well as monopolizing and homogenizing 
discourses of Islam. In this context it might be reminded that these discourses were 
shared within the political circles and hence by the Young Turk elite and were 
occasionally utilized by the CUP policies related to the social effectiveness of religion. 
These discourses were also inherited by the Republican regime and its official 
ideology. A more radical vision of Sufi orders and superstitions can be witnessed in the 
ideas of the Republican elite. It would not be inaccurate to assume Şemseddin Günaltay 
as an agent for the conduction of anti-Sufi and anti-superstition discourses into the 
Republican official ideology and popular public discourses through state‟s ideological 
apparatuses, thanks to his active involvement in the production of official historical and 
social ideological materials. A closer scrutiny of the ideas of Republican elite or 
textbooks of religion and history courses might provide with sufficient knowledge of 
the continuities of mentioned discourses into the Republican period. Official state 
department of religion, Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi (Chairmanship of Religious Affairs) 
conducted a comprehensive research of superstitions in the local contexts in 2005. One 
issue of Diyanet‟s monthly journal (Diyanet Aylik Dergi)553 in June, 2006 was 
dedicated to the study of superstitions with a similar anti-superstition discourse of 
Şemseddin Günaltay. These are few examples of the contemporary manifestations of 
anti-superstition discourses that reflect the current weight of these discourses and the 
preoccupation of the state to control and supervise the sanctioned religion. These 
examples need further examination that reaches beyond the limits of this study. 
Nevertheless, these examples are indicative of the contemporary prevalence of the 
rhetoric on superstitions and Sufi orders as well as the domineering endeavors to 
demarcate the religion that extend beyond the timespan of Second Constitutional 
Period.  
 
                                                 
553 Diyanet Aylik Dergi, 186 (June, 2006: Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi Yayinlari).  
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